Comparative District Conflict and Security Assessment Report For Baidoa 2013/2015
Comparative District Conflict and Security Assessment Report for Baidoa District 2013/2015
Introduction

Since its establishment in 2009 the Observatory of Conflict and Violence Prevention\(^1\) (OCVP) has worked with local and international stakeholders to measure and evaluate progress in peace-building and state-building in all regions of Somaliland and Somalia. In an effort aimed at supporting evidence-led policy formulation and programming, the OCVP regularly undertakes district level data collection efforts for research publications. The District Conflict and Security Assessment (DCSA) Reports are OCVP’s flagship publications.

The DCSA is, in fact, designed to serve as a tool to regularly gather and analyse community perceptions on the providers and delivery of services related to security, justice and governance; as well as examining the drivers of local conflict in the district. These types of regular assessments are therefore critical, not only to the development and implementation of new evidence-based programmes and sound policies, but also in providing an important tool for the continued monitoring and evaluation of the relative success or failure of existing efforts at the district level.

While the continual assessment of issues regarding justice, governance and security is critical for the formulation of sound policies and interventions - equally important is the generation of data that compares year-over-year trends in order to shed light on what may be working, and what may not be working, in a particular target district. Through the support of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) for Somalia and later the United Kingdom’s Department for International Development (DFID) as well, the OCVP was able to conduct district level assessments in Baidoa District during the years of 2013 (wave 1) and 2015 (wave 2). The purpose of this report is to compare key results of the assessments conducted during the two periods.

District Profile

Baidoa (Baydhabo) is the capital of the Bay Region of Somalia. It is situated approximately 247 kilometres northwest of Mogadishu and shares its borders with the Gedo, Bakol, Lower Shabelle, and Middle Jubba regions. Four main quarters or sub-divisions: Isha, Berdale, Horseed and Hawl Wadaag were sampled in both waves. The main inhabitants of the district are the Rahanweyn clan, which comprises the Digil and Mirifle Somali sub-clans.

The city of Baidoa serves as one of the main economic centres in Southern Somalia. Significant trade is conducted in livestock, cereals (local and imported), and non-food items. Livestock are transported from surrounding districts in the Bay region and other neighbouring regions to Baidoa, which is a transit point for cattle trade to Kenya’s main livestock market, Garissa. Baidoa is also the main sorghum trading market in the area and supplies the southern and north-eastern regions of Somalia along with parts of Ethiopia and Kenya. Other economic activities in the town include small, medium and large businesses, casual labour, and self-employment. However, the protracted conflicts in the country impeded the district’s ability to fully utilize its rich resources.

In 2006, Baidoa became the nation’s provisional capital. Al Shabaab then took control of the city for three years from 2009 to 2012 before being driven out by Transitional Federal Government (TFG), which was heavily backed by the Ethiopian Army. An advance joint-contingent of Ugandan and Burundian soldiers serving along with the African Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) was deployed to

\(^1\) Website: [www.ocvp.org](http://www.ocvp.org)
Baidoa in April 2012 and remains stationed in the surrounding area and the Baidoa airstrip. Subsequent to the departure of the Ethiopian National Defence Forces from some of the areas in Baidoa in July 2013, Quick Response Forces (QRF) were established by AMISOM. These forces patrol the town at night and are on standby for reinforcement in the event of an attack.

The administration of the Bay region is comprised of a Governor, a Deputy Governor and a District Commissioner.

**Methodology and Possible Limitations**

The wave 1 and wave 2 assessments for Baidoa were conducted in 2013 and 2015 respectively. The two assessments employed a mixed method research approach that included both quantitative (household surveys) and qualitative (focus group discussions and key informant interviews) means to collect public perception on the state of security, justice, governance as well as general stability of the district. However, it is should be noted that the Wave 2 assessment was carried out with the use of a number of improved research tools and techniques that included:

- a) Updated questionnaires that avoided some of the ambiguity and vague questions that were identified in the 2013 assessment were used in the 2015 research activities.
- b) Improved research questions – for both qualitative and quantitative data - were reworked to better complement each other and generate in-depth information on the topic; something that was not the case with the 2013 research questions.
- c) Smart-phones with mobile data collection software developed by Open Data Kit (ODK) were used by the enumerators to administer the 2015 survey, while in 2013 conventional paper and pen quantitative data collection methods were employed.

While these changes resulted in an improvement in the quality of the data collected, it is essential to recognise that they are likely to have had an adverse impact on the ability and confidence with which one can compare the two datasets. With this in mind, the data obtained in the two assessments can provide some indication of potential changing trends in the areas covered.

**Survey Participants**

The wave 1 assessment comprised a sample of 239 respondents, while the wave 2 assessment comprised a similar sample of 240 respondents for the household survey. The following presents an overview of the demographic profile of respondents for each assessment.

- **Gender**

With respect to gender, while a greater proportion of female respondents were interviewed in wave 1 (female: 55%, male: 45%), during wave 2 assessment the gender composition was almost equal with 49% of the respondents being female and 51% male. See figure 1 and Table 1.
Figure 1: Distribution of respondents by gender

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Wave 1</th>
<th>Wave 2</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>45%</td>
<td>51%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>55%</td>
<td>49%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Male | Female
--- | ---
Wave 1 | 132 | 107 | 239
Wave 2 | 123 | 117 | 240

Table 1: Number of participants by gender

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Participants’ gender</th>
<th>Wave 1</th>
<th>Wave 2</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>132</td>
<td>123</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>107</td>
<td>117</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>239</td>
<td>240</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- **Age**

There were notable variations in the age distribution of respondents in the wave 1 and wave 2 assessments, particularly in the 20-29 (wave 1: 41% vs. wave 2: 24%) and 40-49 (wave 1: 4% vs. wave 2: 27%) year age categories. Variations in the other age categories were within +/- 5 percentage points between the two waves. (Fig. 2.)

Figure 2: Respondents’ age groups

- **Marital Status**

Those who reported to be married represented the majority of the respondents in both waves. However, there was an increase in the proportion of married respondents from 54% in wave 1 to 73% in wave 2. In line with this, there was a reduction in the proportion of single respondents between the two waves, with the proportion falling from 24% in wave 1 to 11% in wave 2. There was also a slight reduction in the proportion of divorced respondents from 13% in wave 1 to 7% in wave 2, while the proportion of widowed respondents remained at 9% for both assessments (Fig. 3).
Perceived Performance of Security, Justice and Governance Providers

The two District Conflict and Security Assessments sought to record community perceptions of the deployment, performance, preference and perception of both formal and informal providers of security, justice, and governance, such as the police, courts, local government authorities, community elders and religious authorities. The assessments also sought to investigate respondents’ experience with local conflict and their perception of safety within their communities.

**Governance Providers**

During the wave 1 assessment, the local council in Baidoa consisted of the remains of the local council that was nominated in 2005 by clan elders under the ambit of the Transitional Federal Government (TFG). After the capture of Baidoa by Al-Shabaab in 2009, this Council fell as many of the councilors resigned, while others fled the city. After the reclamation of the city by the Federal Government (FG) supported by AMISOM in 2012, a few of these councilors returned and ostensibly resumed their roles as councillors. Their office tenure subsequently came to an end but was extended by a decree from the Federal Government; however, still half of the 2005 councilors did not return to office.²

The Wave 2 assessment was conducted in the wake of the establishment of the Interim South West Administration (ISWA), a member of the Federal State. The new political change ushered in leadership changes in the town as the Federal Government’s Ministry of Interior reappointed the former mayor as the interim mayor for a period of six months. This was followed by a discussion, between the mayor, the regional administration and the residents of Baidoa, to establish a new local council. The outcome was the nomination of an interim council consisting of 10 councilors representing the different clans in Baidoa.³

² *Baidoa Mayor, Key Informant Interview, December 2013*
³ *Baidoa Mayor, Key Informant Interview, May 2015*
The awareness of the presence of the local council among household survey respondents doubled in the period between the two assessments; increasing from 44% in the wave 1 assessment to 86% in wave 2 (Fig. 4). Awareness of the council was also low among focus group discussants in wave 1.

Figure 4: Awareness of Governance Providers

- **Participation in Local Government Consultations**

Despite the increased awareness of the council in wave 2, the level of participation in local council meetings was similar between the two waves (wave 1: 7% and wave 2: 8%). However, at the time of the wave 2 assessment, the Mayor explained that there were systems in place to facilitate communication between the local council and the community. There were committees at the village level, with members who were nominated and selected on a clan basis in order to ensure that each clan was represented. These committees were purported to utilise face-to-face discussions as the main channel of communication with the community. Based on the Mayor’s account, there were meetings between the Mayor and the village heads on an ongoing basis so the Mayor could receive feedback on current activities, security, and any other areas of concern.4

Figure 5: Participation in local government consultations

- **Perception of the Local Council**

Among those who were aware of the council in wave 1, a few were of the opinion that its performance was unsatisfactory. To support this point, youth discussants stated that social services, such as water and electricity, which were usually associated with the council, were now being provided by private

---

4 Baidoa Mayor, Key Informant Interview, May 2015
companies and that people generally found their own means of garbage collection. At the time, the Mayor argued that the Local Councillors worked on providing service in the areas of security and social services, such as support to prisons. However, he pointed out that collection of taxes and tariffs would have been the main sources of revenue for the council but this was hampered by the absence of taxation and tariff acts. The council was therefore unable to generate the required revenues for service provision. In addition, the unreliable state of security in the district was also said to interfere with the council’s ability to provide services to the community.

The local government appeared to fare better with respect to revenue collection in wave 2. The relevant acts had still not been implemented, but the Mayor spoke of vehicle drivers being charged at the town check points and other governance providers mentioned the collection of revenues from the community. This presented another challenge in that the revenues were at times collected by force and use of weapons, thereby leading to mistrust of the council who were regarded as being ineffective. Governance providers, however, blamed their performance on the state of security. They noted that although efforts were underway to make all areas of the district secure, this had not yet been successful. Another obstacle that the Council faced was the influence of clan power sharing, particularly at the district level where each authority represents a clan and would seek to promote their clan’s interests.

• **Opinions Regarding the Importance of Elected Local Officials**

Though since the collapse of the central government, the local officials were nominated, the opinions on the importance of elected officers was high across the two waves, despite a slight decline in the proportion of respondents who agreed (wave 1: 93%; wave 2: 86%). As mentioned previously, the clan-based nomination system was considered to have negative impact on performance of the local council. The local councillors were nominated according to clan quotas for power-sharing purposes, rather than because of their individual qualifications, and most were thought to lack the required level of education and expertise in the relevant areas. Even those among the community elders and religious leaders argued that elections are important as they ensure that those in office are accountable to the electorate. However, they suggested that while citizens may want an elected administration and local council, security is a pressing need, as it would be fundamental to ensure that the elections are carried out correctly.

---

5 *Baidoa Youth*, Focus Group Discussion, May 2013  
6 *Baidoa Mayor*, Key Informant Interview, December 2013  
8 Baidoa Mayor, Key Informant Interview, May 2015  
9 *Local Governance Providers*, Focus Group Discussion, May 2015  
11 *Baidoa Elders and Religious Leaders*, Focus Group Discussion, May 2015  
12 Ibid
When asked to state the main issues facing the community, unemployment and the poor economy were identified as the main challenges during both assessments. However, in wave 2, matters pertaining to health replaced insecurity as one of the three leading areas of concern. Nonetheless, insecurity remained one of the main concerns and was frequently mentioned by discussants in both assessments.

The fear of Al-Shabaab was identified as the main cause of insecurity. The youth lamented frequent killings, especially targeting educated youth who worked with the government or other organisations. Local government officials also stated that civil servants were a primary target of Al Shabaab. As a result, some were afraid to take up employment due to the fear of being targeted. Participants in the governance providers’ group added that the situation had affected the economy of the district as many businesses had been closed due to the state of insecurity. Women noted that men and women were equally affected and that although the land is fertile, people were unable to farm because of they were afraid of leaving the town. This made it difficult to trade their produce as there was no market and frequent roadblocks complicated the matter of business. Furthermore, unemployed youth were vulnerable to recruitment by Al-Shabaab as this was one of the few sources of income that was available to them. The high rate of unemployment also led to migration being regarded as a viable alternative among the youth, as some sought to migrate via the desert or the sea in search of a better life.

Nepotism was identified as another challenge facing the community. In some cases, clan links were said to be required in order to obtain employment. There were claims that tribal power dominated the local administration. Women argued that there was poor management and leadership as well as frequent internal disputes, which in turn created an additional obstacle to the delivery of services. The justice providers pointed out that, while people paid taxes, this did not translate into the much

---

14 Youth, Focus Group Discussion, May 2015
15 Women, Focus Group Discussion, May 2015
17 Youth, Focus Group Discussion, May 2015
18 Ibid
needed services, such as roads being built, water resources being made available, or health being improved for the poor population.

With respect to health, discussants were concerned that there were not enough qualified doctors in the area and most emergency cases were transferred to Mogadishu.\(^{19}\) Local government representatives confirmed this, stating that the city had only one public hospital, which was unable to meet the needs of the local community due to the lack of qualified doctors and insufficient medicines. There was a small private hospital, but many persons were unable to pay for its services.\(^{20}\) Women also pointed out that the city was in need of mother and child care centres.

### Justice Providers

As with all other Somali regions, justice provision in Baidoa is characterised by the presence of both formal and informal actors. The formal justice system relies on statutory laws as passed by the parliament and enforced by state institutions (the police, courts and the prison service) and operates alongside an informal justice system built upon Somali inter-clan customary law (Xeer) and Shari’ah law.

- **Awareness of the Court**

Most respondents in the Baidoa household survey acknowledged the presence of a functioning court in the district during both assessments. However, the proportion of respondents who indicated that they were aware of the court fell from 85% in wave 1 to 76% in wave 2. This was accompanied by a sizeable increase in the proportion of respondents who stated that they did not know whether a functioning court did exist, rising from a marginal 2% in wave 1 to 19% in wave 2 (Figure 7). The court in Baidoa had three levels – the district court, regional court and court of appeal. At the time of the wave 1 assessment, there was no official office for the courts, which had to make use of two rooms at the police centre.\(^{21}\) There had been no change in this situation in the period between both assessments. Furthermore, the security of the area affected the performance of the public institutions, including the courts. The assassination of the District Court Commissioner who was interviewed in wave 1 is a further manifestation of the risk faced by the judicial staff.

---

21 Baidoa Justice Providers, Focus Group Discussion, December 2013
Use of Justice Providers

Traditional elders remained the entity that was most utilised by respondents for matters of justice during both assessments. The proportion of respondents who stated that they had utilised the services of traditional elders for matters of justice in the 12 months preceding the assessment remained constant at 26% in wave 1 and in wave 2. During wave 1, religious leaders and the courts had also been utilised for matters of justice by 23% and 21% of respondents respectively. However, unlike the use of traditional elders, which remained fairly constant, use of the other two entities declined in wave 2, in which 15% of respondents stated that they had utilised religious leaders and 12% stated that they had utilised the courts for matters of justice during the reference period. See Figure 8.

Similar issues had been referred to each justice provider by respondents who had utilised their services in both assessments. In wave 1, the mentioned issues were land/water disputes, household violence, and robbery. These issues were also mentioned in wave 2 along with business disputes, assault, and matters relating to youth violence. The only type of case which was unique to a particular justice provider was rape, which only one respondent in wave 2 identified as an issue that was referred to the court.

Perception of Justice Providers

Discussants in the wave 1 assessment stated that the community culturally owes its respect to the traditional elders and religious leaders. The services of these informal providers had been widely used over the two decades when the absence of a viable central government affected all government institutions, including the formal justice system. Furthermore, the court was criticised for delays in judgments and lack of enforcement.22

There was no indication of an improvement in the perceptions of the various justice providers during the wave 2 assessment. In addition to the issues cited in wave 1, the court was portrayed as being ineffective, with several of the cases that the court failed to resolve being referred to religious leaders.23 Discussants in wave 2 also regarded the court as being costly, allegedly on account of its susceptibility to corruption, thereby reducing its accessibility and public confidence. In particular, members of the IDP community were of the opinion that there was “...no public access to justice, and

---

22 Ibid
23 Informal Justice Providers, Focus Group Discussion, May 2015
those who do have access to the justice system are those who can afford to pay enough money to see their cases opened.”

They added that, “Traditional systems are cheaper than the formal one, more easily available, and faster while dealing with cases.” Consequently, “most people prefer to see their issues solved in traditional ways, by referring their cases to justice providers such as religious leaders or traditional elders.” Not surprisingly, therefore, the formal court had been least utilised for matters of justice during both assessments.

Figure 8: Use of justice providers

- Most Trusted Justice Provider

Religious leaders maintained their position as the most trusted justice provider during both assessments, as indicated by similar proportions of approximately two in every five respondents (wave 1: 40%; wave 2: 42%). During wave 1, the court followed closely, having been identified as the most trusted justice provider by 38% of respondents, while traditional elders were most trusted by 23%. Wave 2, however, saw a decline in the level of trust in the courts relative to the other justice providers whereby the proportion of respondents who identified the court as their most trusted justice provider was nearly halved to 20%. Similar to religious leaders, the elders also saw a marginal 2% increase in the proportion of respondents who trusted them most for matters of justice in wave 2 (23%), while ‘other’ providers, such as local security guards, which had not been mentioned at all during wave 1 were mentioned by a small proportion of respondents in wave 2. See Figure 9.

---

24 Internally Displaced Persons, Focus Groups Discussion, May 2015
25 Ibid
26 Ibid
When asked to state reasons for their choice of most trusted justice provider, respondents cited similar reasons for selection of each. The reason that was mentioned most frequently for selection of each of the preferred justice providers during both assessments was fair judgments. Table 2 illustrates.

Consistent with the results of the household survey, discussants in wave 1 collectively identified informal justice providers as their most trusted justice provider ahead of the courts during both assessments. Religious leaders or Shari’ah Office were favourably regarded as they were perceived as being incorrupt, insusceptible to bribes, and able to issue judgments in a timely manner. In contrast, the formal justice system was regarded as being incompetent and corrupt. However, few discussants argued that the court was more privileged than the informal justice providers as they had the legal power to enforce judgments. Business leaders argued that the religious leaders settle less divisive cases in which the conflicting sides pledged to accept the final judgment and elders pledged to enforce the judgment. They noted that otherwise, the case should be referred to the formal courts.

Youth in the wave 2 assessment summarised the general opinion regarding justice provision:

The traditional justice system is most trusted within our community. The formal justice system is highly corrupt, while the traditional one is mostly based on clan norms and regulations, and is generally dedicated to defend the privilege of clan members. ...the traditional justice system is more likely [to be] successful in solving existing problems, and requires less time than the formal system.

Table 2: Reasons for choice of most trusted justice provider

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reasons for choice of most trusted justice provider</th>
<th>The Court</th>
<th>Traditional Elders</th>
<th>Religious Leaders</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fast decisions</td>
<td>Wave 1</td>
<td>Wave 2</td>
<td>Wave 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fair judgments</td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>11%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independence from politics</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>18%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

27 Women, Focus Group Discussion, December 2013
28 Youth, Focus Group Discussion, December 2013
29 Burao Business Leaders, Focus Group Discussion, December 2013
Reasons for choice of most trusted justice provider

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reason</th>
<th>The Court Wave 1</th>
<th>Wave 2</th>
<th>Traditional Elders Wave 1</th>
<th>Wave 2</th>
<th>Religious Leaders Wave 1</th>
<th>Wave 2</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Less costly</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ease of access</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More reliable</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Base</strong></td>
<td><strong>90</strong></td>
<td><strong>46</strong></td>
<td><strong>45</strong></td>
<td><strong>54</strong></td>
<td><strong>96</strong></td>
<td><strong>101</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- **Confidence in the Formal Justice System**

In addition to the decline in respondents’ trust in the court relative to other providers, there was also an overall decline in the proportion of respondents who indicated that they were very confident or fairly confident in the formal justice system. Approximately 30% of respondents stated that they were very confident or fairly confident in the formal justice system during the wave 2 assessment compared with an overwhelming majority of 90% in the previous assessment. More specifically, it is noteworthy that while the majority of respondents were able to state that they were very confident in the formal justice system during wave 1, only 9% had a similar perception in wave 2. Furthermore, the proportion of respondents who stated outright that they were not confident in the formal justice system increased substantially from 6% in Wave to 50% in Wave 2. Figure 10 illustrates.

**Figure 10: Confidence in the formal justice system**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Wave 2</th>
<th>9%</th>
<th>21%</th>
<th>50%</th>
<th>21%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Wave 1</td>
<td>63%</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Security Providers**

The Police, along with troops from the Somali National Army (SNA), the National Intelligence Security Agency (NISA), and the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) were together responsible for security in the district of Baidoa. These providers of security had different mandates as well as different lines of communication and authority. The Federal Government of Somalia (FGS), AMISOM and the Interim South West Administration (ISWA, which was established in November 2014 subsequent to the 2013 DCSA), were the main authorities responsible for overseeing the operations of the formal security providers. Traditional leaders, including elders and religious leaders, neighbourhood watch groups (madani), and the wider community also provided support to the security providers where possible.

At the time of the wave 1 assessment in 2013, Baidoa had two police stations. However, the Police Commissioner was of the opinion that the number of police stations was inadequate given the size
and needs of the local population. Other discussants also argued that the number of police stations as well as the number of police officers was insufficient for efficient security provision. The number of police stations remained the same during the wave 2 assessment, but there was mention of two additional police posts in the town. Nonetheless, there was still concern that the number of police was inadequate to meet the needs of the local population. This was not only due to the number of police officers that were deployed, but was also impacted by the capabilities of the serving police officers. The Police Commissioner stated explicitly that:

*There are not enough police officers. We are only 70 officers, of which 20 are over age, and cannot participate in operations and patrolling, and thus spend most of the time at the police station. In relation to the population and geographical extension of the city the number is insufficient, and this shortage prevents us from patrolling at night.*

### Awareness of the Police

Despite complaints about the number of police officers, the police presence was widely acknowledged by respondents in both wave 1 and wave 2 (93% and 89% respectively). However, there was a slight decline in awareness in wave 2. This was accompanied by an increase in the proportion of respondents who indicated that they were uncertain about whether the police were present in the area (from none in Wave 1 to 6% in Wave 2) as well as a marginal decline in the proportion who stated outright that there was no police in the district (7% in Wave 1; 5% in Wave 2). See Figure 11.

**Figure 11: Awareness of the police presence**

![Awareness of the police presence chart](chart)

### Preference for Reporting of Civil Matters, Petty Crimes and Serious Crimes

There was an overall decline in respondents’ inclination to call on the police relative to other security providers. The police was identified as respondents’ preferred choice for reporting petty crimes and serious crimes in both the wave 1 and wave 2 assessments. However, while the police was identified as the preferred entity for reporting civil matters in wave 1, elders surpassed the police as the leading choice in this regard during wave 2. The proportion of respondents who stated that they would prefer to report civil matters and petty crimes to the police also fell during this period. In addition, local

---

30 *Baidoa Police Commissioner, Key Informant Interview, December 2013*

31 *Baidoa Police Commissioner, Key Informant Interview, May 2015*

32 *Baidoa Women, Focus Group Discussion, May 2015*

33 *Baidoa Police Commissioner, Key Informant Interview, May 2015*
security guards, who had not been mentioned in wave 1, were featured among respondents’ preferred security providers in wave 2.

- Civil Matters

With respect to civil matters, during the wave 1 assessment, approximately one-half of the respondents (49%) stated that they would prefer to report civil matters to the police. However, this proportion was reduced to 30% and traditional elders, having been mentioned by 36% of respondents, were identified as the preferred choice for reporting civil matters at the time of the wave 2 assessment (Figure 12). Focus group participants mentioned that the choice of security provider was largely dependent on the type of case, whereby experience with the specific issue was also a key factor. For example, land or family disputes were often referred to the traditional elders, based on their awareness of land issues pertaining to the territory as well as historical systems of ownership. Therefore, it was generally perceived that civil disputes, such as business or family disputes could be solved by the people by reporting them to the sub-village committee or clan.

Figure 12: Reporting preference for civil matters

- Petty Crimes

The proportion of respondents who stated that the police would be their preferred choice for reporting petty crimes decreased from 57% in wave 1 to 37% in wave 2. While the police remained the preferred choice for reporting petty crimes, elders again gained favour, with the proportion of respondents who stated that they would prefer to report petty crimes increasing from 23% to 33% over this period (Figure 13.) Youth representatives argued that petty crimes, such as theft and robbery, should be reported to the police because of their experience and familiarity with these types of issues. Notably, however, government troops were accused of being among the perpetrators of armed robberies.

---

34 Women, Focus Group Discussion, May 2015
35 Traditional Elders and Religious Leaders, Focus Group Discussion, May 2015
36 Women, Focus Group Discussion, May 2015
37 Youth, Focus Group Discussion, May 2015
38 Baidoa Police Commissioner, Key Informant Interview, May 2015
Serious Crimes

There was less noticeable change regarding respondents’ preferred entity for reporting serious crimes between both assessments. The proportion of respondents who selected the police increased marginally from 45% in Wave 1 to 48% in wave 2. Women were of the opinion that serious crimes required enforcement and legitimate intervention, and should therefore be reported to powerful security providers, women such as the police. Even so, there was also little variation in respondents’ indication of their preference for reporting serious crimes to elders (wave 1: 25%; wave 2: 26%) or religious leaders (wave 1: 11%; wave 2: 9%) during both reporting periods. However, there was a more notable decline in preference for reporting serious crimes to the court during this period (wave 1: 17%; wave 2: 9%). Despite the stated preferences, elders suggested that they handled most cases of murder, noting that they did this by trying to prevent revenge killings which would take place if these cases were not settled. See Figure 14.

---

39 Women, Focus Group Discussion, May 2015
On the whole, when asked to state who they would trust most to respond to crime and violence, a slight majority of the respondents (52%) named the police as their preferred choice during wave 1. Focus group participants supported this choice, stating that the police was generally the first institution to respond to violence, particularly in the urban areas of the district. The police remained the leading choice in wave 2, though the proportion of respondents who trusted the police most fell to 44%. It was noted that the police was very “willing and active in their response.” Indeed, the most frequently cited reasons for selection of the police by survey respondents in both assessments were their fast response (45%) and accessibility (35%). (See Table 3.) However, they were criticised for being reactive instead of proactive in dealing with incidences of crime and violence, largely on account of logistical challenges due to limited resources and poor coordination between themselves, the community and other security providers. It was also argued that while they were generally responsive during the day, the police generally failed to operate in the nights, mainly due to fear of Al Shabaab, thereby resulting in members of the community being more vulnerable to attacks during the nights.

Notably, the court which had been selected as the most trusted entity in this regard by approximately one in five respondents in wave 1 (18%), was not mentioned in wave 2. On the contrary, traditional elders, religious leaders, and the local authority each experienced an increase in respondents’ trust in their ability to respond to crime and violence relative to the other security providers. Local security guards and others, which included NISA and family members, were also considered among those who were most trusted to respond to crime and violence by respondents in wave 2. Figure 15 illustrates.

---

**Figure 14: Reporting preference for serious crimes**

- **Most Trusted Security Provider**

![Bar chart showing reporting preference for serious crimes](chart.png)

- **Police**: Wave 1 - 45%, Wave 2 - 25%
- **Traditional Elders**: Wave 1 - 26%, Wave 2 - 26%
- **Court**: Wave 1 - 17%, Wave 2 - 9%
- **Religious Leader**: Wave 1 - 11%, Wave 2 - 9%
- **Local Authority**: Wave 1 - 2%, Wave 2 - 2%
- **Other**: Wave 1 - 0%, Wave 2 - 1%
- **Don’t know/No response**: Wave 1 - 0%, Wave 2 - 3%

---

40 Baidoa Women Focus Group Discussion, May 2015
41 Ibid
42 Ibid
43 Baidoa Youth, Focus Group Discussion, May 2015
44 Elders and Religious Leaders, Focus Group Discussion, May 2015
Figure 15: Most trusted security provider

Similar to the police, respondents who selected the local authority as their most trusted security provider for responding to crime and violence did so primarily on account of their fast response and accessibility in wave 2 (61% and 17% respectively), resulting in a slight shift from wave 1 in which respondents cited respect (75%) as the main reason for their selection, though fast response was the only other reason stated for choice of the local authority in wave 1. During wave 2, elders were selected mainly on account of the respect that people held for them (33%) followed by their fast response (29%), whereas respect and ease of access (27% each) had been equally mentioned as the main reasons for choice of elders in wave 1. Respect was also determined to be influential in respondents’ choice of religious leaders as this was one of the main reasons for selection of religious leaders in both wave 1 and wave 2. Another key reason for selection of religious leaders during both waves was their perceived unbiased enforcement (wave 1: 57%; wave 2: 25%). Table 3 illustrates.

Table 3: Reasons for choice of most trusted security provider

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reasons for choice of most trusted security provider</th>
<th>The Police</th>
<th>The Court</th>
<th>Local Authority</th>
<th>Traditional Elders</th>
<th>Religious Leaders</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Wave 1</td>
<td>Wave 2</td>
<td>Wave 1</td>
<td>Wave 2</td>
<td>Wave 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fast response</td>
<td>34%</td>
<td>45%</td>
<td>51%</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>25%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unbiased enforcement</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>They are respected</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>75%</td>
<td>11%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ease of access</td>
<td>36%</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>17%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Base</strong></td>
<td>122</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- **Level of Trust in the Police**

Overall, trust in the police also declined during the wave 2 assessment. While nearly two-thirds of respondents (63%) expressed fairly or very high levels of trust in the police in wave 1, this proportion decreased to approximately 51% in wave 2. In addition, there was also an increase in the proportion
of respondents who expressed fairly low or very low levels of trust, from 34% in wave 1 to 41% in wave 2. Figure 16 illustrates

Figure 16: Respondents’ level of trust towards police in responding to crime

- Challenges facing the police

The police in the district of Baidoa continued to be faced with several challenges in both assessments. During the wave 1 assessment, the inadequate number of police and their capabilities were identified as the main challenges facing the police. As previously mentioned, these factors continued to pose challenges to the police performance in wave 2. Although the police received support from other security providers, participants in the wave 2 assessment also reported poor coordination and collaboration among the various entities. The Ethiopian contingent was criticised for operating through only a few checkpoints and at the airport instead of patrolling the town every night as the Ugandans and Burundians had done. The police themselves were said to have limited resources available to them. For example, the police had access to only three cars, including that of the regional police. This impacted their ability to patrol the district regularly.

Other challenges included what was regarded as low salaries, which were frequently delayed. Stating that the police could not be expected to perform effectively without regular payments, local governance providers pointed out that the police had not yet received outstanding salaries from UNDP and the Federal Government. Insufficient training for the police was another area of concern. It was proposed that the police should undergo more military type training in order to respond more effectively to the specific types of threats that they faced, particularly complex attacks orchestrated by Al Shabaab.

While the local administration also supported neighbourhood watch groups (Madani) to provide security in the area up to 10:00 p.m. at night, it was suggested that there was need for a better relationship between the community and the police. Governance providers were of the opinion that

---

45 Baidoa Police Commissioner, Key Informant Interview, December 2013
46 Internally Displaced Persons, Focus Group Discussion, May 2015
47 Baidoa Police Commissioner, Key Informant Interview, May 2015
48 Local Governance Providers, Focus Group Discussion, May 2015
49 Ibid
50 Internally Displaced Persons, Focus Group Discussion, May 2015
51 Local Governance Providers, Focus Group Discussion, May 2015
community policing would place emphasis on crime prevention and facilitating the work of the police through better relations with the community.52

**Dynamics of Conflict and Violence**

Following the reclamation of Baidoa by the Federal Government, backed by AMISOM, in 2012 and leading up to the assessment in 2013 (wave 1), conflicts in the city were primarily attributed to continued power struggles with Al Shabaab. Participants in the 2013 assessment also mentioned that disagreements between local leaders and local councillors, supported by the Government, regarding the establishment of a new semi-autonomous state had become one of the key contributors to local conflict. Local elders were said to be in favour of a state which comprised six regions, whereas the Government wanted a state which comprised three regions. However, the issue of the composition of the proposed central state had been resolved with the establishment of the Interim South West Administration (which comprised three regions) in 2014. At the time of the wave 2 assessment, the feedback indicated a general decline in conflicts in the area. The Police Commissioner pointed out that most conflicts over the past twelve months had taken place outside of the town. The only conflict which was regarded as posing a threat to the security of the community had been those resulting from clashes between the National Army and Al Shabaab.53

- **Experience with Conflict**

Results from the household survey indicated a decline in the proportion of residents who had witnessed conflict between clans or other groups in the period between the wave 1 and wave 2 assessments. During wave 1, 19% of respondents stated that they had witnessed conflict between clans or groups in the 12 months leading up to the assessment, while this proportion was reduced to 10% during wave 2. Figure 17 illustrates.

*Figure 17: Account of witnessing conflict between clans or groups (last 12 months)*

- **Reasons for Conflicts that were Observed**

When asked to state the reasons for the conflicts that they had witnessed, resources (land, water, etc.) were identified as the primary reason in wave 1 and wave 2, while family disputes and revenge were also mentioned among the top three reasons in both waves. Other reasons stated for the

---

52 *Governance Providers, Focus Group Discussion, May 2015*

53 *Police Commissioner, Key Informant Interview, May 2015*
conflicts that were observed in both assessments included business disputes, power or cultural struggles, rape and revenge. Crime, lack of justice, and youth violence were also mentioned among the reasons for conflicts that were observed during wave 2, but not in wave 1.

- **Experience with Crime and Violence**

Experience with crime and violence had been relatively prevalent during the wave 1 assessment, with approximately one-third of respondents (34%) stating that they had witnessed at least one incident of crime or violence against someone outside of their household in the 12 months leading up to assessment. This was drastically reduced during the wave 2 assessment, wherein 10% of respondents stated that they had witnessed crime or violence against someone outside of their household in the preceding 12 months. See Figure 18.

**Figure 18: Account of witnessing crime or violence (last 12 months)**

- **Causes of Insecurity**

During the wave 1 assessment, discussants identified several causes of insecurity in the area. Chief among these was the perceived lack of law and order, which was attributed to the absence of what was considered to be a viable government system. Elders expressed dissatisfaction with the performance of the police with respect to settling conflict and disputes, stating that the police were ill-equipped and divided along clan lines. Furthermore, they felt that police officers were trying to earn a living from persons in the community as their salaries were not enough to cover their expenses.\(^\text{54}\) This concern was carried through to the wave 2 assessment, in which Government forces were also said to be central to conflict as a result of their involvement in criminal activity, such as robberies and targeting of khat dealers through the use of force.\(^\text{55}\) This was accompanied by the perception that there was no justice due to the negative perception of the formal justice system, which had only worsened in the period between both assessments. As a result of these circumstances, it was stated that persons often took the law into their own hands as they did not believe that they would be able to get justice if they followed the formal complaint procedures.\(^\text{56}\)

Proliferation of arms into the hands of civilians and the presence of armed militia were also identified as key contributors to crime and violence in wave 1. It was reported that there were frequent livestock robberies as well as disputes over land and water points.\(^\text{57}\) Furthermore, the youth was believed to be

---

\(^{54}\) Elders, Focus Group Discussion, December 2013  
^{55} Burao Elder, Key Informant Interview, May 2015  
^{56} Burao Business Leaders, Focus Group Discussion, December 2013  
^{57} Traditional Elders, Focus Group Discussion, December 2013
particularly vulnerable to getting involved in these types of activities due to the high level of unemployment and lack of opportunities available to them. This problem was exacerbated by reluctance to report matters or give security tips to the police for fear of harassment and detention.58

The concerns which were voiced in the wave 1 assessment remained in wave 2, despite the fall in the proportion of respondents who had personally witnessed conflict or crime and violence. During wave 2, fear of Al Shabaab was singled out as a major safety concern.59 There had also been a number of unsolved murders, which had taken place in the city, mainly during the nights. Victims were known to be members of civil society or workers in the district administration.60 As a result of this, people did not want to leave their homes, especially at nights.

- Perception of Safety

Despite the many safety concerns, there was a slight increase in the proportion of respondents who stated that they felt fairly or very safe from 60% in wave 1 to 62% in wave 2. Further to this, the proportion of respondents who stated specifically that they felt very safe doubled, increasing from 7% to 14% during this period. Correspondingly, the proportion of respondents who stated that they felt fairly or very unsafe also decreased marginally by 2% between wave 1 and wave 2 (39% and 37% respectively). Notably, the proportion of respondents who stated specifically that they felt very unsafe halved from 15% in wave 1 to 7% in wave 2. Figure 19 illustrates.

Figure 19: Perception of safety

- Change in Safety

Relative to the wave 1 assessment, survey respondents in wave 2 had a less favourable perception of the change in safety over the twelve months leading up to the assessment. In the wave 1 assessment, approximately two-thirds of respondents (66%) felt that the level of safety in the area had improved over the past year, whereas this proportion declined to 34% in wave 2. However, the results from both assessments indicate that similar proportions of approximately one-quarter of respondents felt that there had been a decline in the level of safety in the year leading up to the respective assessments (26% and 24% respectively). The most significant change in perception was with respect to the proportion of respondents who felt that there had been no change in the level of safety, with only a marginal 1% of respondents in Wave 1 stating that there had been no change in safety over the

58 Baidoa Youth, Focus Group Discussion, December 2013
59 Governance Providers, Focus Group Discussion, May 2015
60 Governance Providers, Focus Group Discussion, May 2015
previous twelve months, compared with 36% of respondents in wave 2. The findings highlight that respondents’ perception of safety overtime was not solely based on the effectiveness of the formal systems. Instead, informal systems and individual coping mechanisms were also recognised as being rather influential in this regard.

Figure 20: Change in perception of safety

![Bar chart showing change in perception of safety](chart)

Wave 1 Wave 2
Increase 66% 34%
No change 36% 26%
Decrease 24% 7%
Don’t know/ No response 5% 1%

**Conclusion**

A comparative analysis of the results of the District Conflict and Security Assessments is useful in helping to understand the direction of community perception in relation to the thematic areas of study, namely governance; security; justice; conflict and violence. With due consideration afforded to the methodological challenges in comparing the two waves of DCSCAs for Baidoa (wave 1: 2013 and wave 2: 2015) owing to the changes to data collection tools, the information presented in this report provides an indication of potential changing trends in the issues covered in the three assessments.

Overall, there had been a decline in the incidence of conflict in Baidoa in the period between the two assessments. There was also a reduction in the proportion of respondents who stated that they had witnessed incidents of crime or violence. Despite this, insecurity was identified as a major challenge facing the community. In particular, Al Shabaab was said to be behind a number of killings, which in particular, targeted persons who were employed to the government and other companies. They also used frequent illegal roadblocks as a means of extorting revenue. This made people reluctant to take up jobs, or to leave their homes, especially at night. Furthermore, there was waning confidence in government officials and the formal systems of security and justice.

Respondents in the wave 2 assessment were more aware of the presence of the local council. However, there had been no noticeable improvement as it relates to interaction between the council and the district. Similar to the findings from the wave 1 assessment, less than one in ten respondents had participated in consultations with the local government in the year leading up to the wave 2 assessment. Although the council collected some taxes, their performance did not meet the expectations of the community. Tax collection was hindered by the absence of tax and tariffs laws
Representatives from the council also stated that their efforts were hindered by the state of insecurity and the need to prioritise security provision. In addition to the various systems that were in place, the council also offered additional support to community neighbourhood watch groups. However, other services such as health, infrastructure, and water resources were said to be largely neglected.

The clan-based nomination system was regarded as having a negative impact on the operations of the council. Although the system was meant to ensure that the various clans were represented in the local government, it was thought to influence nepotism and other inefficiencies. In particular, representatives were accused of looking out only for their clan’s interests and perceived as lacking the required experience for carrying out their roles. While there had been a decline in the proportion of respondents who agreed that it was important to have elected representatives, the vast majority maintained that this was important. Improved accountability was identified as one of the advantages of an electoral process. However, it was noted that there would have to be an improvement in security conditions in order to ensure that elections are carried out correctly.

With respect to security provision, the police was supported by several entities, including the Somali National Army (SNA), the National Intelligence Agency (NISA), and the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM). The traditional system, which comprised elders and religious leaders, also played a role. Notably, while the police remained the leading choice when respondents were asked to identify their most trusted justice provider, there had been a decline in the proportion of respondents who shared this opinion in the period between the wave 1 and wave 2 assessments. Respondents were also less inclined to report issues such as civil matters and petty crimes to the police, although largely maintaining that they should be the ones to handle serious crimes. The main challenges that the police had faced in wave 1 carried over to the second assessment. These included an insufficient number of police officers to meet the needs of the district as well as inadequate capacity to carry out their roles. Added to this, during wave 2, there were also complaints about lack of coordination among the formal security providers and the police was criticised for being more reactive than proactive. However, in addition to the mentioned challenges, it was acknowledged that the police had limited resources. For example, it was mentioned that the police had only three cars and this interfered with their ability to patrol the district regularly. It was also noted that the police received low wages, which were frequently delayed, thereby encouraging corruption among its members. Notably, the findings indicate that trust in the police had declined between wave 1 and wave 2.

The formal justice system was also less favourably regarded in the wave 2 assessment. There had been a decline in awareness and usage of the courts during this period. Further to this, there had also been a downturn in trust in the court relative to the informal justice providers. The traditional justice system was more trusted and was perceived as being more successful than the court in solving existing problems. It was also stated that more people generally preferred to see their issues resolved in traditional ways. Meanwhile, the court was considered to be corrupt and susceptible to bribes. Feedback from the assessments illustrates not only a decline in the proportion of respondents who stated that they were confident in the formal justice system, but also sizeable increase in the proportion of respondents who stated outright that they were not confident in the system.