Comparative District Conflict and Security Assessment Report for Kismayo 2015/2016
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Introduction

Since its establishment in 2009, the Observatory of Conflict and Violence Prevention1 (OCVP) has worked with local and international stakeholders to measure and evaluate progress in peace-building and state-building in all regions of Somaliland and Somalia. The OCVP regularly collects data at the district level and consequently disseminates research publications in an effort aimed at supporting evidence-led policy formulation and programming. The District Conflict and Security Assessment (DCSA) Reports are OCVP’s flagship publications.

The DCSA is designed to serve as a tool to regularly gather and analyse community perceptions on the providers and delivery of services related to security, justice and governance; as well as examining the drivers of local conflict in the district. These types of regular assessments are therefore critical, to not only the development and implementation of new evidence-based programmes and sound policies, but also in providing an important tool for the continued monitoring and evaluation of the relative success or failure of existing efforts at the district level.

While the continual assessment of issues regarding justice, governance and security is critical for the formulation of sound policies and interventions - equally important is the generation of data that compares year-over-year trends in order to shed light on what may be working, and what may not be working, in a particular target district. Through the support of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) for Somalia and later the United Kingdom’s Department for International Development (DFID) as well, the OCVP was able to conduct district level assessments in Kismayo District during the years of 2015 (Wave 1) and 2016 (Wave 2). The purpose of this report is to compare key results of the assessments conducted during the two periods.

District Profile

Kismayo is the commercial hub of the autonomous Jubaland State of Somalia (Jubaland), which is a part of the Federal Republic of Somalia (Somalia). It is the third largest city in Somalia and is centrally located between the Kenyan border and Somalia’s capital, Mogadishu. The district of Kismayo benefits from a beautiful coastline with a port that once served not only as a base for the Somali Navy but for the Soviet Navy as well. This is currently the main port in South Somalia. Kismayo also has an airport, which is located a few kilometres away from the city.

Jubaland comprises the regions of Gedo, Middle Juba and Lower Juba, of which Kismayo is the capital. During the colonial era, parts of Jubaland were briefly incorporated into British East Africa until being ceded to Italy in 1925, thereby forming a part of Italian Somaliland. After gaining independence in 1960, the then Trust Territory of Somalia (formerly Italian Somaliland) along with the State of Somaliland (the newly independent British Somaliland) together formed the Somali Republic.

There have been frequent battles for control of the Juba regions since the downfall of the central government in 1991 during the Somali Civil War. Several factors have contributed to this, including the area’s fertile soils, rich grazing grounds, and marine resources - otherwise absent in Somalia as

1 Website: [www.ocvp.org](http://www.ocvp.org)
well as the importance of the seaport as a source of revenue for local authorities. The region is also one of the most diverse in Somalia, with a population comprised of more than thirty sub-clans constantly struggling for resources along clan lines.²

In August 2008, militants from Al-Shabaab and the Islamic Courts Union (ICU) gained control of Kismayo after a three-day battle with pro-government militias, dubbed the Battle of Kismayo, involving heavy loss of human lives and leaving tens of thousands homeless. The city was under the control of Al-Shabaab until, in 2012, an alliance between the Somali National Army and the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), with mandate from the United Nations (UN)³ went head to head with Al-Shabaab and drove them out of Kismayo. In 2013, the Juba Interim Administration, established in 2010, was officially recognised as the government of Jubaland under a national reconciliation agreement (concerning Jubaland and the Federal Government of Somalia).

The State Government of Jubaland, headed by the Regional President, is composed of the Central Government of Jubaland, along with the Regional and District Administrations. The Interim Charter of the State outlines the role of the government and is the supreme law of the land after Shari’ah.⁴ The Charter also makes provision for the Council of Traditional Elders of Jubaland, formally establishing the role of recognised elders as advisors to the government on religious and cultural affairs as well as arbitration of communal disputes (Article 32). This provides a framework for governance and institutionalisation of key services, including security and justice, with due regard for the traditional system. Non-governmental organisations (NGOs), International Development Partners, and other civic groups also play a key role in supporting the Government. Kismayo, however, remains vulnerable due to continued interest in the area because of its natural resources and economic potential.

**Methodology**

The Wave 1 and Wave 2 District Conflict and Security Assessments for Kismayo were conducted in 2015 and 2016 respectively. Both Assessments employed a mixed method research approach that included both quantitative (household survey) and qualitative (focus group discussions and key informant interviews) means to collect public perception on the state of security, justice, governance as well as general stability of the district.

**Survey Participants**

The Wave 1 assessment included of a sample of 202 respondents, while the Wave 2 assessment included a sample of 201 respondents for the respective household surveys. The following presents an overview of the demographic profile of respondents for each assessment.

**Gender**

An attempt was made in both assessments to attain equal gender representation so as to make distinctions between the views of male and female respondents for the purposes of the more

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² AMISOM, Sector II Profile: Kismayo.
⁴ Draft Interim Charter of the State Government of Jubaland of Somalia (March 2013).
minute observations covered by the DCSAs. As a result, male respondents made up 54% of the sample in Wave 1 and their female counterparts made up 46%, while in Wave 2 the female respondents made up 54% and the males made up 46%. See figure 1 and Table 1.

![Figure 1: Distribution of respondents by gender](image1)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Participants’ gender</th>
<th>Waves</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Wave 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>110</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>202</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Figure 1: Distribution of respondents by gender**

**Table 1: Number of participants by gender**

**Age**
There was very little variation in the composition of the age groups of the respondents from Wave 1 to Wave 2. The most notable variation was in the reduction of the portion of respondents aged between thirty and thirty nine years of age from 31% in Wave 1 to 24% in Wave 2. The portion of those aged below twenty years went up slightly from 1% in Wave 1 to 4% in Wave 2. The rest of the age groups were either equal in both assessments or had variations of two percentage points or less. See figure 2 below.

![Figure 2: Respondents’ age groups](image2)

**Marital Status**
In both assessments, majority of the respondents reported that they were married, with an increase from 64% in the initial assessment to 77% in the latter. There was a decline in the portion of those who reported that they were divorced (13%: Wave 1 to 4%: Wave 2), while the portions of those
who were single (11%: Wave 1 and 12%: Wave 2) and those who were widowed (7%: Wave 1 and 6%: Wave 2) stayed close to equal. Figure 3 illustrates.

Figure 3: Respondents’ marital status

Level of Education

Major variations were observed in the reported level of education of the respondents in the two Kismayo assessments. There were increases in the proportions of respondents admitting that they had never been educated from 9% in Wave 1 to 35% in wave 2 and those who had attended Quranic Madarasa from 21% in Wave 1 to 27% in Wave 2. This was accompanied by notable decreases in the proportions of those who had attained post-primary education (intermediate; 17%: Wave 1 to 11%: Wave 2, secondary; 20%: Wave 1 to 6%: Wave 2 and tertiary; 14%: Wave 1 to 3%: Wave 2). Only the portions of those who had attended primary school (15%: Wave 1 and 14%: Wave 2) and those who claimed to be self-taught (3%: Wave 1 and 2%: Wave 2) remained close to equal across the two assessments. The effect of this was that collectively, the respondents in the latter assessment had lower literacy levels than those in the initial assessment. See figure 4.
Figure 4: Respondents’ level of education

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Education Level</th>
<th>Wave 1</th>
<th>Wave 2</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Never educated</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>35%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self schooled</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quranic Madarasa</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>27%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primary</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>14%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intermediate</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>11%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secondary</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tertiary</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Perceived Performance of Security, Justice and Governance Providers

The two District Conflict and Security Assessments sought to evaluate community perceptions of the deployment, performance, preference and perception of both formal and informal providers of security, justice, and governance, such as the police, courts, local government authorities, community elders and religious authorities. The assessments also sought to investigate respondents’ experience with local conflict and their perception of safety within their communities.

Security

As a strategically important location, Kismayo suffered decades of warfare and civil strife that led to the loss of many lives, the displacement of thousands and the destruction of virtually all institutions of governance and socio-economic development. Governmental security apparatus were decimated, replaced by warlords, the Islamic Courts Union militia and eventually by Al-Shabaab. Overtime, informal stakeholders, mainly traditional elders and religious leaders had up to fill the gap left by the destroyed government institutions in terms of the provision of justice as well as security. The ouster of the latter radical group from the city in 2012 by an alliance of the Somali National Army, troops from the UN mandated AMISOM was a key turning point in Kismayo’s tumultuous history.

By 2015, when the first District Conflict and Safety Assessment for Kismayo was conducted, sufficient security had been restored in Somalia to allow for the establishment of a federal government and political dialogue around the formalisation of member states was underway. However, there were still fears of a return to violence in Kismayo, owing particularly to the interest in the administration of the strategically located capital of the region. Furthermore, as at the time of the Wave 1 assessment, only the town itself could be considered as having been fully liberated since the national security forces could not exercise control over the peri-urban and rural areas of the district. This fragility was emphasised by an elder in an FGD who said,

*We are only within 7km radius of the secure areas of the town and the distance beyond this area is occupied by the Al-Shabaab... Beyond the airport one cannot travel, our security is very bad.*

Awareness of the Police

In the Wave 1 and Wave 2 assessments, A majority (80%; wave 1 and 70%; Wave 2) of the respondents reported awareness of the existence of police in Kismayo. The proportion of those who claimed outright that there were no police reduced slightly from 18% in Wave 1 to 15% in Wave 2. However, it should be noted that the portion of respondents either claiming that they did not know whether there were police in Kismayo or declining to give a response increased from 2% in Wave 1 to 15% in Wave 2. See figure 5.

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5 Traditional Elders, Focus Group Discussion, January 3, 2015
Figure 5: Awareness of the police presence

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Wave 2</th>
<th>Yes (70%)</th>
<th>No (15%)</th>
<th>Don't know/No response (15%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Wave 1</td>
<td>Yes (80%)</td>
<td>No (18%)</td>
<td>Don't know/No response (2%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Reporting Preference: Security Matters

In general, it was observed that while informal security providers were dominant actors in both waves of the assessments, the popularity of formal providers was progressively increasing. The popularity of the police (as a preferred provider to whom respondents would report) saw a notable increase with regard to civil matter, a significant increase with regard to petty crime and almost equalled that of traditional elders with regard to serious crimes. Although the question of the factors that influence the choice of provider were not canvased to great detail in the initial assessment, qualitative participants in the Wave 2 assessment had the opportunity to list some of the main factors. A participant in the focus group discussion with the youth stated that these factors included the type of the case, the level of confidence in the security provider, the degree of the expectation of the outcome and financial ability. He told the OCVP researchers,

> It is about the degree of the expectation for an outcome. If one loses some property, he/she goes to the police. If it is family or household dispute, then the informal security providers are informed. Murder has no place in informal security providers; instead, it should first be reported to the police.  

Another youth intimated that the lack of awareness as to whom certain matters ought to be reported also affected the choice of provider,

> It is due to lack of awareness of the public that leads to reporting to different security providers. For instance, in the rape cases, people report to the elders than to the police, which is wrong in my opinion.

One of the internally displaced persons interviewed in a focus group added that,

> At the police station, we are supposed to pay money. The poor people do not have a place in the police station, because if you don’t pay, your case will not be processed.

Civil Matters

The most popularly preferred security provider in terms of reporting incidences involving civil matters in both the Wave 1 and Wave 2 assessments was the traditional elders (48%: Wave 1 and 39%: Wave 2). However, there was a notable increase in the proportion of respondents stating that they would prefer to report to the police, going from 18% in Wave 1 to 32% in Wave 2, making them

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6Youth, Focus Group Discussion, February 14, 2016
7Ibid.
8IDPs, Focus Group Discussion, February 13, 2016.
a much closer second option than they had been in the previous year. The portion of respondents who would prefer to report to the court was seen to have declined (13%: Wave 1 to 3%: Wave 2). Analysis also revealed slight increases in the portions that would prefer to report to the local authority (10%: Wave 1 to 13%: Wave 2) and those who either said that they did not know or did not give an answer (3%: Wave 1 to 5%: Wave 2). The portion of those who would report to religious leaders remained the same at 7% for both assessment periods. Figure 6 illustrates.

Figure 6: Reporting preference for civil matters

![Figure 6: Reporting preference for civil matters](image)

**Petty Crimes**

With regard to petty crimes, traditional elders were also the most preferred security provider to whom respondents stated they would report, having been mentioned by 41% of the sample in each assessment. Again, the police came in second and saw an increase in popularity from 29% in Wave 1 to 33% in Wave 2. The local authority was also mentioned by a larger portion in Wave 2 (11%) compared to Wave 1 (4%). The court experienced a decline in popularity from 9% to 3%, as did the religious leaders from 12% to 6%. See figure 7 below.
Serious Crimes

For serious crimes, wide variations were observed. The police, who had been in the third position during Wave 1 at 20%, became the most preferred security provider from reporting purposes during Wave 2 at 43%, replacing the traditional elders who had held the first position in Wave 1 at 45%. The traditional elders came in second at 27% in Wave 2, a position that had been held in Wave 1 at 23% by the Court, which dropped to fourth position at 8% in Wave 2. The Local authority rose from the last position at 2% in Wave 1 to third position in Wave 2 at 11%. Although there was a slight increase in the proportion of those stating that they would prefer to report to religious leaders (5%: Wave 1 to 7%: Wave 2), they were behind all other security provider in the second assessment, having been ahead of only the local authority in the first assessment. See figure 8.

Figure 8: Reporting preference for serious crimes
Challenges facing the police

After years of conflict and high levels of insecurity during which it had been impossible for the formal security providers to operate within Kismayo, the police were observed to be in the process of gradually taking up their role. Some of the challenges they were said to face included the following.

Low Capacity

In an environment of heightened security concerns with the danger of a return to hostilities, the low capacity of the police was said to have a negative effect on their ability to come up with an effective security stabilisation plan and implement it. On the one hand, qualitative discussants questioned their integrity,

*The Police should be well conversant with law and order; they lack the ethics governing them.*

By the time of the Wave 2 assessment, concerns were still being raised about the capacity of the police, a participant in the focus group discussion with governance providers stated,

*You know if you were trained how to shoot, given gun and ignorant about the law you can be part of the security problem we are talking about.*

Lack of Resources

On the other hand, the police were said to be severely restricted in terms of resources, to the point that they did not have uniforms that could distinguish them from the military as was pointed out by a traditional elder during an FGD in the Wave 1 assessment:

*The police lack a dress code, there is no distinction between the police and the military because their dress code is similar. Only old officers who previously served in the former Siad Barre regime can differentiate the two wings of security.*

Added to that, the lack of sufficient remuneration in face of the danger in which the police operated had the effect of discouraging potential recruits from joining the force and thus negatively affected the capacity of the police for growth and expansion. A participant in the youth FGD during the Wave 1 assessment pointed out,

*We, the youth, fear to be recruited into the police or military due to the risk of being victimised and lack of salaries make it unworthy.*

In the Wave 2 assessment, resource constrictions revolved around the lack of transportation, lack of fuel, and unreliable and low salaries. A participant in the women FGD emphasised,

*The district police lack all the necessary requirements to maintain security such as transportation facilities, vehicles, medical assistance and salaries to boost their moral.*

Clan Politics

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9 Traditional Elders, Focus Group Discussion, January 3, 2015  
10 Governance Providers, April 14, 2016.  
11 Traditional Elders, Focus Group Discussion, January 3, 2015  
12 Youth, Focus Group Discussion, January 3, 2015  
13 Women, Focus Group Discussion, April 13, 2016.
During the Wave 2 assessment, there were concerns regarding the lack of a holistic and inclusive approach to the formation of the new government and its various arms. A religious leader who spoke as a key informant highlighted this problem as follows,

*People say that the current government is not inclusive of all the tribes living in the area. They are all from the same clan. Therefore, there is the need to include others and form integrated army composed of all tribes.*

In a similar vein, a participant in the FGD with women also emphasised the negative impact of the perceived marginalisation of some clans,

*The biggest challenge could be the lack of confidence between the administration and some tribes.*

**Most Trusted Security Provider**

During the Wave 1 and 2 assessments, respondents were further asked to state which of the security providers they trusted the most to react to crime and violence and a notable amount of variation was observed. During the Wave 1 assessment, the police had been the most mentioned provider at 34%, with the traditional elders and religious leaders tying for second position at 26% each and the local authority bringing in the rear at 10%. During the Wave 2 assessment, the traditional elders (48%) were most mentioned as most trusted security provider, followed by the court (24%) which had not been mentioned by any respondent in the earlier assessment, with the police and religious leaders tying for third position at 11% each and the local authority bring up the rear at 3%. See figure 9.

*Figure 9: Most trusted security provider*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Provider</th>
<th>Wave 1</th>
<th>Wave 2</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Traditional elders</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>48%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Police</td>
<td>34%</td>
<td>11%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious leaders</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>11%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Court</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local authority</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don't know/ No response</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Level of Trust in the Police**

Despite the apparent decrease in the popularity of the police when respondents were asked to state which of the security providers they trusted the most, it was observed that trust in the police

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14 Religious Leader, Key Informant Interview, April 14, 2016.
15 Women, April 13, 2016.
specifically had increased. When respondents in both Wave 1 and Wave 2 of the assessment were asked what level of trust they attributed to the police with regard to response to crime and violence, the proportion of those with either a fairly high or very high level of trust rose from 41% in Wave 1 to 69% in Wave 2. The proportion of respondents with low levels of trust decreased from 52% in Wave 1 to 28% in Wave 2. Figure 10 illustrates.

**Figure 10: Respondents’ level of trust towards police in responding to crime**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Wave 2</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Very high</td>
<td>Fairly high</td>
<td>Fairly low</td>
<td>Very low</td>
<td>Don’t know/no responses</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20%</td>
<td>49%</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Wave 1</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Very high</td>
<td>Fairly high</td>
<td>Fairly low</td>
<td>Very low</td>
<td>Don’t know/no responses</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26%</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>39%</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>7%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Perception of the Performance of the Police – Year-to-Year Trend**

Finally, respondents were queried as to their perception of the performance of the police in each respective year of assessment compared to the previous year. The portion of respondent who believed that there had been an improvement in performance decreased from 55% in Wave 1 to 44% in Wave 2, while that of respondents who felt that there had been no change increased from 29% in Wave 1 to 49% in Wave 2. See figure 11.

**Figure 11: Perception of the Performance of the Police – Year-to-Year Trend**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Wave 2</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Improved</td>
<td>No Change</td>
<td>Declined</td>
<td>Don’t know/no responses</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>44%</td>
<td>49%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Wave 1</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Improved</td>
<td>No Change</td>
<td>Declined</td>
<td>Don’t know/no responses</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>55%</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Justice

Following more than two decades without formal institutions, the informal justice providers had firmly established themselves in the minds of the public, who favoured their methods when disputes arose. However, with the liberation of the city, the landscape had begun to change and the formal courts were re-emerging in Kismayo. In December 2014, a District Court was established and by the time of the Wave 1 assessment the following month, a Regional and Court of Appeal Court were in place too, although not yet fully functional. There was also access to a mobile court that was periodically sent from Mogadishu to assist in the provision of justice in the area. During the Wave 2 assessment, participants positively confirmed the existence of the three tiers of courts in Kismayo,

We do have functioning courts: District Court, Regional Court and Regional Court of Appeal. On the other hand, we have three judges, a chairman, his assistant and a messenger.\(^\text{16}\)

Awareness of the Court

In the household surveys conducted during the two assessments, the level of awareness of the existence of the court remained almost constant (67%: Wave 1 and 68%: Wave 2). There was a drop in the portion of respondents stating outright that they believed there was no court in Kismayo from 24% in Wave 1 to 7% in Wave 2. However, the portion of respondents stating that they do not know or declining to give an answer rose notably from 9% in Wave 1 to 26% in Wave 2. See figure 12.

Figure 12: Respondents’ awareness of the existence of courts

Use of Justice Providers

When respondents in both waves were asked which of the justice providers they had used within the year preceding the assessments, traditional elders remained the most used for both assessment periods, followed by religious leaders and the court. However, the portions of respondents who had used the respective justice providers were observed to decrease (traditional elders: 26% to 15%; religious leaders: 15% to 9% and the court: 9% to 4%). See figure 13.

During the Wave 1 assessment the elders pointed out that for years, they had been the only justice provider available to the people of Kismayo and that the reason they continued to operate was due to the personal preference of the members of the community. This dominance of the informal sector was also acknowledged by participants in the FGD with justice providers during the Wave 2 assessment,

\(^{16}\)Justice Providers, Focus Group Discussion, April 14, 2016.
We use both formal and informal justice providers. The country never had constitutional court for the last 25 years, and that drifted us towards using religious methods of justice by which we handle cases involving injuries, compensation and family disputes.\textsuperscript{17}

Another reason advanced for the popularity of the informal justice providers was said to be the lack of familiarity with the formal justice system among members of the community as stated by a justice provider during the Wave 2 assessment,

\textit{We don’t know the laws of the constitutional court, so we have to use the religion. Islamic laws are more powerful and respected here in our society and they are more likely to be enforced.}\textsuperscript{18}

Justice providers offered a caveat during the Wave 1 assessment, stating that there was an undercurrent of clanism with the justice sector and it affected the likelihood of the disputants to accept the outcome of the case. They stated,

\textit{Justice cannot prevail unless the state is a powerful one. The courts need to be independent from political interference.}\textsuperscript{19}

Figure 13: Use of justice providers

![Use of justice providers](image)

Issuance and Enforcement of Judgments

Among those who had used a justice provider in the twelve months preceding both assessments, further inquiry was conducted as to the issuance and enforcement of judgements. For all justice providers that had been used in both assessments an increase in the rate of enforcement of the judgements issued was observed. The greatest increase was observed with regard to the enforcement of judgements issued by the court, rising from a little over one half (53\%) in Wave 1 to almost nine in every ten (88\%) in Wave 2. Enforcement of judgements from traditional elders rose from 70\% in Wave 1 to 77\% in Wave 2, in the case of religious leaders, there was a rise from 73\% in Wave 1 to 82\% in Wave 2. See table 2 below.

\textsuperscript{17} Justice Providers, Focus Group Discussion, April 14, 2016.
\textsuperscript{18} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{19} Justice Providers, Focus Group Discussion, January 4, 2015
Table 2: Issuance and enforcement of judgements

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Entities that were consulted on matters of justice</th>
<th>Judgments issued and enforced</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Wave 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Court</td>
<td>53%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Traditional Elders</td>
<td>70%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious Leaders</td>
<td>73%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Despite the marked improvement, the prosecutor who was interviewed as a key informant during the Wave 2 assessment was of the opinion that enforcement, particularly of the decisions of the formal court was still a big challenge. He stated that,

*Enforcement of laws is really a problem in the district, though only four cases filed an appeal against the judgment. However, it remains a big challenge.*

With regard to decision from elders, enforcement was not seen as a big challenge due to the popular support from the community and the government. An elder speaking in a Key informant interview during the Wave 2 assessment said,

*If an enforcement problem arises, the government is there to support us and a person who refuses the verdict of the elders will be ostracized from the rest of the clan members.*

The involvement of the traditional elders at all stages of the case was also said to aid in the enforcement of the consequent decision,

*...Moreover, the elders will accompany every process of the case until the verdict is enforced, especially those coming from the offender’s side, because they have to prove to the other party, that they are ready to resolve the matter peacefully.*

Where the religious leaders were concerned, the main reason for enforcement of judgements was said to be the religious obligation of the parties involved, rather than the threat of force or being ostracised. A religious leader said in a key informant interview,

*We do not use force; the people are confident and trust us. We judge based on the Islamic law, so the people will accept because it is their religion that decided.*

Those sentiments were echoed by a participant in the women FGD, who stated,

*We prefer to approach the religious leaders and the religious court, because we are Muslims, and we submit our consent in advance that we shall fulfill whatever the ruling will be, and in that way we enforce the verdict.*

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20 Prosecutor, Key Informant Interview, April 15, 2016.
21 Key Traditional Elder, Key informant Interview, April 14, 2016.
22 Ibid.
23 Key Religious Leader, Key Informant Interview, April 14, 2016.
24 Women, April 13, 2016.
Perception of Justice Providers

As discussed above, the informal justice providers were seen during both assessment periods to be more popular than their formal counterparts. Elders were said to play a central role in conflict resolution and the provision of security during the Wave 1 and 2 assessments. A participant in the elders’ FGD in the Wave 1 assessment commented:

In Kismayo, elders prevent violence by delivering justice. Elders have rules and regulations governing them in addition to local acceptance; many residents find elders more accessible and honest in their services…elders have no weakness; they are like the shadow that moves from one side to the other side.25

Furthermore, participants in the youth FGD added that:

Elders are the most preferred and trusted simply because of their various roles. For instance, they mediate between conflicting parties…. in times of reconciliation, they are reliable…. and often they seem more realistic and objective when handling different community issues unlike politicians.26

Those attributes had contributed to a high level of trust in the informal justice providers which consequently led to high levels of trust as stated by a participant in the youth FGD held during the Wave 1 assessment:

Respect is what elders reflect… elders are highly respected by the Kismayo community… they are more knowledgeable about the past and the present challenges and are more contextual, which the people appreciate.27

Religious leaders were said to be trustworthy because of the faith of those they served as was indicated by a participant in the governance providers FGD during the Wave 2 assessment:

We prefer the religion because it is ours, and we are happy with its judgments and its procedures.28

Most Trusted Justice Provider

When respondents in the household surveys in both assessments were asked to state whom among the justice providers they trusted the most, the traditional elders were the most mentioned in both instances (61%: Wave 1 and 43%: Wave 2). Religious leaders, who had been the least, mentioned in Wave 1 (14%) saw a notable rise in popularity as justice providers in Wave 2, being mentioned by a portion almost equal to that of respondents that had mentioned traditional elders (42%). The court had been mentioned by one quarter (25%) of the sample in Wave 1 and 15% in Wave 2 as shown in figure 14.

25 Traditional Elders, Focus Group Discussion, January 3, 2015
26 Youth, Focus Group Discussion, January 3, 2015
27 Ibid.
28 Governance Providers, Focus Group Discussion, April 14, 2016
Challenges Faced by the Formal Justice System

When the Wave 1 assessment was conducted, the courts were newly established and there was a backlog of cases waiting to be heard. The transitional period was characterised by scepticism among the public as well as concerns about the meagre resources that were at time, available to the courts.29 Internally displaced persons informed OCVP researcher that:

> There is lack of justice and the formal courts are still new ... it is the limited infrastructure that makes the formal justice system inaccessible, hence many turn to informal justice services, mainly elders.”

The Elders in their FGD, expressed the opinion that the courts were not accessible to the poor and marginalised in the community:

> Justice as it is today, in Kismayo community, is for the rich, powerful and affluent only.31

By the time of the Wave 2 assessment, it was observed that resource constraints still plagued the formal justice sector. The prosecutor who spoke as a Key informant intimated:

> In the justice department, we need constant and adequate salaries. The current administration is trying their best to pay us, but they do not pay on monthly basis, and it cannot be called a salary. This will have an impact on the way we offer justice in the real sense of the term. 32

A similar issue was raised in the justice FGD in the same assessment, which pertained to the lack of provision of monthly and sufficient salaries and logistical facilities, which would facilitate the work expected of the justice staff:

> It is difficult to expect justice from a judge who was not given any salary for four months. We risk our lives in fulfilling justice duties, by walking all the way to the residences of the accused to give them the summons of the court without a vehicle or even a bodyguard.32

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29 Justice Providers, Focus Group Discussion, January 3, 2015
30 Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs), Focus Group Discussion, January 2, 2015
31 Traditional Elders, Focus Group Discussion, January 3, 2015
32 Prosecutor, Key Informant Interview, April 15, 2016.
A member of the justice providers FGD further lamented:

“We need housing allowances, constant salary and security packages because our lives are at risk”.

Complaints about the lack of fairness persisted in the Wave 2 assessment, with a woman involved in an FGD stating:

The justice system is not fair, there has to be a system review and intervention. Moreover, women should be involved in the justice system as judges and prosecutors.

Confidence in the Formal Justice System

The proportion of respondents expressing confidence in the formal justice system as a whole dropped from 70% in Wave 1 to 58% in Wave 2 although the portion of those who stated outright that they were not confident in the system dropped slightly from 23% in Wave 1 to 20% in Wave 2. It is also noteworthy to observe that there was a marked increase in the proportion of non-responses from 7% in Wave 1 to 21% in Wave 2. Figure 15 illustrates.

Figure 15: Confidence in the formal justice system

![Confidence in the formal justice system](image)

Perception of the Performance of the Court – Year to Year Trend

During the Wave 1 assessment, over one half (54%) of the household survey respondents that the performance of the court had improved in the twelve months leading up to the assessment compared to the previous year. In the Wave 2 assessment, the portion of respondents that held a similar opinion accounted for almost one quarter (23%) of the sample, with more than a half (56%) feeling that there had been no change. In both assessments, only 2% of the respondents felt that there had been a decline in the performance of the court. Figure 16 provides a detailed breakdown.

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33Justice Providers, Focus Group Discussion April 13, 2016
34Ibid.
35Women, Focus Group Discussion, April 13, 2016.
Figure 16: Perception of the Performance of the Court – Year-to-Year Trend

Wave 1
- Improved: 54%
- No change: 30%
- Decline: 2%
- Don't know/ No responses: 15%

Wave 2
- Improved: 23%
- No change: 56%
- Decline: 2%
- Don't know/ No responses: 19%
Governance

Each of the four districts in Jubaland is headed by a District Commissioner who is appointed by the President. In accordance with this, the District Commissioner, who in turn appoints respective chairpersons for each village (sub-division) and neighbourhood, heads the Local Government in Kismayo. The neighbourhood chairperson represents the smallest group, and is responsible for fifty households. The Local Government, under the ambit of the Central State Government (Jubaland), assumes responsibility for provision of services including tax administration, sanitation, hygiene, security provision, and education. However, there remains some confusion between the roles and functions of the Central Government and the Federal Government of Somalia as Federalism is yet to take its deep roots in the country.

Awareness of the Council and its Role

Awareness of the existence of a local council increased sharply from 2% in the Wave 1 assessment to more than one half (56%) of the respondents in the Wave 2 assessment. One quarter (26%) of the respondents in Wave 2 still claimed that there was no local council in Kismayo, though this was a great reduction in proportion from Wave 1 where 93% of the sample had held a similar opinion. See figure 17.

Figure 17: Respondents' awareness of the existence of local council

Issues Facing the Community

During the Wave 1 and 2 assessments, respondents gave their opinions to what they believed to be the most pressing local issues. Lack of water ranked amongst the most mentioned concerns in both periods of investigation, having been the most mentioned in Wave 1 by two-thirds (67%) of the respondents and the second most mentioned in Wave 2 by eight in every ten respondents (82%). At 87%, unemployment was the most mentioned issue in the Wave 2 assessment, up from 49% in the Wave 1 assessment. Poor health (61%: Wave 1 and 72%: Wave 2); poor education (54%: Wave 1 and 66%: Wave 2); poor sanitation (52%: Wave 1 and 50%: Wave 2); lack of infrastructure (37%: Wave 1 and 41%: Wave 2) and poor economy (32% in each wave) were among other issues that remained
dominant social problems across both assessments. Table 3 below provides a more detailed breakdown.

Table 3: Most Pressing Local Issues

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Most pressing local issues</th>
<th>Waves</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Wave 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lack of water</td>
<td>67%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Drought</td>
<td>14%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lack of infrastructure</td>
<td>37%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poor sanitation</td>
<td>52%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poor health</td>
<td>61%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployment</td>
<td>49%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poor Education</td>
<td>54%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shortage of electricity supply</td>
<td>14%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poor economy</td>
<td>32%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Charcoal production/deforestation</td>
<td>23%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Insecurity</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender-based violence</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bad health centres</td>
<td>24%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Base</td>
<td>202</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Participation in Local Government Consultations

Participation in local governance consultations remained low, increasing from 1% in the Wave 1 assessment to just 9% in the Wave 2 assessment as shown in figure 18.

Figure 18: Participation in local government consultations

During the Wave 1 assessment, the local governance involved in an FGD claimed that they met twice a week to discuss matters of significance to the community.36 It was also stated that elders and other community stakeholders such as women’s groups and youth committees were invited to meetings held at the administrative headquarters or at the Social Affairs Office.37 In agreement with those assertions, the elders also spoke of the consultative process with governance providers,

36 Local governance providers, Focus Group Discussion, January 3, 2015
37 Deputy District Commissioner, Key Informant Interview, January 6, 2015
adding that recently their work had resulted in improvements in hygiene and sanitation. In addition, there had been work on road rehabilitation, including filling of potholes to deter planting of roadside bombs.\(^{38}\)

However, some participants in the FGD with IDPs found the claims of consultation to be dubious, with the IDP chairperson asserting that:

\[ \text{The administration does not consult with anyone. They just sit and implement issues as they see fit.}^{39} \]

At the time of the Wave 2 assessment, the Deputy District Commissioner informed OCVP that there were various groups of stakeholders, which the administration had established to formalise channels of communication with the community. He stated:

\[ \text{We have women groups, youth, elders and village officials who are all formed by the district administration. We} \]
\[ \text{communicate all community concerns through these groups who represent the rest of the community by submitting} \]
\[ \text{community grievances and working with the government on behalf of the community.}^{40} \]

The Deputy District Commissioner further informed OCVP that there were gathering centres built in every village, with the purpose of hosting weekly local governance consultation meetings, i.e., every Thursday, where people discussed issues of concern.\(^{41}\)

**Opinions Regarding the Importance of Elected Local Officials**

Despite the low levels of participation in governance processes and the multitude of pressing issues facing the community, a majority of residents continued to believe that it is important to have elected representative at the district level as evidenced by 87% of respondents in Wave 1 and 90% of respondents in Wave 2. Figure 19 illustrates.

**Figure 19: Perception of importance of elected government officials**

![Figure 19](image)

Although it was not specifically highlighted in the qualitative discussions in the Wave 1 assessment, participants in the Wave 2 assessment reiterated the importance of having elected representatives. Particularly, the elders FGD was of the opinion that the nomination could be problematic, because it removed the link between the nominated officials and the public. As they stated:

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\(^{38}\) Traditional Elders, Focus Group Discussion, January 3, 2015  
\(^{39}\) Internally Displaced Persons Chairman, Key Informant Interview, January 3, 2015  
\(^{40}\) Deputy District Commissioner, April 15, 2016.  
\(^{41}\) Ibid
Nomination of representatives has so many problems, because it eliminates any sort of loyalty between the nominated officials and the public; rather they are more loyal to their officials who nominated them.\(^{42}\)

Emphasising the capacity of elections to promote accountability, another elder stated that:

> The elected officials will always be dependent on the community for their political career, because election will always be there, and if they do not fulfil the requirements of the people, they will not be re-elected. Hence, having that fear, they will be more close to the public.\(^{43}\)

Participants in the women’s FGD also discussed the importance of elections, with a participant pointing out that the current Jubaland administration was now based on districts and settlements rather than 4.5 power sharing formula.\(^{44}\) As a result, even some clans, which had never been represented in previous governments, had gotten shares in the administration. However, she insisted that election is better in the effort to make the officials accountable to the public. As she stated,

> Election is better than nomination. Hence we would like to elect our officials so that we make the right choices and make sure that they are accountable to us, because it our destiny.\(^{45}\)

**Perception of the Council’s Performance**

During the Wave 1 assessment, resource constraints were identified as the local government’s main limitation in carrying out its mandate.\(^{46}\) This was said to affect several areas negatively, ranging from payment of local government officials\(^{47}\) to the provision of security and other facilities, which are necessary for implementing law and order.\(^{48}\)

Lack of unity, clannism, and limited awareness of the roles and responsibilities of the different government departments were also recognised hindrances to effective service delivery.\(^{49}\) Local government providers pointed out that there was a low level of awareness, even among themselves, with respect to administrative matters including work processes, coordination, and lines of communication.\(^{50}\) Other participants confirmed this, including the youth who stated that the concept of government was still relatively new owing to the fact that the past twenty-four years had been characterised by wars, which were predominantly clan-based, and the absence of any formal administration or recognised system of governance. They expressed that they had little knowledge concerning government and governance.\(^{51}\)

During the Wave 2 assessment, while acknowledging that the administration had come a long way in the provision of services despite its resource constraints, qualitative discussants cautioned that the focus on supporting the maintenance of security within the town was myopic. The Key traditional elder highlighted the danger that Al-Shabaab still posed to the town in this way:

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\(^{42}\)Elder and Religious Leaders, April 13, 2016.

\(^{43}\)Ibid.

\(^{44}\)A tribal based political scale used to share political seats in the Somali governments.

\(^{45}\)Women, April 13, 2016.

\(^{46}\)Deputy District Commissioner, April 15, 2016.

\(^{47}\)Ibid

\(^{48}\)Security Officer, Key Informant Interview, January 6, 2015

\(^{49}\)Deputy District Commissioner, April 15, 2016.

\(^{50}\)Local governance providers, Focus Group Discussion, January 3 2015

\(^{51}\)Kismayo Youth, Focus Group Discussion, January 3, 2015
Al-Shabaab is a major security threat to the people. They collect cattle and recruit children forcefully. They also dam wells with beans and poison them to force people to endanger themselves by contending with crocodiles in the river.\textsuperscript{52}

He further added that when the AMISOM troops and the Somali government forces capture an area formerly occupied by the Al-Shabaab, they would it immediately, resulting in the area being retaken by Al-Shabaab.\textsuperscript{53} For instance, he talked about how recently through a joint operation, the Somali government forces and the Kenyan troops had captured a town located 30Km away from Kismayo. The town was said to have abundant water supply with the potential to produce enough water for even Kismayo. Unfortunately, they had abandoned it and Al-Shabaab had recaptured the town. The same had happened in in two other locations known as Birole and Berxaani.\textsuperscript{54}

During the Wave 1 assessment, the single respondent who had answered the question as to what services he believed the local council to provide had said that those services included education, health services and security. In the second assessment, 112 respondents answered the question and their responses ranged from security (64%), justice (17%), education (9%), health (9%), agriculture (4%), sanitation (4%), to infrastructure (2%). Notably, a little more than one quarter of them (28%) claimed that the council provides no services. See table 4 below.

**Table 4: Opinions Regarding Service Provision**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Opinion regarding the services providing by the local council</th>
<th>Waves</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Wave 1</td>
<td>Wave 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>64%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Justice</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>17%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Infrastructure</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sanitation</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No service</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>28%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Base</strong></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>112</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Perception of the Performance of the Local Council – Year-to-Year Trend**

When asked about their perception of the council’s performance in the year of assessment compared to the previous year, 10% of the respondents in the Wave 2 assessment felt that there had been an improvement while 42% felt that there had been no change and 2% felt that there had been a decline, while nearly half of the respondents (46%) did not give response. In the Wave 1 assessment, vast majority of the respondents (98%) did not know what to answer regarding the performance of the local council. Only 2% had felt that there had been an improvement. Figure 20 illustrates.

\textsuperscript{52}Key Traditional Elder, April 14, 2016.
\textsuperscript{53}Ibid
\textsuperscript{54}Ibid.
Figure 20: Perception of the Performance of the local council – Year-to-Year Trend

Wave 2
- Improved: 10%
- No Change: 42%
- Declined: 2%
- Don't know/No response: 46%

Wave 1
- Improved: 2%
- No Change: 98%
Dynamics of Conflict and Violence

At the time of the Wave 1 assessment in Kismayo, the town was said to be relatively peaceful with the exception of a few isolated incidents. Relative normalcy had only recently returned since the establishment and subsequent recognition of the Jubaland state. By the time of the Wave 2 assessment, there had not been a radical escalation of violence and the number of conflicts witnessed continued to drop.

Experience with Conflict

In the household surveys, a drop was observed in the portion of respondents reporting that they had witnessed conflict between clans or groups in the twelve months preceding each of the assessments from 17% in Wave 1 to 7% in Wave 2 as shown in figure 21.

Figure 21: Account of witnessing conflict between clans or groups (last 12 months)

Reasons for Conflicts that were observed

With regard to the household surveys, during the Wave 1 assessment the causes of the conflicts observed had ranged from power/cultural struggles (60%); family disputes (43%); crimes (40%); revenge (23%); lack of justice (9%); to resources (3%). In the Wave 2 assessment, the conflicts that were observed had been caused by resources (50%), power/cultural struggles (21%), revenge (14%), crimes (14%) and family disputes (14%). Table 5 below illustrates.

Power/cultural struggle

At the time of the Wave 1 assessment, the force of Al-Shabaab had already witnessed notable dwindling in the face of the coalition between AMISOM and the Somali National Army and the sporadic attacks that took place had taken on the form of guerrilla warfare, characterised by the planting of explosives. Speaking in general, the elder also alluded to conflict between ‘groups

55 Local Elder, Key Informant Interview, January 3, 2015
which were trying to control and rule the city’ that they said was compounded by the excessive use of clan power and clan-based violence.\textsuperscript{56}

During the Wave 2 assessment, power struggles were said to be a major factor that not only caused conflicts, but also perpetuated and encouraged all sorts of injustice, systematic subjugation and dominance. A member of the women FGD expressed how the people of Kismayo have experienced a large amount of conflicts due to issues of power. As she told the OCVP:

\textit{The people of Kismayo have witnessed so many conflicts between rival clan militias over the control of the town, some of them backed by remote allies, which not only caused the loss of lives, but retarded the growth of the town and destroyed its infrastructure.}\textsuperscript{57}

Table 5: Causes of Conflict Observed

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cause of Conflict</th>
<th>Waves</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Wave 1</td>
<td>Wave 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resources (land, water)</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Family disputes</td>
<td>43%</td>
<td>14%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crimes</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>14%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Power/cultural struggle</td>
<td>60%</td>
<td>21%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lack of justice</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Revenge</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>14%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Base</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Experience with Crime and Violence

As with accounts of witnessing conflict between clans or groups, the proportion of respondents that reported witnessing crime and or violence against someone outside the homestead also decreased across the two assessments from 27% in Wave 1 to 11% in Wave 2 as shown by figure 22 below.

Figure 22: Account of witnessing crime or violence (last 12 months)

Perception of Safety

\textsuperscript{56} Ibid
\textsuperscript{57} Women, Focus Group Discussion, April 13, 2016
The perception of safety remained very high across both periods of investigation with 90% and 91% of the respondents in Wave 1 and Wave 2 respectively stating that they felt either fairly safe or very safe. Though the portion of those who felt rather unsafe remained almost equal (8%: Wave 1 and 9%: Wave 2) none of the respondents in the Wave 2 assessment stated that they felt very unsafe, as 2% had intimated during the Wave 1 assessment. See figure 23 below.

Figure 23: Perception of safety in the district

In the Wave 2 assessment, two-thirds (66%) of the respondents felt that there had been an increase in the levels of safety in Kismayo during the year leading up to the assessment compared to the previous year whereas one third (33%) felt that there had been no change. In the Wave 1 assessment, 94% of respondents had felt that there had been an increase in levels of safety compared to the previous year and 5% had felt that there had been no change. See figure 24.

Figure 24: Perception of safety in the district - yearly trend
Conclusion

A comparative analysis of the results of the District Conflict and Security Assessments is useful in helping to understand the direction of community perception in relation to the thematic areas of study, namely governance; security; justice; conflict and violence. The information presented in this report provides an indication of potential changing trends in the issues under investigation by comparing the two Waves of DCSCAs for Kismayo (Wave 1: 2015 and Wave 2: 2016).

The district of Kismayo falls under the administrative stewardship of the District Commissioner who is a presidential appointee. The Commissioner in turn appoints chairpersons for each village/subdivision and neighbourhood. The neighbourhood chairpersons represent fifty households each. In this formation, the local government is responsible for provision of services including tax administration, sanitation, hygiene, security provision, and education. Awareness of the existence of the council was observed to rise sharply between the two assessments. However, participation in consultative processes with this council remained low, only increasing marginally from Wave 1 to Wave 2. Lack of water, poor education and poor health remained top concerns for the community during both assessments. A majority respondents during both assessments expressed positive views regarding the importance of having elected representatives at the district level. During the Wave 1 assessment, respondents identified lack of unity, clannism, and limited awareness of the roles and responsibilities of the different government departments as the main hindrances to effective service delivery. In the Wave 2 assessment, the main concern was the excessive reliance on the maintenance of security within the town without considering the encroachment of the Al-Shabaab on the outskirts and outlying villages.

Security provision in Kismayo was observed to be highly militarised in character, with the AMISOM troops and the Somali National Army being more visible than the police service. A majority of respondents in both the Wave 1 and 2 assessments reported an awareness of the existence of the police though when asked to whom they would prefer to report in the event of a civil matter, a petty crime or serious crime, they mostly chose traditional elders. It is noteworthy to observe however, that despite the constant dominance of the traditional elders in this respect, the popularity of the police was seen to improve steadily from the first assessment to the second. Among the challenges attributed to the police service were the low capacity of the officers, lack of resources and clan politics. While the police had been the most trusted security provider in the Wave 1 assessment, the traditional elders took the title in the Wave 2 assessment, other conversely, the levels of confidence attributed to the police in responding to crime and violence were observed to increase from Wave 1 to Wave 2. However, there was decrease in the proportion of respondents who believed that there had been an improvement in the performance of the police in each year of investigation compared to the previous year.

After more than two decades without formal justice institutions, the residents of Kismayo had grown to place reliance on the age-old informal systems comprising the traditional elders and religious leaders. However, with a return to peace and stability formal courts had returned to Kismayo and by the time, the Wave 2 assessment was conducted, there was a District Court, a Regional Court and Court of Appeal operating in the town. Awareness of the existence of the courts was equally high in both waves and usage followed a similar trend with traditional elders being the most utilised,
followed by religious leaders and the formal courts. Usage of any of the justice providers was however observed to have fallen slightly. There was an increase in the rate of issuance and enforcement of judgements from all justice providers. Traditional elders and religious were seen to be more popular than the formal court in both waves of the Kismayo assessments.

With regard to conflict and violence, it was observed that since the liberation of Kismayo by the AMISOM and Somali National Forces, there had been a notable decrease in the occurrence of violent conflict. To wit, the portion of respondents reporting that they had witnessed conflict between clans and or groups in Kismayo over the twelve months preceding each assessment reduced by ten percentage points across the two waves. In the Wave 1 assessment power and cultural struggles had been the leading cause of violence while during the Wave 2 assessment the largest portion of conflicts had been caused by disputes over land and resources. Other causes of conflict included family disputes, crimes, revenge killings and lack of justice. In a similar vein, the portions of respondents reporting that they had witnessed crime and/or violence against someone outside the homestead in the twelve months preceding each assessment also reduced notably across the waves. Furthermore, the proportion of respondent stating that they felt safe in Kismayo remained high across the two waves as did the proportion of respondents stating that safety had improved over the past year in each of the assessments.