Safety and security
District baseline report

GALKAYO
Safety and Security District Baseline Report: Galkayo

Authors

• Yann-Cédric Quero, Criminologist, Senior analyst (Ph.D. candidate, University of Montreal)
• Mireille Widmer, Community Safety Specialist, (UNDP Somalia)
• Marie De Lutz, Analyst (Saferworld)
• Lindsey Peterson, Analyst (UNDP Somalia/OCVP).

Copyright

Published and Copyright ©2011 by the Observatory of Conflict and Violence Prevention

No part of this book may be reproduced or utilised in any form or by any means electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording or by any information storage and retrieved system without permission in writing.

First Edition (August 2011)
First Printing (February 2012)

Inquiries should be addressed to:
Observatory of Conflict and Violence Prevention (OCVP)
Hargeisa, Somaliland
info@ocvp.org
http://www.ocvp.org
Acknowledgements

The Somali Observatory of Conflict and Violence Prevention (OCVP) wishes to thank the following organizations (in alphabetical order):

Right from the beginning of this project, the Danish Demining Group participated in consultations on the development of the survey tools, particularly the Crime and Victimization Survey (CVS). In addition, it provided logistical and substantive support for the facilitation of several rounds of focus group discussions, including training of local non-governmental organization (NGO) partners, facilitation and recording of the proceedings, including the District Safety Plans. It also helped gather additional data for the district mapping in Burao, Las Anod, Bossaso and Galkayo.

The NGOs Haqsoor (Burao), Hornpeace (Las Anod), SORSO (Bossaso) and KAALO (Galkayo) provided local support for the facilitation of the district mapping and sampling, the crime and victimization survey, and focus group discussions. SOYDEN and the Centre for Peace and Democracy also provided mapping information from four Mogadishu districts and supported the implementation of the CVS.

The International Centre for the Prevention of Crime (Montreal, Canada) provided expert feedback on the development of the CVS.

The Japan Centre for Conflict Prevention took a leading role in the development of the survey tools and methodological guidance, primarily the CVS and the focus group questionnaires. It oversaw the sampling of districts necessary to conduct the CVS, participated in the training of enumerators, set up the database, and oversaw data entry and cleaning.

The Observatory of Conflict and Violence Prevention (OCVP) contributed to the collection of additional information from Burao, Las Anod, Bossaso and Galkayo for the finalization of the Community Safety and Security Analysis.

SAACID contributed useful insights for the development of the CVS.

Saferworld was involved from the beginning in consultations on the development of the various survey tools, particularly the CVS. It took a leading role in collecting and analysing information from the focus group discussions, including additional desk-based reviews, for the production of the initial Community Safety and Security Analyses for Burao, Las Anod, Bossaso and Galkayo. For Galkayo and Burao, Saferworld also performed a first statistical analysis of the data from the CVS, including additional key informant interviews.

SOCDA took a leading role in the implementation of the CVS. From the beginning of the project, it participated in the development of the CVS, recruited and oversaw the local teams of enumerators, participated in their training and supervision, as well as contributed to data entry and cleaning.

SOYDEN took the initiative of conducting focus group discussions in four Mogadishu districts, providing precious additional qualitative information on patterns of crime and violence in Mogadishu.

The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) in Somalia, in particular the Armed Violence Reduction project within the Rule of Law and Security Programme, provided overall substantive, technical and financial support.
Table of Contents

Executive summary........... 8

1. Introduction............ 11

2. Methodology............ 12
2.1. District mapping........ 12
2.2. Crime and Victimization Survey........ 12
2.3. Focus groups........ 12
2.4. Key informant interviews........ 13
2.5. Validation........ 13

3. Mapping of Galkayo District........ 14
3.1. Historical background........ 14
3.2. Geography and demographics........ 15
3.3. Resources and the economy........ 17
3.4. Access to basic services........ 17
3.5. Governance........ 18

4. Perceptions of insecurity........ 20

5. Forms of insecurity and violence........ 22
5.1. Homicide........ 22
5.2. Assault or physical attack........ 23
5.2.1. Victims........ 24
5.2.2. Perpetrators........ 24
5.4. Violence against women and girls........ 26
5.5. Violence against children........ 26
5.6. Abductions........ 27
5.7. Property crime........ 27
5.8. Confrontations with state security forces........ 28
5.9. Conflict dynamics........ 28
5.10. Threat of violent Islamic groups........ 29

6. Drivers and risk factors........ 30
6.1. Social factors........ 30
6.2. Economic factors........ 31
6.3. Political/governance factors
6.4. Firearms and security-related factors

7. Perceived performance of justice and security actors
7.1. Comparative perspectives
7.1.1. General perception
7.1.2. Reporting
7.2. The Police
7.2.1. Mapping
7.2.2. General perception
7.2.3. Response
7.3. Statutory courts
7.3.1. Mapping
7.3.2. General perception
7.3.3. Response
7.4. Women
7.5. Youth
7.6. Elders and religious leaders
7.7. Business community
7.8. Other justice and security providers

8. Recommendations
8.1. Improving the capacity of the police
8.2. Improving prisons
8.3. Improving the capacity of the judiciary
8.4. Involving the community in safety and security
8.5. Demobilization of freelance militia
8.6. Improving the capacity of the District Safety Committee (DSC)
8.7. Improving the safety of internally displaced persons (IDPs)
8.8. Providing alternatives for youth
8.9. Improving moral behaviour
Figures

Figure 1: Subdivisions of Galkayo town
Figure 2: Estimated number of households in Galkayo District, by North/South and urban/rural
Figure 3: Clan of Galkayo head of household (weighted %)
Figure 4: Residential status (Weighted %)
Figure 5: Occupation of the head of household, by North/South Galkayo (weighted %)
Figure 6: Daily spending on food per household (US$) (Weighted %)
Figure 7: Education of head of household (Freq. %)
Figure 8: Assistance received after sexual violence (Freq.)
Figure 9: Change in perceived safety, North/South Galkayo (Weighted %)
Figure 10: Change in perceived safety over the last 12 months, by gender (Freq. %)
Figure 11: Perceived level of safety walking after dark (Weighted %)
Figure 12: Perceived level of safety walking after dark, North/South Galkayo (Weighted %)
Figure 13: Activities avoided due to insecurity (Weighted %)
Figure 14: Number of crimes witnessed (Freq. %)
Figure 15: Perception of safety and actual crime levels, North/South Galkayo (Freq. %)
Figure 16: Homicide by age and gender (Freq.)
Figure 17: Homicide by victim’s clan (Weighted %)
Figure 18: Homicide by victim’s status (Weighted %)
Figure 19: Physical attack or assault: location and time of day (Freq. %)
Figure 20: Type of weapons used for assault (Freq. %)
Figure 21: Assault by gender and age of victim (Freq.)
Figure 22: Victims of assault or attack by clan association (Weighted %)
Figure 23: Experience of assault/attack in the last 12 months, by clan, North/South Galkayo (Weighted %)
Figure 24: Profile of perpetrators of assault (Freq. %)
Figure 25: Type of weapon used for assault for the three principal perpetrators’ profile (Freq. %)
Figure 26: Experience of assault or physical attack over the 12 months prior to the survey by resident status (Weighted %)
Figure 27: Sexual violence: location and time of day (Freq.)
Figure 28: Age of victims of sexual abuse (Freq.)
Figure 29: Number of assaults and physical attacks against children, by age (Freq.)
Figure 30: Number of sexual assaults against children, by age (Freq.)
Figure 31: Frequency of property crime (Freq.)
Figure 32: Type of property crime (Freq. %)
Figure 33: Month of property crime (Freq. %)
Figure 34: Perpetrators of property crime (Freq. %)
Figure 35: Frequency of clan disputes (Freq. %) 28
Figure 36: Most common reasons for clan disputes (Freq. %) 28
Figure 37: Clan disputes by month (Freq. %) 29
Figure 38: Firearms possession, by residential status (Weighted %) 32
Figure 39: Types of firearms available (Freq. %) 32
Figure 40: Main reason for owning a firearm (Freq. %) 33
Figure 41: Availability of arms over the last 12 months, North/South Galkayo (Weighted %) 33
Figure 42: Threat from remote-controlled or time bombs, North/South Galkayo (Weighted %) 33
Figure 43: Perceived presence of landmines and UXOs (Weighted %) 33
Figure 44: Levels of trust in the public authorities who serve as security providers (Weighted %) 34
Figure 45: Reporting property crime (Freq. %) 34
Figure 46: Public authorities to whom property crimes were first reported (Freq.) 34
Figure 47: Reporting assault (Freq. %) 34
Figure 48: Public authorities to whom assault crimes were first reported, by gender (Weighted %) 35
Figure 49: Reporting sexual violence (Freq. %) 35
Figure 50: Reporting homicide (Freq. %) 35
Figure 51: Level of trust in the police (Freq. %) 35
Figure 52: Access to the police (Freq. %) 35
Figure 53: Speed of response (Freq. %) 35
Figure 54: Trust in the police, North/South Galkayo (Weighted %) 36
Figure 55: Accessibility of the police, by subdivision (Freq. %) 36
Figure 56: Satisfaction with police response (Freq.) 36
Figure 57: Level of trust in the courts (Weighted %) 37
Figure 58: Trust in the courts, North/South Galkayo (Weighted %) 37
Figure 59: Physical accessibility to the courts (Weighted %) 37
Figure 60: Accessibility of the courts, by subdivision (Freq. %) 37
Figure 61: Speed of court response (Weighted %) 37
Figure 62: Reasons to avoid court (Freq. %) 37
Figure 63: Reasons for female non-participation in community and townhall meetings (Freq. %) 38
Figure 64: Trust in religious leaders, by gender (Weighted %) 39
Figure 65: Trust in the community elders, by gender of respondent (Weighted %) 39
Executive summary

Galkayo District is characterized by being divided under two different regional administrations: Puntland in the north, and Galmudug to the south. This administrative/political division dates back at least to colonial times and reflects in some way the area’s clan composition, mainly the Darod to the north, and the Hawiye to the south, with a number of derived sub-clans. However, although the district’s division has pervasive consequences on conflict dynamics and cooperation between governance and security actors, it should not be viewed as an ineluctable – or even the principal – driver of insecurity.

Insecurity is rife in Galkayo: 137 of the Crime and Victimization Survey (CVS) respondent households witnessed a total of 370 crimes during the 12 months prior to the survey. The overwhelming majority of respondents from South Galkayo (94%) felt that security had been improving, whereas in North Galkayo, a slight majority (54%) felt that security had deteriorated in the last 12 months. Women are also slightly less optimistic than men in their assessment of security trends.

Actors of insecurity identified during focus group discussions include piracy groups, who use Galkayo as a logistics base and are involved in a number of violent and non-violent activities, such as prostitution, killings, car accidents, and drug and alcohol use. Street gangs and violent Islamic groups were also mentioned. The area around the Green Line separating North and South Galkayo is known as a particularly lawless area, especially Warshed Galey in Garsoor 1 subdivision.

Perceptions of safety and crime rates differ markedly from North to South, with the North more insecure than the South, with the exception of incidents of sexual violence. Forty-five cases of homicide were recorded by the CVS, corresponding to 6 percent of households. Internally displaced person (IDP) households have particularly been victimized; 12 percent were affected by a homicide in the past 12 months. This rate is even higher among the Digil Mirifle specifically, with 20 percent of households affected by a homicide. Focus groups noted different dynamics resulting in homicide, namely traditional revenge killings, and more elusive “unknown killings” or targeted assassination of political or community leaders.

In addition, the CVS recorded 73 cases of assaults (10% of the total sample, but 50% of respondents to the question). Assault rates were significantly higher in North Galkayo, where 54 percent of respondent households experienced assault, compared to 32 percent of respondent households from the South. These occurred principally in the street at night, and at home in the afternoon. Indeed, insecurity inside the home is a particular concern in Galkayo. Victims were male in 60 percent of cases; female in 40 percent. The Darod clan registered the highest proportion of assault cases – 60 percent of respondent households. Perpetrators included organized armed groups in 43 percent of cases, and individual criminals in 37 percent of cases.

In addition, 27 respondent households were the target of a property crime. These mainly took two forms: house burglaries (44% of cases) and street theft (37% of cases). Both were predominantly linked to organized criminal groups. Focus group discussions indeed pointed out the alarming rising trend of organized crime such as from street gangs, piracy groups and drug dealers.

Violence against women is highlighted in the CVS through corresponding rates of assault, homicide, sexual violence and kidnapping. Ten cases of sexual violence were recorded by the CVS; in all cases where gender was stated, the victim was a female. Focus groups and key informants shed further light on domestic violence, a phenomenon strongly supported by cultural norms viewing violence against women as a purely private matter, if not an acceptable practice.

Other types of violence explored through the CVS and focus group discussions included clan disputes, which generally occurred once a year and appear mainly motivated by revenge or competition over resources. The threat of violent Islamic groups was also mentioned as a concern.

A number of drivers and risk factors were identified through focus group discussions and by key informants; some are related to weak institutions, whether state justice and security actors, or traditional justice mechanisms that appear powerless before new forms and actors of violence. Socio-economic factors include clan identity, population
movements that hamper social control mechanisms, norms condoning violence against women, the lack of socio-economic opportunities, limited resources leading to competition, and – particularly in Galkayo – religious differences. The history of violence itself is a factor perpetuating violence if left unaddressed. Other risk factors are the use of qat, a mild stimulant, which, over time, can result in emotional instability and manic and irrational behaviour, as well as the pervasiveness of firearms.

The use of firearms is particularly acute in Galkayo: according to the CVS, 47 percent of assaults in the district were committed with firearms, mostly high-powered assault rifles. Perceived trends in firearms availability differ markedly between North and South Galkayo: 69 percent of respondents from the North stated that firearms had become far less available in the 12 months preceding the survey, while 73 percent of respondents from South Galkayo stated that they had become slightly to far more available. Remote-controlled or time bombs are considered a high threat in North Galkayo, but much less of an issue in South Galkayo, whereas mines and unexploded ordnances (UXOs) are perceived to be more of a threat in South Galkayo than in the North.

The CVS also evaluated how the formal and non-state justice and security actors were perceived. The religious leaders are the most trusted in the community in Galkayo, followed by the elders, while the police and particularly the courts are trusted far less. It should be noted, however, that women have more faith in state actors than men, particularly the police, to the detriment of the elders. Trust in the police and the justice system is higher in North than in South Galkayo, possibly reflecting the higher levels of stability and institutional presence in the North (Puntland).

Reporting rates to the police are low: only 15 percent of property crime, 6 percent of assault and just 2 percent of homicide are actually reported (the reporting rate of sexual violence appears to be 10%, but overall numbers are too low for the proportion to be conclusive). Even more rarely did cases lead to a court verdict. When examining to which authority a particular type of crime was reported, the CVS shows that the elders generally came first, be it assault, property crime, or even sexual violence. The police came second, and some cases of assault were also reported to religious leaders.

The CVS also evaluated the trust, accessibility and speed of response of the police and the courts. Perceptions were generally negative; however, it should be noted that the perception of accessibility varied greatly between wards both for the police and the courts. Interestingly, when rating the response of the police to actual crime, most victims reported being somewhat or very satisfied, particularly in the case of homicide and sexual violence. Too few of the crimes recorded resulted in a court verdict to be able to rate general court responses. CVS respondents stated that a perception of corruption/bribery and unfair judgments tended to keep them away from the courts.

Focus group discussions drew attention to a number of other justice and security actors. First, women assume the role of peace-builders, which is sometimes recognized, although they were also reported to encourage violence in some cases. Although youth are generally viewed as perpetrators of violence, they should also be included as peace-building because their energy is a potential source of social change. The role of elders and religious leaders was highlighted positively but with a realistic perception of their limitations in dealing with new forms and agents of violence. Similarly, focus groups reported that the business community sometimes contributed to peace-building as a way to protect their business interests, although in other instances, they funded and supported criminal activities. Finally, the role of informal security actors was mentioned, including IDP and clan militias taking over security functions due to perceived government incapacities.
1. Introduction

Evidence-based programming and policy development in the fields of community security, armed violence reduction and peace-building require a comprehensive and accurate prior analysis of insecurity. Measuring the outcome and impact of interventions to deal with insecurity is equally important, both to advance collective understanding of what works and what does not, and to hold all those involved accountable. The Somali Community Safety Framework (SCSF) is a loose consortium of organizations, local and international, non-governmental and United Nations agencies, which collectively aims at building Somali capacity to mitigate violence and insecurity in a sustainable manner. Committed to evidence-based programming, participants in the SCSF identified the collection and analysis of solid data on safety as a priority.

The value added of these data would be greatly increased if they contributed to the adoption of common indicators and methodologies feeding into a common information pool. A broad consultation process was therefore undertaken in 2009–2010 under the umbrella of the SCSF to develop a CVS that would be recognized by SCSF participants.

Somali ownership of the data and survey methodologies must be ensured. Until recently, the little data and knowledge available on causes and manifestations of insecurity – whether related to crime or conflict – generally remained within the organization that collected it, and were often lost when projects ended or key staff moved on. To contribute to local ownership, the Somali Observatory of Conflict and Violence Prevention (OCVP) is undertaking this task on behalf of participants in the SCSF, to ensure that a non-partisan academic institution will be the custodian of data and information on crime and conflict in the Somali regions. By collecting, storing and sharing the knowledge acquired, the OCVP can help ensure that interventions are guided by reliable evidence, and that their impact is measured and evaluated. It will also centralize data collection tools and methodologies, and encourage their widespread use to improve the comparability of the data collected.

UNDP Somalia is a founding member of the Somali OCVP. Through its Rule of Law and Security Programme, it supported the development and implementation of the CVS in selected Somali districts between 2009 and 2010. Specifically, this household survey was rolled out in the districts of Burao, Bossaso, Galkayo and Las Anod, as well as six Mogadishu districts (Waberi, Shangani, Hamar Weyne, Hamar Jabjab, Dharkenley and Wadjir). Locations were selected in order to cover some of the major population centres so that more people might benefit from the lessons drawn from the survey while at the same time illustrating a variety of security challenges. In particular, the locations surveyed vary between conflict, post-conflict or crime-related. The entire raw data, as well as the data collection tools and methodologies, form the initial endowment of the OCVP and are publicly available for further research.

Based on these data, UNDP Somalia then supported the drafting, on behalf of the OCVP, of five Safety and Security District Baseline Reports, which will also be translated into Somali. These analytical reports are compiled using a selection of data from the CVS, focus group results, mapping information, key informant interviews and a number of secondary sources. Results are validated by the community and authorities prior to publication. The reports will be supplemented every year by brief updates of trends based on focus group discussions and possibly new qualitative and quantitative data.

The picture of safety and security that emerges from these baseline reports then guided the elaboration of appropriate responses by communities, local and state governments. These recommendations are elaborated by the District Safety Committees (DSCs), which were established under the authority of the District Council in each location, composed of representatives of youth, women, the elders and religious leaders, local government and police/justice officials. The suggested interventions are described in District Safety Plans, which will be integrated into the District Development Framework and as part of annual planning and budgeting cycles. Local and international agencies will be able to benefit from these tools to select, design and measure the impact of ensuing interventions on the basis of this combination of data and needs assessment.

The present district baseline report is divided into eight sections. Following this introduction, the research methodology is described in Section 2. Section 3 provides a general profile (mapping) of Galkayo District, including important historical background notes. Section 4 examines the perception of insecurity, and Section 5 presents the main security concerns noted in Galkayo. The drivers and risk factors underlying these issues are then explored in Section 6. Section 7 examines the perceived performance of the justice and security actors, including the police, the courts, women, the elders and religious leaders. Finally, Section 8 presents the District Safety Plan developed in North Galkayo as a recommended response to the findings.

1 See www.somalipeacebuilding.org for more information.
2. Methodology

This Safety and Security District Baseline Report for Galkayo was prepared through a methodology that consisted of compiling data and information gathered through four research tools: a district mapping exercise, a crime and victimization survey, focus group discussions and key informant interviews. It was complemented by desk reviews of relevant published and unpublished reports. More information on the development, content and use of the various tools is available in the Monitoring and Assessment Toolkit.2

2.1. District mapping

The first tool used to gather data for this district baseline report is a mapping of the available formal and informal resources in the community to cope with insecurity. The mapping3 seeks to capture initial indications on the composition of the target community, its demographic profile and degree of social cohesion (e.g. proportion of IDPs, clan profile). Historical background information is included to reveal both traumatic events that may underpin the vulnerability of the community, and past peace initiatives that may provide important lessons learned and influence perceptions of any new peace initiatives. Existing institutions of justice, security and healthcare have been surveyed to map out the state’s capacity to enforce peace, justice and security, and provide assistance to victims of violence. Finally, such capacities for peace as civil society initiatives, conflict management mechanisms, and neighbourhood watch schemes have been mapped out because under certain conditions they could be incorporated into programmes. Knowing how information is accessed and/or circulated in the community can also be useful for future awareness-raising activities. The mapping of Galkayo District was conducted by KAALO in October 2009, and completed by a UNDP scoping assessment in the same month. Additional mapping information was collected by the Danish Demining Group (DDG) in March 2011.

2.2. Crime and Victimization Survey

The second tool used was the CVS questionnaire developed in 2009.4 It aims at providing the quantitative information necessary to establish an accurate picture of crime and victimization in target districts, and hence measure the impact of interventions. Enumerators in Galkayo were recruited by SOCDA and trained with the support of the Japan Centre for Conflict Prevention (JCCP).

The information gathered during the mapping exercise was used to determine possible geographical subdivisions in which the CVS could be conducted. Subdivisions were chosen after meeting with the local administration, partner NGOs or community elders to obtain a profile for mapping, establishing borders and determining the number of households. The researchers then finalized the survey methodology by randomized sampling of 20 households from each subdivision.

The CVS was conducted in Galkayo District between 23 November and 31 December 2009, with a total sample of 701 questionnaires collected. Subdivisions covered by the CVS in Galkayo town included Garsoor 1-4, Israac 1-4, Hormar 1-2 (North Galkayo town) and Wadajir 1-2 (South Galkayo town). Surveys collected in Hormar 1 and 2 were analysed as one subdivision. Figure 1 presents the number of questionnaires that were collected in each subdivision. It must be noted that Israac 5 and Garsoor 5 subdivisions were drawn up by the city administration in early 2010; at the time of the survey, these areas fell within Israac 4 and Garsoor 4 subdivisions, respectively. Rural settlements surveyed in the district included Bacaadwayn and Xarfo in the north, and Dagaari and Sedex Higlo in the south.

2.3. Focus groups

The third tool used was focus group discussions aimed to record perceptions of the nature of insecurity in the districts, its causes and risk factors, victims and perpetrators, and capacities for peace.6 The first round of focus group discussions was conducted by the local NGO partner KAALO in December 2009 and included six separate discussions with male and female youth, women, local elders, security institutions and religious leaders. One of the issues encountered during the first round of focus group discussions was a poor transcription of results. The focus group methodology was revised based on this experience, and a second round of focus group discussions was carried out in April 2010 by KAALO with technical support from the Danish Demining Group. This
also contained six groups, including community elders and religious leaders in a single group, the district council (North Galkayo), women, youth (male and female), the police and judiciary actors (North Galkayo), and IDPs.

It must be noted that neither round of focus group discussions included individuals from South Galkayo (Galmudug) or from rural areas. Attempts have been made through qualitative interviews to compensate for this skew by cross-validation of results.

2.4. Key informant interviews

Qualitative interviews were conducted by Saferworld in two sets. The first round of qualitative interviews was carried out between 21 May and 22 June 2010, and covered only North Galkayo District. The second round of qualitative interviews was conducted between 26 and 31 August, and covered both North and South Galkayo District. Each interview lasted between 45 minutes and 2 hours. Two interviews were group interviews, the first bringing together ten women representatives of women’s organizations of South Galkayo (Galmudug), and the second bringing together seven youth representatives of youth organizations of South Galkayo (Galmudug). Interview sources included various members of both local administrations (at the regional and district levels), community and neighbourhood-based committees, local and international civil society organizations working in peace and reconciliation, IDP settlement committees, local hospitals and clinics, and United Nations agencies. A total of 28 interviews were held. Given the constraints of information gathering, a larger proportion of organizations and individuals interviewed were from or operated in the North. Given the prevailing dynamics between North and South Galkayo, these constraints have been taken into account in the analysis process, and all attempts have been made to ensure the neutrality of results. To this end, the affiliation of interview sources (North vs. South Galkayo) was specified directly in the text where relevant, and in all references, because of its significant impact on the perceptions and understanding of context and events. Names of individuals and organizations have generally been omitted at the request of interviewees.

2.5. Validation

Results from the focus group discussions were compiled and presented first to the community in a two-day validation workshop held by KAALO in July 2010 with some 95 participants representing elders, religious groups, business groups, the District Council, the judiciary, the police, women’s and youth groups, professional associations, secondary school students (youth) and media outlets. After further desk-based reviews, a draft Community Safety and Security Analysis was written by Saferworld in September 2010 based on this information. After further editing, this was presented to the Galkayo District Safety Committee by UNDP in November 2010, during which time some additional qualitative information was received. Once quantitative data from the CVS were assembled, they were presented to representatives of the Puntland Ministry of Security, Ministry of Interior, and the Vice-Governor of Mudug Region in April 2011.

2 The Monitoring and Assessment Toolkit is available at http://www.somalipeacebuilding.org/pb-resources/maa.html
3 See Annex A of the Monitoring and Assessment Toolkit.
4 See Annex B of the Monitoring and Assessment Toolkit.
5 Each caption is followed by the reference to the corresponding question in the CVS and the number of respondents to the question (n). When this number is below 30, trends cannot reliably be inferred, and the data are only illustrative.
6 See Annex C of the Monitoring and Assessment Toolkit.
### 3. Mapping of Galkayo District

#### 3.1. Historical background

Mudug Region and Galkayo District in particular have long been considered a hotspot for violent conflict. Dating back to the Italian occupation of the region, clan and resource-based conflicts have routinely occurred there due to its diverse clan composition and strategic importance along key trading routes. Galkayo town was established in 1903 by Sultan Ali Yusuf from Hobyo. In 1908, a first conflict opposed Sayid Mohamed – better known as the Mad Mullah – and the resident community. But in 1924, Sultan Ali Yusuf faced a different opponent when the Italians battled their way into Galkayo. The city fell under Italian administration, and the colonizers proceeded from there to Bari region. The Italians ruled Galkayo from 1924 to 1939, until the British took over the administration of the region in 1941.

Colonial practices initially reinforced established clan-based lines in the area, launching a rivalry between the two dominant clan groups – the Darod and the Hawiye – which would manifest itself over the years. A major confrontation took place in 1943 during the *Hoduag* drought, which pitted the Hawiye against the Darod. Other confrontations took place in 1950 (the Dibiro conflict), 1952 (the Caado Kibir conflict), 1953 (the Caaga Dukbat conflict) and 1958 (the Teendho Balo conflict), mainly over issues of political supremacy and revenge. This started to change after independence in 1960.

Deepening social clan divisions are largely attributed to the rule of President Siad Barre. According to a Galmudug peace-building organization, under his rule, governance structures in Galkayo took into account clan composition in order to ensure a certain level of stability: if the Governor was from the North, the Mayor would be from the South. Indeed, after two conflicts in the early 1960s (the Car Tuko conflict in 1963 and the Foodcade conflict in 1964), no more major confrontations were registered until 1981. Increasing fragmentation within the sub-clans also led to scaling down conflicts to much more local confrontations. The Mudug and Galgadud Regions were demarcated in the early 1970s.

Throughout Somalia, opposition to the Barre regime began to arise in the 1980s through clan-based political groups. Barre exploited the political composition of the opposition in the period leading up to the civil war by pitting these groups against each other; this was notably the case between the Darod and the Hawiye in Galkayo (e.g. the Gawrae Dheere conflict in 1981 and the Bardagool conflict in 1988). Following the fall of Siad Barre in 1991, the United Somali Congress (USC), who had played a major part in the Mogadishu victory over the regime, attacked Galkayo. A deadly sub-clan war ensued between the Hawiye (Habar Gedir/Sa’ad) and the Darod (Majerten and Lelkase) in Galkayo and other districts in the region. Being a strategic trading centre between northern and southern Somalia as well as Ethiopia, the district became a key zone for conflicts between political parties aiming to establish power bases. These notably included the Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF), a political party associated with the Majerten sub-clan of the Darod clan family, and the USC, a party dominated by the Sa’ad sub-sub-clan of the Habar Gedir (Hawiye).

The two clans established two separate administrations in the district and town. Importantly, Puntland saw a significant rise in the number of displaced people to and from Galkayo, which complicated conflict dynamics. The SSDF regained control of the city in late summer 1991, but major confrontations between both factions nonetheless continued to occur.

Recognizing the stalemate in which their factions were locked, by 1993, prominent local political leaders Col. Abdullahi Yusuf (Omar Mohamud/Majerten/Darod) and Gen. Mohamed Farah Aideed (Sa’ad/Habar Gedir/Hawiye) eventually agreed to the Mudug Peace Agreement (MPA). This was signed between their respective armed factions, the SSDF and USC, and allowed for both parties to control their respective areas and support each other, significantly reducing conflict in the region. While this did not address political differences, the agreement did include the establishment of joint security structures involving the traditional leaders of the two opposing sides in order to contain acts of violence. The agreement was accepted by traditional leaders, the elders, religious leaders, intellectuals and women’s groups, and displaced families eventually returned to their homes. Despite occasional sub-clan revenge incidents, business could resume in Galkayo. However, certain factions within the SSDF rejected it, and the USC was preoccupied with ongoing fighting in Mogadishu, so that the MPA was never fully implemented, particularly in its security provisions.

The Puntland government was formally established in 1998, and North Galkayo immediately came under its authority. In 2006, the Galmudug administration was formally declared in the south of Mudug and the north of Galgadud. Importantly, the two administrations have managed since then to protect common interests and avert a new major outbreak of violence. Most prominently,
between 2006 and 2007, they unified their militia forces to defeat the Islamic Courts Union (ICU) and prevent it from taking over power in Galkayo. In August 2009, Puntland reformed the Galkayo administration, and collaboration proceeded particularly on issues related to security, including police operations and humanitarian access. Since the beginning of 2009, a number of small conflicts between north and south, and between governments and communities have been mitigated through mediation efforts, generally involving a combination of government representatives of one or both sides, and traditional elders or other community leaders. But tensions between clans continue to simmer, as demonstrated by a constant string of revenge killings.

### 3.2. Geography and demographics

Located on the border between Puntland and South-Central Somalia, Galkayo District, specifically Galkayo town, is a key trading centre linking Bossaso (Puntland) to the north, Mogadishu (South-Central) to the south, and Ethiopia to the west. Its geostrategic role has led to a dynamic and bustling city that accommodates travellers from afar, but has also led to mutual suspicion based on the potential and actual threats to peace of the district.

**Map of Galkayo District, with the approximate location of the Green Line separating Puntland and Galmudug**

Galkayo District contains roughly 25,000 households, around 75.3 percent of which are located in Galkayo town (Figure 2).

**Figure 2: Estimated number of households in Galkayo District, by North/South and urban/rural**

The administrative divisions of North and South Galkayo fall along historical clan lines: North Galkayo is primarily the Omar Mohamud (Majerteen/Darod), whereas South Galkayo is primarily Sa’ad (Habar Gedi/Hawiyie). Minority clans settled along the Green Line and in other areas, and IDPs settled in both North and South Galkayo, in both urban and rural settings. **Map 2** provides the approximate dividing lines between North Galkayo town and South Galkayo town, as well as rough lines of existing administrative subdivisions and wards of North Galkayo town. The boundaries of South Galkayo subdivisions are not known.

**Map 2: Puntland and Galmudug administrations**

The division line between North and South, referred to as the “green line”, is a particularly lawless area. One interview source identified Warshed Galey as the most insecure zone of Garsoor Ward, due to drug dealing and the presence of firearms, which occasionally lead to violence. The perception of Warshed Galey, and more broadly of the Garsoor 1 subdivision, as a particularly insecure zone in Galkayo town was reinforced during an interview with a Puntland-based peace-building organization, who identified it as a “refuge area” in which perpetrators could commit violence but authorities of both sides of the Green Line were unable to control. The main marketplace serves as the only area in which daily interaction between the two communities occurs, leaving little room for any attempts at increasing social cohesion and peace.

While the average citizen can cross the Green Line, political and community leaders are unable to do so because clan lines run parallel to administrative ones, serving as a stumbling block for reconciliation and political unity. Although most key informants and focus group participants agree that a level of possible interaction between the two clans has increased steadily since the 1993, xenophobia between the two clans can be seen in daily life, particularly for those who come from the less economically and structurally stable south. This
form of xenophobia indicates that although “crossing the line” is not an issue on a one-off basis, deeper interactions such as friendship and relationships are much less open. Few neutral spaces remain where the communities can meet for practical reasons, such as the airport and the main market. A peace school was established in Garsoor 1, North Galkayo town, just along the Green Line to accommodate children from both North and South, but has since closed due to insecurity.19

The CVS sample consisted of 701 households, from which it can be inferred that there are on average 7.7 people per household: 4.0 male, 3.7 female; and a mean of 3.6 of youth (under 15 years old), of which 1.9 are male and 1.7 are female.

According to the CVS, of the 645 households who indicated their clan identity, the two primary clans are the Darod clan (48.2% of the population) and the Hawiye (22.3%). To a lesser degree, there are also residents of the Dir (8.2%), Bantu (6.5%), Digil-Mirifle (5.3%), Isaaq (4.5%), Arab (3.7%) and other clans (1.2%). As expected, the population in North Galkayo is mainly Darod, while the population in South Galkayo is mainly Hawiye (Figure 3).

According to a local minority rights organization (North Galkayo),20 minority clans are faced with particular vulnerabilities during conflict due to their lack of social weight and of support from the international community. Minority clans are particularly vulnerable to violence and conflict since they are marginalized from the social decision-making process and are not represented equally, because their clan is not strong enough to support them against others. Additionally, according to the organization, minority clans largely inhabit the Green Line, leaving them vulnerable to possible surrounding clashes, to a loss of livelihoods since businesses and marketplaces may close during times of conflict, and to potential displacement.21 Minority clans have only recently found a place within the local government of North Galkayo town.

In addition, Galkayo is home to significant numbers of IDPs and refugees. Overall, 74.1 percent of survey respondents were permanent residents, 21.5 percent were IDPs and 4.4 percent had refugee status. However, the proportion of IDPs is substantially higher in North Galkayo (26.9%) than in South Galkayo (12.7%) (Figure 4). Although much smaller in overall numbers, the same applies to refugees, which account for 5.7 percent of the population in North Galkayo, compared to 0.8 percent in South Galkayo.

![Figure 4: Residential status (Weighted %)](image)

IDP settlements are dispersed both within and outside the city.22 A comparison of various studies indicates an increasing presence of IDPs in Galkayo over time: a 2005 UNDP study indicates a total of 4,000 IDP households in Galkayo; a joint study by the Danish Refugee Council and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) indicates 4,666 in 2007; and both UNHCR and the District Mapping conducted by KAALO indicate that the number of households increased to over 6,000 in 2010.23 Due to the dynamic nature of IDP movements and the position of Galkayo as an entry point from south to north, it is difficult to determine the exact number of IDPs in the district. This is further compounded by the decision of the Puntland government in July 2010 to deport IDPs, mostly from South-Central Somalia and Ethiopia, and many of whom are reported to have entered Galkayo.24

It is estimated that over 3,000 of the IDP households in Galkayo District are located in north Galkayo town and surrounding areas.25 As of June 2010, there were roughly 800 households in rural areas; the oldest IDP camp in the district, located near Bacaadwayn in the north, contains around 715 households.26 A 2005 UNDP study indicates IDP populations in Galkayo District are primarily Somali Bantu, originating from Baidoa, Mogadishu, Afgoye and to a limited extent, Ethiopia.27 Migration patterns seem to be primarily linked to conflict; however, labour migration does occur.28

Discrimination against IDPs, particularly those originating from South-Central Somalia, has led to restricted economic opportunities for IDPs living in South Galkayo, because marketplaces are located in the North. In an IDP settlement in Galmudug, a male IDP explained that the deportation of southern IDPs from Puntland in 2010 had led to a loss of jobs for many because travel to
North Galkayo town, where the main markets of the city are located, is restricted. According to him, while women can easily cross the line, if a criminal act occurs in the north, a male IDP from South-Central Somalia will be harassed and potentially put in jail, accused of the crime. This led him to conclude that, “only we have security [in the settlement], but nothing else, we cannot work”. It must be noted, however, that a number of IDPs originating from South-Central Somalia reside in the North.

There are a limited number of refugees in the area; however, statistics are difficult to find. An international NGO working with IDPs during an interview stated that this might be due to a tendency of refugees to integrate into the community rather than settle in camps; as such, they often lack recognition and do not receive the same level of material support as IDPs in the community.29

3.3. Resources and the economy

The socio-economic challenges faced by the population of Galkayo can serve as significant triggers of violence and conflict.30 This is particularly true for IDP populations, who are faced with limited employment opportunities generally restricted to working in market places, collecting refuse and selling wares.

Demographic profiling of data gathered from CVS respondents show that 38.2 percent were unemployed. The largest proportions of employed respondents, 45.2 percent, worked as labourers; 41 percent were employed through private non-governmental security forces; 3.3 percent were pastoralists; 2.4 percent were employed through NGOs and United Nations agencies and 1.6 percent through the government forces (the police, the army, etc.); and 0.5 percent were farmers or pastoralists. Another 4.8 percent were employed through other channels not specified in the CVS. However, the CVS reveals significant differences in the occupation of heads of households between North and South Galkayo (Figure 5). It is particularly striking to note that the head of over one in five households in South Galkayo stated working in a “private or non-government security force”.

According to the survey, 44.6 percent of respondents indicated that daily food spending ranged from US$3.00 to 4.90, 30.0 percent spent US$1.00 to 2.90, 17.3 percent spent US$5.00-9.9, 4.3 percent spent less than US$1.00, and 3.8 percent spent more than US$10.00 per day on food. However, residents of South Galkayo tended to spend less on food than in North Galkayo (Figure 6).

3.4. Access to basic services

Poor education opportunities for children and youth, linked both to socio-economic stress and the accessibility of schools, and the absence of future economic opportunities stemming from higher education severely limit the growth capacity of the community and have the potential to increase violence and conflict. In addition, 50.2 percent of CVS respondents stated having received no education; 49.8 percent, some formal education; and 16.3 percent, an informal education. Of those informally educated, 81.0 percent had religious studies and 19.0 percent attended life-skills or literacy classes. The proportion of respondents formally educated who completed university or college level studies is 21.1 percent. An additional 44.7 percent completed high school or secondary school, 25.4 percent completed intermediate school, and the remaining 8.8 percent completed primary school (Figure 7).
Interviewed Galmudug women’s organizations estimated rates of schooling for children in South Galkayo at roughly 30 to 40 percent due to the absence of public schools and the high cost of private schools. In IDP settlements in South Galkayo, rough estimates by local committees of the proportion of their children attending school varied between 1/100 and 1/5. Access to education in South Galkayo relies heavily on the presence of a public school in the immediate surroundings, and financial capacity, because, according to the women’s organizations, private schools cost roughly US$10 per month. Tensions between Northern and Southern clans also seem to prevent individuals from the South from benefitting from better facilities in the North. According to a Galmudug peace-building organization, a local youth attempted to attend a university in the north, but when it was discovered that he belonged to the Sa’ad clan, he was stigmatized to the point that he was forced to end his studies.

Access to medical care is also inadequate. While North Galkayo has one major hospital and a number of medical clinics, South Galkayo relies almost entirely on the local hospital run by Médecins Sans Frontières.

For example, according to the CVS, seven of the ten victims of sexual violence reported that there was no medical or psychological assistance available; two of them sought assistance from the community elders, and only one went to the hospital (Figure 8).

Both within the host and IDP communities, there are formal structures for mediating the day-to-day management of the community and resolving conflict. In Galkayo, these take the form of committees established within IDP settlements, as well as within the various administrative subdivisions of the town and villages. These committees serve as an authority on issues pertaining to the specific locality (for example, Tawakal Galmudug. The part of Galkayo District that falls under the Puntland administration is referred to as North Galkayo, while the portion falling under the Galmudug administration is referred to as South Galkayo. The same terminologies apply to the district capital, Galkayo town, which is similarly divided.

In the Puntland-governed North, Galkayo town is the regional centre for Mudug Region, which is administered by a Regional Governor. It is also the District Capital of Galkayo District. The City Council, mayor and deputy mayor administer Galkayo town and district; city councillors, elected by clans, appoint the mayor; and the Ministry of Interior appoints the secretary for the municipality. Local structures for dealing with issues of conflict and security link with target groups such as IDPs: the City Council facilitates and communicates with clan-based leadership structures within IDP settlements. In 2009, a District Safety Committee (DSC) was established under the District Council, bringing together representatives from the district authorities, the police, the judiciary, women, youth, the elders and religious leaders.

South Galkayo District falls under the Galmudug administration, and Galkayo town serves as the administration’s capital. Prior to 2006, a clan committee administered South Galkayo. Ahlu-Sunna Wal-Jama established the Galmudug administration in 2006, with an elected president and an elders’ committee formed from the elders of sub-clans present in the area. According to members of the administration of South Galkayo, the “people were fed up with tribalism”, which led to the establishment of a charter with the collaboration of the traditional elders, a Parliament and an elected government in order to reinforce security through an administrative rather than clan structure. As a result of the relative inexperience of the Galmudug administration, established only in 2006, the governing structures are still being put in place and capacity is extremely limited, as government revenue-making structures such as taxation have yet to take form. Due to the lack of security actors outside of South Galkayo town, they are spread thin and are often unable to address issues in areas outside of the administrative capital.

Both within the host and IDP communities, there are formal structures for mediating the day-to-day management of the community and resolving conflict. In Galkayo, these take the form of committees established within IDP settlements, as well as within the various administrative subdivisions of the town and villages. These committees serve as an authority on issues pertaining to the specific locality (for example, Tawakal Galmudug. The part of Galkayo District that falls under the Puntland administration is referred to as North Galkayo, while the portion falling under the Galmudug administration is referred to as South Galkayo. The same terminologies apply to the district capital, Galkayo town, which is similarly divided.

In the Puntland-governed North, Galkayo town is the regional centre for Mudug Region, which is administered by a Regional Governor. It is also the District Capital of Galkayo District. The City Council, mayor and deputy mayor administer Galkayo town and district; city councillors, elected by clans, appoint the mayor; and the Ministry of Interior appoints the secretary for the municipality. Local structures for dealing with issues of conflict and security link with target groups such as IDPs: the City Council facilitates and communicates with clan-based leadership structures within IDP settlements. In 2009, a District Safety Committee (DSC) was established under the District Council, bringing together representatives from the district authorities, the police, the judiciary, women, youth, the elders and religious leaders.

South Galkayo District falls under the Galmudug administration, and Galkayo town serves as the administration’s capital. Prior to 2006, a clan committee administered South Galkayo. Ahlu-Sunna Wal-Jama established the Galmudug administration in 2006, with an elected president and an elders’ committee formed from the elders of sub-clans present in the area. According to members of the administration of South Galkayo, the “people were fed up with tribalism”, which led to the establishment of a charter with the collaboration of the traditional elders, a Parliament and an elected government in order to reinforce security through an administrative rather than clan structure. As a result of the relative inexperience of the Galmudug administration, established only in 2006, the governing structures are still being put in place and capacity is extremely limited, as government revenue-making structures such as taxation have yet to take form. Due to the lack of security actors outside of South Galkayo town, they are spread thin and are often unable to address issues in areas outside of the administrative capital.

Both within the host and IDP communities, there are formal structures for mediating the day-to-day management of the community and resolving conflict. In Galkayo, these take the form of committees established within IDP settlements, as well as within the various administrative subdivisions of the town and villages. These committees serve as an authority on issues pertaining to the specific locality (for example, Tawakal Galmudug. The part of Galkayo District that falls under the Puntland administration is referred to as North Galkayo, while the portion falling under the Galmudug administration is referred to as South Galkayo. The same terminologies apply to the district capital, Galkayo town, which is similarly divided.

In the Puntland-governed North, Galkayo town is the regional centre for Mudug Region, which is administered by a Regional Governor. It is also the District Capital of Galkayo District. The City Council, mayor and deputy mayor administer Galkayo town and district; city councillors, elected by clans, appoint the mayor; and the Ministry of Interior appoints the secretary for the municipality. Local structures for dealing with issues of conflict and security link with target groups such as IDPs: the City Council facilitates and communicates with clan-based leadership structures within IDP settlements. In 2009, a District Safety Committee (DSC) was established under the District Council, bringing together representatives from the district authorities, the police, the judiciary, women, youth, the elders and religious leaders.

South Galkayo District falls under the Galmudug administration, and Galkayo town serves as the administration’s capital. Prior to 2006, a clan committee administered South Galkayo. Ahlu-Sunna Wal-Jama established the Galmudug administration in 2006, with an elected president and an elders’ committee formed from the elders of sub-clans present in the area. According to members of the administration of South Galkayo, the “people were fed up with tribalism”, which led to the establishment of a charter with the collaboration of the traditional elders, a Parliament and an elected government in order to reinforce security through an administrative rather than clan structure. As a result of the relative inexperience of the Galmudug administration, established only in 2006, the governing structures are still being put in place and capacity is extremely limited, as government revenue-making structures such as taxation have yet to take form. Due to the lack of security actors outside of South Galkayo town, they are spread thin and are often unable to address issues in areas outside of the administrative capital.
In many cases, particularly within the IDP community but also within the broader social structure, when disputes cannot be solved through traditional means or established local committees, they are gradually brought to a higher level in the hierarchy, all the way up to the local governor or mayor – albeit not in their formal capacity. In three IDP settlements interviewed, committees followed similar steps of negotiation: first, informal dispute resolution within the smaller community through the committee and/or traditional elders, and second, resorting to formalized institutions such as the mayor or governor as an outside mediator to the conflict. In conflicts involving the broader community or communities, political institutions are directly involved in the mediation process and often bring in traditional elders to help resolve conflicts.
4. Perceptions of insecurity

Perceptions of safety vary widely between North and South Galkayo, with CVS respondents from the South generally feeling that overall safety had improved in the 12 months preceding the survey, while respondents from the North had more mixed feelings on the question (Figure 9).  

Figure 9: Change in perceived safety, North/South Galkayo (Weighted %)

The CVS also reveals that women do perceive the communities as less safe than men. Overall, 66.9 percent of men and 56.9 percent of women perceived the communities as safer, a discrepancy of 10.0 percent between genders (Figure 10).

Figure 10: Change in perceived safety over the last 12 months, by gender (Freq. %)

In general, most households stated that concerns of insecurity within the neighbourhood did not interfere with their daily activities. However, the CVS indicates that about one-fifth of respondents – particularly female – feared carrying out activities listed in the survey: 21.4 percent of respondents avoided seeking a daily supply of food, firewood, or water due to insecurity; 21.7 percent avoided going to the market; 22.2 percent avoided sending their children to school; 21.6 percent avoided using public transport; and 30 percent avoided keeping livestock or property outside (Figure 13). Note that roughly only half of the respondent households answered this question; there was no indication as to why there was a low response rate.

Figure 13: Activities avoided due to insecurity (Weighted %)
Perceptions of insecurity can also be influenced by the frequency of witnessing crime. There were 234 households, or 35.8 percent of respondents, who witnessed a form of crime or violence against someone outside their own household; of these, 58.5 percent witnessed one crime, 17.1 percent, two crimes, and 13.7 percent, three crimes (Figure 14).

Figure 14: Number of crimes witnessed (Freq. %)

The difference in perception may be explained by the fact that South Galkayo is significantly smaller than its northern counterpart in both surface and population, and that the comparatively greater mobility of the population in the North means that social control is weaker.
5. Forms of insecurity and violence

A criminological typology of violence includes standard crimes such as homicide, assault, sexual violence and property crime. However, in the Somali context, some individual crimes are not viewed as distinct events, but rather as components of broader conflict dynamics and inter-group violence. Forms of group violence mentioned as particular concerns in Galkayo include intercommunal violence, revenge killings, land disputes and other resource-based conflicts. Organized crime was also mentioned as a concern, although this also largely manifests itself through individual acts of violence.

### Table 1: Summary of focus group findings, April 2010 (extracts)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Main safety concerns</th>
<th>Internally displaced persons (IDPs)</th>
<th>Youth</th>
<th>Local authorities</th>
<th>Police</th>
<th>Women</th>
<th>The elders and religious leaders</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Piracy; Al-Shabaab</td>
<td>Rape; street gangs</td>
<td>Pirates (also violence against women); drug use</td>
<td>Political and clan issues; land disputes; qat and alcohol; pirates</td>
<td>Killings; theft; rape</td>
<td>Drug users; gangs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Types of violence against men</td>
<td>Clan violence; political violence; unknown killings</td>
<td>Revenge among clans</td>
<td>Fighting and clan revenge</td>
<td>Clan killings; political killings; unknown killings</td>
<td>Clan revenge</td>
<td>Assassinations; clan revenge</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Types of violence against women</td>
<td>Rape; beatings</td>
<td>Rape</td>
<td>Rape</td>
<td>Rape</td>
<td>Rape</td>
<td>Rape; Female Genital Mutilation (FGM)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Is domestic violence an issue?</td>
<td>Yes (men monopolizing household revenue for private use)</td>
<td>Yes (beating and divorcing women)</td>
<td>Yes (men keeping the household income, leading to violence, aggravated by qat use)</td>
<td>Yes (beatings, divorce)</td>
<td>Yes (beatings, qat users becoming violent)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Is child abuse an issue?</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes, child labour in IDP camps and rural areas</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The following section presents the quantitative data collected on individual crimes, including a discussion of different types of inter-group violence identified by focus groups.

It should be noted that the incidence of most forms of crime varies significantly between North and South Galkayo, with the North experiencing higher rates of homicide, assault and property crime (but not sexual violence) (Figure 15). As mentioned above, this is also reflected in the overall perception of safety.

### Figure 15: Perception of safety and actual crime levels, North/South Galkayo (Freq. %)

Ref. B3_R3xPV1 (n=618), B3_R3xPC1 (n=139), B3_R3xAA1 (n=140), B3_R3xSV1 (n=136), B3_R3xMD1_R1 (n=618)

5.1. Homicide

The CVS captured homicide in Galkayo as a “murder or a death as a result of violence or crime”. Forty-five criminal deaths had been registered by the CVS for the period, corresponding to 6.4 percent of respondent households. As noted above (Figure 15), higher rates are found in North Galkayo than in South Galkayo (7.6% vs. 5.2%, respectively). Victims are predominantly males between the ages of 15 and 34, peaking at around 25–29 years old (Figure 16).

### Figure 16: Homicide by age and gender (Freq.)

Ref. MD1 (n=41)

With respect to the clan composition of homicide victims, 20.0 percent of the Digil-Mirifle households had a member who was victim of lethal violence during the 12 months
of the CVS, against 13.5 percent of the Bantu households, 12.5 percent for the Arab households and 11.1 percent for the Isaq households (Figure 17). Victimization rates were also higher among IDP households (12.0%) than among permanent residents (5.5%) (Ref. MD1xRP9 (n=43) Figure 18).

Homicides can result from several dynamics. Unsurprisingly, given the levels of mistrust between clans, it emerged in focus group discussions that revenge killings were commonplace. They sometimes involve close relatives of the offended party organizing a group of militia to carry out the killing in public places, particularly in markets. However, such killings also occur more spontaneously given the pervasiveness of firearms in Galkayo. For example, one local youth, originally from South-Central Somalia, had been hired by an NGO to work in the North. He was forced to move to South Galkayo out of fear for his life when three men from the North had been killed by members of his clan. According to the youth, “You can stay in the area, but only if you are not recognized. If you are recognized and you keep staying, you are risking your life.” This effectively reduces social interactions between the North and South to ad hoc meetings primarily relying on shared marketplaces or family ties.

Homicides can also be “unknown killings”, which refer to targeted assassinations of political or community leaders, particularly individuals who take an active stance on peace-building initiatives. For example, in March 2011, the Chairman of the Galkayo District Safety Committee, Hussein Ali Dube, was gunned down in the evening while leaving a mosque after prayers.

According to both administrations, targeted assassinations of political or community leaders can be related to the threat of Al-Shabaab. According to a member of the Galmudug administration, there have been five attacks by Al-Shabaab on Galkayo District over 2009–2010. Reports indicate an increasing presence of al-Shabaab sympathizers in Galkayo. This type of organizational presence is new to Galkayo.

In addition, pirates are reported to commit a number of violent and non-violent crimes, including prostitution, killings (notably linked to firearms), car accidents, and drug and alcohol use, among others. In July 2010, pirates under the influence of drugs started shooting in a populated downtown area, killing one and injuring another.

5.2. Assault or physical attack

Seventy-three respondent households (50.0% of respondents, 10.4% of the sample) experienced assault or attack during the 12 months prior to the survey; 95.9 percent of these victims only experienced this once. As noted above, assault rates are significantly higher in North Galkayo (53.6%) than in South Galkayo (32.1%) (Figure 15).

Analysed by time and place, the largest proportion of incidents occurred in the street at night (23.4%). However, overall, the location most prone to assault was the home, with 42.2 percent of the assaults, particularly in the afternoon (Figure 19).

Firearms – mostly high-powered – were used in a staggering 47.3 percent of cases of assault. These include Kalashnikov-type assault rifles (29.2%) and handguns (18.1%). Other weapons used included bladed weapons such as knives, swords, pangas or sticks (23.6%); blunt weapons such as stones, bottles, glass or rope (12.5%); bombs or hand grenades (9.7%); no weapons were used in only 5.6 percent of the assaults (Figure 20).
5.2.1. Victims

Out of the declared 73 assault victims, 60.0 percent were male and 40.0 percent female. The peak age of assault is between the ages 25 and 29 for both males and females. However, males were at higher risk of assault for a longer period, from ages 15 to 44 years (Figure 21).

Assault and attack were prevalent across all clan associations, with a slightly higher occurrence among the Darod (60.0%), the Bantu (56.3%) and the Dir (53.8%) clans (Figure 22).

However, the picture changes when distinguishing North and South Galkayo, revealing the high level of victimization of the Hawiye clan in North Galkayo (Figure 23).

5.2.2. Perpetrators

Victims of assault or physical attack identified 42.5 percent of the perpetrators as members of ‘organized armed groups’, 37.0 percent were identified as ‘individual criminals’, 15.1 percent as ‘friends or neighbours’, 4.1 percent from a ‘clan group’, and 1.4 percent were believed to be ‘foreign troops’ (Figure 24).

Unsurprisingly, different categories of perpetrators tend to use different weapons, with organized armed groups predominantly using high-powered Kalashnikov-type assault weapons, individual criminals preferring pistols and revolvers or blunt weapons, and acquaintances and neighbours mainly using bladed weapons (Figure 25).
crime, such as in a July 2010 organized bank robbery, as well as regular gang fights, attacks, gang rapes, drug dealing, rising prostitution, random killings and other safety and security incidents including drunk driving and car accidents. Since Galkayo is inland, it does not serve as an operational base for pirates; however, it has been observed that pirates travel to Galkayo when not at sea, and recent reports indicate that it may be becoming a logistics hub for piracy.41

Violence among youth, particularly among young men, was identified by focus groups as contributing to insecurity in the district. According to focus group participants, personal conflicts among youth can turn into gang fights, and according to a local youth organization, youth are the primary perpetrators of violent criminality, including incidents primarily related to beatings and attacks using sticks, knives and blades.42

Gangs were identified by focus group participants and multiple interviews as an increasing threat in Galkayo, often accused of rape, fighting and violent thefts. The composition of gangs is difficult to discern, although they seem to include youth from the local urban community as well as from rural areas, former militias and youth from other areas. It was generally agreed by all interviewees that gangs were composed primarily of young men, although age estimates varied between 15 and 40 years.43 The criminal activity of gangs can contribute directly to conflict; according to a Galmudug peace-building organization, the last two conflicts in Galkayo between North and South were ignited by clashes between gangs.44 However, while gangs may be formed along clan lines, there have been clear cases where criminals have come together from multiple clans in order to conduct a criminal activity. According to the Galmudug administration, the gang involved in a bank robbery in July 2010 was composed of four members from the North and four from the South.45 This may provide an indication that gang composition in Galkayo is not exclusively clan-based, but, like pirates, may be a question of opportunity.

5.3. Violence against internationally displaced persons (IDPs)

Out of a total of 73 victims of physical assault or attacks, 52.1 percent were permanent residents, 8.2 percent claimed refugee status, and 39.7 percent were IDPs. Weighted by category, the results show that for every 100 refugees, 75 were victims; for every 100 IDPs, approximately 57 were victims; and for every 100 permanent residents, approximately 44 were victims (Figure 26).

Figure 26: Experience of assault or physical attack over the 12 months prior to the survey by resident status (Weighted %)

Ref. AA1xRP10 (n=73), permanent resident (n=38), refugee (n=6), IDP (n=29)

While the relationship between host and IDP communities in Galkayo is rather fraternal, tensions do exist, as exemplified by an attack by the local community on an IDP settlement to the North of Galkayo town due to reports of stolen children. This may be exacerbated by an influx of new migrants seeking stability and escaping war.

IDPs, however, are not a homogenous group. According to a member of the Garsoor Ward Committee, the differences between IDPs originally from Mudug Region, who often resettle with family or relatives, and those from South-Central Somalia, who primarily reside in IDP settlements, fuel tension as socio-economic differences between them become apparent. In fact, the relationship between the IDPs and the host community seem to vary: while Holoboqod IDP settlement outside North Galkayo receives support from the local government and local militias to ensure security and wellbeing in the community, the Warshed Galey IDP settlement in Garsoor 1 (North Galkayo) seems to face particular insecurity and a tenuous relationship with the host community. Although the Committee of Warshed Galey during interviews was adamant about having a strong relationship with the Puntland government and local police station, located adjacent to the settlement, multiple reports of insecurity relating to the settlement were brought up by individuals of North Galkayo.

Although IDPs receive aid from international agencies, and settlement committees often have strong links to local government, the former are a particularly vulnerable group because they lack support of the clan and suffer from poor socio-economic opportunities. Breaking and entering into the home was observed, particularly for IDP populations whose lack of protective shelter leaves them vulnerable to attack.46 Violence by intruders in the home is of particular concern for IDPs living in rural areas, because the lack of settlement security facilitates criminal intrusion and violent acts being committed. According to an international NGO working in Galkayo, there have been reports of armed men entering IDP settlements and
causing violent crimes, particularly in rural areas. In addition, according to the committee of an IDP settlement located on the outskirts of North Galkayo town, the lack of permanent shelter leads to vulnerabilities because thieves can easily enter homes, armed with knives, sticks and sometimes other weapons.47

5.4. Violence against women and girls

There were 20 declared incidents of assault or physical attacks against women and girls. As seen in Figure 21, women and girls in Galkayo District appear to be less susceptible to assault and physical attack than men, with the exception of the 25–29 year age group, which peaked for both sexes.

In addition, ten respondents were victim of sexual violence – all of whom were female. In all ten cases, the incident only occurred once; in four, incidents occurred within the home (two in the morning and two at night); and six occurred in the street (one during the afternoon and five at night) (Figure 27).

Figure 27: Sexual violence: location and time of day (Freq.)

Ref. SV7xSV6 (n= 10)

It emerged that all victims of sexual violence whose gender was declared were 10–34-year-old females (Figure 28).

Figure 28: Age of victims of sexual abuse (Freq.)

Ref. SV5_R2xSV4 (n=7)

Five perpetrators of sexual violence were identified as ‘organized armed groups’ and the other five individual criminals.

Focus groups and key informants highlighted the severe marginalization of women in society. According to one NGO worker, the “shame” associated with violence against women in the domestic sphere and the manner in which they are constantly belittled have worsened over time due to the continuous absence of the rule of law. The negation of the role of women in society does not necessarily trigger conflict, but rather, it excludes a significant source of mediation and peace. Furthermore, the economic vulnerability of women in particular may increase their physical vulnerability, for example, when a mother is forced to work at odd times.48 Women are particularly vulnerable to violence in the domestic sphere, as well as to criminality outside the home, specifically robbery and rape. According to focus group participants, women are also vulnerable to being caught in the crossfire during riots.

Major forms of violent crime directed at women identified by focus group participants and during qualitative interviews included rape, which was indicated as a major source of insecurity in the district and appears to be taking on gang dimensions. There were 14 reported cases of gang rape between March and August 2010 in South Galkayo, including an incident in August 2010 in North Galkayo in which a young woman was gang raped by between nine and 11 men.

Other types of violence against women surfaced as IDPs reported that economic stresses within the family unit could lead to conflict between husbands and wives, resulting in beatings or divorce. The police and judiciary focus groups identified two cases in which economic stresses in the household, where the male head of household did not provide for the family unit, led to violence. These types of cases are often associated with high rates of consumption of qat among men, to the detriment of the fulfilment of the economic needs of the household.

Focus group participants further identified divorce and family abandonment as a form of violence inflicted on women, notably as stripping them of their rights. In Somali society, the children belong to the man’s family and take on his clan’s identity. In the case of women who come from clans other than their husbands’, divorce becomes more violent because they are forced to return to their clan without their children. In Warshed Galey IDP settlement, the IDP Committee stated some women also abandon their families, therefore leaving the men alone to support their children, demonstrating that this form of violence can also be inflicted on men.49 Although uncommon, it has been observed that this phenomenon can sometimes be related to the attraction that economically better-off pirates and drug dealers exert on women in particularly vulnerable situations.50

5.5. Violence against children

Violence against children was shown in the CVS through related assault, homicide and sexual violence figures. There were seven cases of assault or physical attack stated in the CVS that targeted children between the ages 0 and 18 (Figure 29). The CVS also revealed three incidents of sexual assault against children (Ref. AA5 (n=7)
According to focus groups, children are significantly impacted by conflict within the domestic sphere; cases of child abuse and child labour have emerged within the community. While focus group participants largely denied the occurrence of child abuse, the police and judiciary, and IDP groups identified child labour as of concern, particularly in rural areas and IDP settlements. A key informant mentioned cases of incest and sexual violence committed against children in Galkayo, both in the home and in schools. Street children are reportedly vulnerable to a number of insecurities, from threats to safety, to broader threats to their wellbeing such as fires, malnutrition and related diseases. Street children in Galkayo are reportedly often the children of IDPs or minority clans, and according to Galmudug women’s organizations, are at times kicked out of their homes by their families. However, street children are also purported to be more likely to contribute to crime and criminality, including gang activity.

### 5.6. Abductions

According to the CVS, a total of six kidnappings (0.9% of respondent households) occurred over the 12 months prior to the survey: five of the seven victims were Darod from an urban area; four of them were permanent residents and two were IDPs. The CVS offers no indication of the age of the victims.

Kidnapping was not reported in focus group discussions as a serious crime in Galkayo, except for a rumour of “stolen children”, which triggered violence against an IDP settlement (see above, Violence against IDPs). Given the number of cases observed from the CVS, the phenomenon should be further investigated.

### 5.7. Property crime

In the CVS, 35.8 percent of respondents witnessed property crimes, and 18.6 percent were victims of property crimes. Of these households, 85.2 percent were victims once, and no one reported more than two incidents. Sixty percent of these crimes resulted in violence where someone was injured (Figure 31). It should be noted, however, that property crime victimization rates are significantly higher in North Galkayo (23.2%) than in South Galkayo (3.7%) (Figure 15).

Out of a total of 27 crimes against property, ten were instances of street theft, 12 were home burglaries, four were theft of crops and livestock, and one involved other incidents of property (Figure 32).

### Incidences of property crime are not evenly distributed during the year; a peak can be observed in October and a steep drop in the early months of the year (Figure 33).
According to the CVS, the perpetrators of property crimes were mostly ‘organized armed groups’ (56.0%), followed by ‘individual criminals’ (32.0%), ‘friends or neighbours’ (8.0%), and individuals directly linked with a ‘clan group’ (4.0%) (Figure 34).

Violent theft has been identified in focus group discussions as a source of insecurity relating to youth gangs. Street theft such as of mobile phones at times becomes violent. According to a local NGO operating in Galkayo, drug, alcohol and qat consumption can often be closely linked to these crimes because users seek money to support their habits.54

5.8. Confrontations with state security forces

According to key informants, violence sometimes erupts between the population and government agents, notably the police. As an example, in 2009 the Puntland government attempted to clean a central marketplace. Apparently, the police did not communicate their intention properly and began demolishing stalls, leading to violent armed clashes (shooting) between them and the shop owners55.

Another incident occurred in March 2010 when the government of North Galkayo attempted to clear a roadside on which informal shops and stalls had been established, resulting in demonstrations by “those in the south” and open fire between the north and south communities. The conflict, according to a member of the Garsoor Ward Committee, was resolved through collaboration between businesspersons, the community and with the involvement of the Governor of Mudug Region.57

Another ongoing conflict concerned land along the Green Line in Galkayo town: the Puntland administration started taxing businesses in the area, which was disputed by local businesses from the south since the area was owned by members of both clans, and thus of both administrations.58 An agreement between the two administrations resulted in voluntary tax payment and shared settlement, yet the underlying conflict dynamics continue to be unresolved. According to a member of the South Galkayo administration, who was present during a group interview with local women’s organizations, conflict in Galkayo repeats itself because, although the manifestations have been resolved, its fundamental issues have not.59

5.9. Conflict dynamics

The CVS questionnaire inquired into how often the respondents’ households had disputes with other clans: 30.7 percent of respondents stated that there were never disputes between clans, but a significant 41.8 percent stated that disputes occurred yearly (Figure 35).

Disputes are seasonal. Respondents identified the beginning calendar months as the most volatile. Out of the 43 declared disputes, 12 occurred in January, nine in February, and seven in March. This high rate of incidents was followed by significantly lower rates of clan disputes, which in turn were followed by a slight escalation in disputes in August, September and October (Figure 37). These variations are generally believed to follow rain patterns, thus indicating competition for pasture and access to waterwells. Galkayo generally has two rainy seasons, the main Gu rains lasting roughly from April to June, and the shorter Dayr rains, from around September to October.
Rural conflicts can also spread to urban areas because, according to a local peace organization, some rural killings are retaliated in urban zones, particularly if a situation does not allow the relative of the victim to take revenge in his or her own area. According to the peace-building organization, when killings occur in rural areas, people in urban areas automatically restrict their own movement in anticipation of the spill-over effects. A north-based peace-building organization further elaborated that rural conflicts “usually emanate from resource-based contentions” and “are likely to exacerbate to high intensity conflict if not contained within the causal issues”, such as by taking on clan or political dimensions. The organization further elaborated that rural conflicts are often supported by members of the community in urban areas: according to a Galmudug peace-building organization and a local businessperson, businesspersons may contribute funds to solve a conflict out of fear that it may spread to urban areas and threaten their business. The organization further elaborated that rural conflicts are often supported by members of the community in urban areas: according to a Galmudug peace-building organization and a local businessperson, businesspersons may contribute funds to solve a conflict out of fear that it may spread to urban areas and threaten their business.

### 5.10. Threat of violent Islamic groups

There are reports indicating that Galkayo District has become an active recruitment ground for violent Islamic groups such as al-Shabaab. Reports were also circulated of a group of armed militia thought to be al-Shabaab organizing on the outskirts of North Galkayo town to fight in Galgala (Puntland). Garsoor Ward, in the western part of North Galkayo town, seems to be the particular target of these activities. Furthermore, a local NGO working in education reported that Al-Shabaab had long been sending school teachers as operatives to the district, allegedly in order to socialize the youth in a manner favourable to future recruitment.
6. Drivers and risk factors

6.1. Social factors

While traditional clan-based conflicts are no longer the dominant or direct source of insecurity, the clan serves as a major backdrop of conflict. Attacks on members of a clan, for any motivation, by a member of another clan can easily escalate from an interpersonal to inter-clan conflict. Following the conflicts that led to the 1993 Mudug Peace Agreement and despite it, resentment between the Sa’ad and Majerteen sub-clans seemed to persist. As already noted, while not the primary player in the conflict between the Sa’ad and the Majerteen, the presence of a number of minority clans in Galkayo District also contributes to broader clan conflicts in the area. According to a local peace organization, “minority clans have conflicts in Mudug, some within their clans and some with major clans.” Given certain variables, major and minor clans support each other in order to gain in a conflict against another clan, essentially since “the enemy of my enemy is my friend.” The players in clan conflicts are not restricted to the two primary actors involved, but include tangentially a multitude of other clans or sub-clans who benefit from the success of one side or another. Although clan or sub-clan linkages are extremely strong, the dynamics in Galkayo and across all Somali regions at times lead to clans supporting one another against a closer sub-clan within the clan-family structure.

Restricted social interactions have filtered into more formal practices. Intermarriage between clans is a case in point: the practice has traditionally served as a method of social cohesion in Somali society, but it has decreased due to continued tensions between the two clans, further dividing the two communities. While many seem to be able to recount at least one member of the family who is married to a member of the opposite clan, recent initiatives by one local NGO to promote intermarriage as a peace-building measure indicate that this is not the norm. Similarly, the lack of shared basic services between the North and South inhibit the positive forces of social cohesion that usually accompany regular social interaction.

Youth delinquency is reported to be a function of poor social opportunities, limited education and the absence of social outlets such as playgrounds, cultural centres and resources for youth to understand their role and participate in society. The absence of social outlets and shared facilities further exacerbates tensions between the North and the South, as social interaction is limited to marketplaces and youth are faced with poor opportunities for the future, and little to no social gathering points such as recreation areas even within their own borders.

The weakening of social control resulting from population movements is considered to contribute to insecurity, as exemplified by the suspicion on the part of the Puntland authorities of IDPs from South-Central Somalia. In Galkayo, although IDPs are received, provided with land, and in some cases, with security by the host community, nevertheless there remains a concern that their influx may bring elements that threaten stability in the area. According to a local IDP aid worker (North Galkayo), IDPs are often accused of sheltering or hiding Islamists or criminals, which appears to be in part a function of their ethnic or regional origin. The aid worker explained that due to the difficult socio-economic conditions faced by IDPs, they may be more likely to be “hired” to provide shelter. However, significant probing and research are needed to substantiate such a claim.

Deep-rooted social norms play a role in the continuation of certain forms of violence, notably domestic violence. According to a local education NGO that deals with such issues, domestic violence is not addressed in the community due to tradition, a reluctance to get involved in the domestic affairs of others (interrelationships within families), and cultural norms that do not view the matter as critical. Domestic violence against women is generally seen as “setting the proper way for your wife”. One local education NGO refers to “the constant belittling of women”. The NGO claims that domestic violence is readily accepted as long as there are no significant bodily injuries such as a broken bone or cut. One focus group, however, cited a case where neighbours intervened in a domestic beating and rallied to provide financial support to a woman after her husband fled the country. During consultations with various IDP committees, it was recognized that incidents of domestic violence can spread into wider community conflicts if not dealt with appropriately.

The marginalization of youth in the social decision-making process was identified by a local youth organization (North Galkayo) as contributing to the increasing involvement of youth in illicit activities. This refers to the gerontocratic nature of Somali society, where traditional power is a function of age, which limits social and political opportunities for youth.
The weakening of traditional justice systems contributes to insecurity, or at least fails to deter acts of violence. Traditionally, a financial compensation is sought for many crimes. However, reports also indicate that this form of compensation is only accepted in order to avoid open conflict between clans but does little to prevent it. According to a local peace organization, in cases of murder, the traditional system of diya, or blood compensation for a killing, is becoming increasingly difficult to apply because it is fails to end retribution due to the high frequency of the violent acts in Galkayo. Families of victims have begun seeking direct justice against the perpetrator of the crime rather than compensation on behalf of his/her clan.73 In some cases, families both take the diya and continue to seek revenge, resulting in the breakdown of traditional social norms. Accompanied by the absence of rule of law, this allows crimes to occur and fails to prosecute them, threatening the stability of the district.

Insecurity is also often associated with high rates of qat consumption among men, to the detriment of the economic needs of the household. In fact, the CVS shows that 24.6 percent victims of assault suspected that the perpetrator was under the influence of alcohol or qat at the time of the crime (AA12, n=61). Other drugs reported to be in circulation in Galkayo include marijuana and alcohol. Drug use can contribute to disputes within the home, but also in the broader community: according to focus groups, use of the drug renders people aggressive, contributing to violence. According to a local qat seller in South Galkayo town, a kilo of qat is composed of roughly 5-6 pieces, costing US$2.5 each. Men consume roughly six pieces per day; young men, two or more; and women, one or two. For adult men, this results in a daily expense of roughly US$15 per day. Various subjective local estimates put average daily qat expenses between US$5 and 18 in North and South Galkayo for an adult male. It should be noted that women dominate the retail selling of qat, and so restrictions to its consumption would affect their economic opportunities. Drug use and dealing is one of the fastest growing phenomena in Galkayo, according to the District Safety Committee.

Further, perceived inequities in the distribution of international assistance between North and South Galkayo have the potential to increase tensions because, despite restricted interactions, many question why others receive when they do not. Due to the already weak social fabric of Galkayo and tense socio-political dynamics, international organizations playing a part in the district must be sensitive to the North-South divide in order not only to limit any possible contributions to conflict due to direct tensions associated with international organizations, but also to ensure that the discrepancies in socio-economic conditions in the two areas are not exacerbated.

6.2. Economic factors

Distribution of limited land and resources are a principal cause of violence and conflict in rural areas, particularly relating to access to water points. The limited availability of boreholes and wells in the district results in herders conglomering around water points, leading to conflicts over livestock and water resources.74 The Tawakal IDP settlement in North Galkayo identified conflicts with southern nomadic herders who use grazing lands surrounding the settlement, at times resulting in theft and conflict with the few IDPs who own livestock. Land and resource disputes in rural areas have the potential to escalate into district-wide conflicts because they take on clan dimensions.

The lack of social services and socio-economic opportunities for youth leaves them vulnerable to organizations that may offer them money or opportunities (for example, pirates, gangs, violent Islamic groups, or people smugglers). Impunity leads to the increased attractiveness of crime as a tool for financial or social stability, particularly for youth who are faced with poor education and job prospects, and who are generally marginalized from the decision-making process in the social and political realms. Economic disparities between the portion of Galkayo falling under the Puntland authorities and that under the Galmudug authority also contribute to tensions that can escalate conflict.

6.3. Political/governance factors

Since no single actor can assume authority or responsibility for the development of Galkayo as a whole, its administrative division perpetuates the tensions across the district. According to a local peace organization, the two rivalling administrations claim to work together and collaborate, but do not.75

Both the Galmudug and Puntland administrations recognize the two-state structure of Galkayo as a fundamental source of insecurity in the district,67 because each side of the district is unable to deal with cross-border issues alone. While there seems to be a certain amount of communication between the two administrations, notably on security issues, tensions within the broader community restrict the capacity of the two governments to interact.77 These structural dynamics further result in the possibility of using crime and violence as instigators of wider conflict, because blame may be placed on one or a number of actors.

According to a Galmudug peace-building organization, “if you go deeply, the problem is the politicians”.78 A Puntland-based peace organization explained that the relationship between North and South was constrained by a political rivalry in which “no one wants to acknowledge the other”.79 In fact, a member of the Galmudug
administration claimed during an interview that “as long as they are Puntland, we will be Galmudug” because of the clan affiliations linked to political entities.80

Additionally, according to a local Galmudug peace-building organization, resource disputes in rural areas now take on another dimension given the division of Galkayo in two administrations. While the clan was traditionally the primary actor involved, due to the links between administrative and clan divisions, these disputes can easily escalate to the political realm and deepen socio-political divisions.81

6.4. Firearms and security-related factors

The limitations of the security and justice sectors in dealing with organized crime fuel insecurity in the district as crimes go unpunished. According to the District Safety Committee, “[a]s clan militias are stronger than the police, it is difficult for [statutory justice and security actors] to handle even civilian cases.”82 The police and judiciary focus group identified cases where incidents of domestic violence were brought to court; however, in general, the failure of the justice system to pursue criminals is exemplified by the issue of rape: fear of discrimination, the inability of the justice sector to reach and implement convictions, double victimization and the fact that the outcome is known ahead of time lead many to avoid formal justice institutions.83 The 2010 August gang rape of a young woman by 9 to 11 men is exemplary: although her assailants were known, they were never brought to court. Instead, her family received a financial compensation for the act, and the perpetrators remained free.84

Despite occasional collaboration between the police forces of each administration in catching criminals, the general level of communication and collaboration is low, allowing criminals to escape by crossing the Green Line. This “dual command” is seen by many as the underlying problem that prevents adequate action to ensure peace within the district, a situation exacerbated by the modern dynamics of organized crime.85 In Galmudug, this is further exacerbated, because due to the absence of security actors outside of Galkayo town, the police and other government actors are unable to adequately provide security for the population.

Furthermore, the ongoing conflict in South-Central Somalia, particularly with respect to the movements of Al-Shabaab, heightens social and political tensions in the district. Both Puntland and Galmudug administrations in Galkayo have acknowledged the existence of a permanent or active presence of Al-Shabaab in Galkayo, and there are multiple indications that the group poses an increasing threat in the area. Insecurity in Mogadishu and more broadly across South Central has the potential to destabilize Galkayo.

The history of violence of Galkayo District, combined with a weak rule of law, also perpetuate violence. Children exposed to injustice and violence, be it at community and domestic level, will be socialized into violence, reproducing the behaviours that they witness and are exposed to. This leads to the perpetuation of conflict throughout generations.86

Importantly, the presence of firearms in public spaces is widespread and clearly contributes to the intensity and lethality of violence. Civilians are free to carry weapons in markets and along main roads, and it is common to keep firearms at home or in businesses for security. Any legislation on this matter is hardly implemented.87

In the CVS, 22.4 percent of permanent resident respondents owned at least one firearm, compared to 17.2 percent of refugees and 5.7 percent of IDPs (Figure 38). Note that 93.7 percent of respondents answered the question on firearms ownership, which could indicate that the issue is not perceived as being sensitive in Galkayo.

Figure 38: Firearms possession, by residential status

![Figure 38: Firearms possession, by residential status](Weighted %)

Ref. WE2_RxRP10 (n=657)

The types of firearms available were declared mainly to be Kalashnikov-type assault rifles and other automatic rifles (62.2%) (Figure 39).

Figure 39: Types of firearms available (Freq. %)

![Figure 39: Types of firearms available](Kalashnikov type assault rifle 62.2%)

Ref. WE3 (n=111)

A significant 72.1 percent of survey respondents stated that their main reason for owning a firearm was for protection; 23.4 percent that it was required for work (police, soldier, etc); 27 percent for hunting and 1.8 percent for traditional purposes (Figure 40).
Strikingly, trends with regard to availability of firearms differ markedly between North and South Galkayo: while 68.6 percent of respondents from North Galkayo stated that firearms had become far less available over the 12 months preceding the survey, 73.0 percent of respondents from the South, on the contrary, stated that firearms had become slightly or far more available (Figure 41). Therefore, while South Galkayo currently appears safer than North Galkayo in terms of actual levels of crime, trends with respect to firearms availability could close this gap.

Figure 41: Availability of arms over the last 12 months, North/South Galkayo (Weighted %)

Ref. WExB3_R3 (n=536)

The perceived threat from remote-controlled or time bombs once again reveals stark differences between North and South Galkayo: while in the South, the threat was considered low to non-existent, in the North, a striking 54.4 percent of respondents felt that there was a high risk of remote-controlled or time bombs (Figure 42).

Figure 42: Threat from remote-controlled or time bombs, North/South Galkayo (Weighted %)

Ref. WE7xB3R_3 (n=576)

When asked whether or not there were mines and/or unexploded ordnances (UXOs) in the area, 53.0 percent of respondents stated that there were none, 43.0 percent, that there were some, and 3.1 percent, that there were many. Here, however, the threat was perceived as higher in South Galkayo than in North Galkayo (Figure 43).

Figure 43: Perceived presence of landmines and UXOs (Weighted %)

Ref. WE8xB3R_3 (n=637)

65 Interview with a local peace organization (North Galkayo), 30 August 2010.
66 Interview with a local peace organization (North Galkayo), 30 August 2010.
67 Interview with a local peace organization (North Galkayo), 30 August 2010.
68 Interview with a Galmudug peace-building organization, 30 August 2010.
69 Interview with a local youth organization (North Galkayo) 7 June 2010.
70 Interview with a local IDP aid worker (North Galkayo), 6 June 2010.
71 Interview with a local education organization in Galkayo, 31 August 2010.
72 Interview with a local youth organization (North Galkayo) 7 June 2010.
73 Interview with a local peace organization (North Galkayo), 30 August 2010.
74 Interview with a local peace organization (North Galkayo), 30 August 2010.
75 Interview with a local peace organization (North Galkayo), 30 August 2010.
76 Interview with the Regional Administration of Mudug (North Galkayo), during an interview with the Galmudug Police, 28 August 2010.
77 Personal Communication, Confidential Informant, 1 Sept 2010.
78 Interview with a Galmudug peace-building organization, 30 August 2010.
79 Interview with a local peace organization (North Galkayo), 30 August 2010.
80 Member of District Administration of South Galkayo, during an interview with the Galmudug Police, 28 August 2010.
81 Interview with a Galmudug peace-building organization, 30 August 2010.
82 Interview with the Galkayo District Safety Committee, 23/24 November 2010.
83 Interview with a local education organization in Galkayo (North Galkayo), 5 June 2010.
84 Interview with a local education organization in Galkayo, 5 June 2010.
85 Interview with a Galmudug peace-building organization, 30 August 2010.
86 Interview with a local education organization in Galkayo, 31 August 2010.
87 Meeting with the Galkayo District Safety Committee, 23/24 November 2010.
7. Perceived performance of justice and security actors

7.1. Comparative perspectives

Both the CVS and focus group discussions inquired about the perceived performance of the various public authorities that are able to respond to insecurity, namely the police, the courts, religious leaders, and the clan or community elders. The following section first presents a comparative perspective of the perceived performance of these different actors, including by type of crime. Each actor is then considered separately in further detail, including a discussion of the role of women and other security providers.

7.1.1. General perception

Respondents stated that the religious leaders of Galkayo District were the most trusted figures in the community (41.4% for men, 41.2% for women), and the community elders were the second most trusted (27.9% for men, 23.7% for women). The police were mistrusted, particularly among men (-12% for men, -6.5% for women), and the judiciary were the least trusted of all (-29.3% for men, -26.7% for women) (Figure 44). Note that perceptions differed between North and South Galkayo, as detailed below (Figure 54 and Figure 58).

7.1.2. Reporting

Reporting rates vary depending on the type of crime experienced. Among the respondents who experienced property crimes, 70.4 percent stated having disclosed the crime to the public. The reporting rate to the police is 14.8 percent (four cases); two cases, or 7.4 percent, resulted in a court decision (Figure 45). With respect to assault, 53.4 percent of cases were disclosed to the public, but only 5.5 percent (four cases) were actually reported to the police, and only one case (1.4%) had been judged (Figure 47).

Ref. AR1_R (n= 656), AR4_R (n=658), AR7_R (n=637), AR10_R (n=641)
Ref. PC10 (n=20)
Ref. AA1 (n=73), AA13 (n=39), AA18 (n=4), AA21 (n=1)

Most cases were reported to the community elders (61.0%); 26.8 percent of household respondents reported first to the government police; 9.8 percent to religious leaders; and 2.4 percent to others not specified in the CVS. It should be noted that women showed a slight preference for government police and religious leaders compared to men, who more readily turned to the elders (Figure 48).
There were nine respondents (ten cases) in which the respondents themselves or a member in their household had experienced sexual violence. Four of these cases were disclosed to the public, and only one was reported to the police. None of the sexual violence cases reported by CVS respondents had been brought to court (Figure 49). The four cases of sexual violence disclosed to the public were reported to the community elders.

Finally, of the 45 cases of homicide declared by the CVS respondents, 25, or 55.6 percent, were disclosed to the public (community elders, religious leaders, police, etc.). Only one (2.2%) was reported to the government police, and no court decision had been taken on any of these cases (Figure 50).

7.2. The Police

7.2.1. Mapping

North Galkayo has four police stations: the central police station in Garsoor (three officers), the Miir Police Station in Hormar (two officers) and the Warshada Galayda Police Station in Garsoor (two officers). In addition, the main regional police station is also located in Galkayo (Garsoor), with 15 officers. The Criminal Investigation Department (CID) has a further two officers, eight officers work for the Tax Police, and one officer is assigned to the traffic police. Only the regional police station has a computer, and records are generally very poor.

In the South, Galmudug has just one police station. The Galmudug Police Station has separate holding cells for men, women and children, but no prison, which results in convicted prisoners being held in the same location as those awaiting trial.

7.2.2. General perception

Over half of CVS respondents (59.0%) expressed low trust in the police (Figure 51). Similarly, over half of survey respondents stated that the police were inaccessible (distant and hard to find) (59.9%) (Ref. AR7 (n=637) Figure 52) as well as slow to respond (57.0%) (Ref. AR8 (n=636) Figure 53).
It should be noted, however, that overall trust differs significantly between North and South Galkayo, with a slight majority of respondents from the North expressing fairly to very high trust in the police, while 56.3 percent of respondents from the South expressed fairly low trust (Figure 54).

Figure 54: Trust in the police, North/South Galkayo
(Weighted %)

Ref. AR7xB3_R3 (n=578)

The perception of accessibility also varies significantly across different wards (Figure 55).

Figure 55: Accessibility of the police, by subdivision (Freq. %)

Ref. AR8_R (n=636)

Focus group participants (all from North Galkayo) highlighted that the mistrust of the existing security apparatus of North Galkayo (Puntland) can be explained by: clan affiliation and tribalism; poor relations and communication between security providers and the population; lack of leadership by the Government in reducing armed violence; poor capacity and inadequate facilities; the absence of reporting systems for crime and armed violence, which endangers future crime prevention activities; poor handling of sensitive information by security providers; a shortage of police officers and the absence of specialized police officers such as criminal investigators; overpopulated jails; inadequate incentives leading to bribery, intimidation of security providers by powerful criminals, clan affiliation as impeding objectivity; and clan protection of criminals. In South Galkayo, the weak ability to apply the law appears to stem primarily from the lack of police capacity.

The District Safety Committee also alluded to broader challenges: the district is characterized by a culture of violence and deep mistrust of governance in any form – the police, local authorities, etc. because traditionally, the people of Galkayo categorically oppose any form of authority.

7.2.3. Response

Satisfaction with police response to actual crimes can be evaluated for each type of crime. Of the ten cases of property crime reported to the government police, six expressed a degree of satisfaction. Of the six cases of homicide handled by the police, five were very satisfied with the police response. The victim of sexual violence was also very satisfied with the police response. Only victims of assault had a rather negative perception of the police response, with four out of six cases reporting to be rather to very unsatisfied (Figure 56).

Figure 56: Satisfaction with police response (Freq.)

Ref. PC14 (n=10), AA19 (n=6), SV19 (n=1), MD17 (n=6)

Four respondents expressed the grievance that the police ‘did not take action’, and two regretted that it ‘took time for taking action after reporting’.

7.3. Statutory courts

7.3.1. Mapping

North Galkayo houses two courts: the Mudug Regional Court and the Galkayo District Court, located in Israac. The District Court has 11 staff members, including five judges, one registrar and one attorney general. In addition, three practising lawyers have been identified. In South Galkayo, Galmudug has three courts: a first degree court, a court of appeal and a high court, although the latter has yet to be established.

7.3.2. General perception

In comparison to other public authorities, the courts were the least trusted (Figure 44). Indeed, a mean of 77.8
percent respondents expressed fairly to very low levels of trust in the courts (Figure 57).

**Figure 57: Level of trust in the courts (Weighted %)**

With respect to the police, however, overall trust varied between North and South Galkayo. In North Galkayo, almost half the respondents (49.8%) expressed very low trust in the courts, but a significant 28.1 percent of respondents nevertheless expressed fairly to very high trust. In the South, while only 35.4 percent of respondents indicated very low trust, there was a lower percentage of respondents who indicated fairly to very high trust (7.9%) (Figure 58).

**Figure 58: Trust in the courts, North/South Galkayo (Weighted %)**

Furthermore, 79.7 percent of the respondents stated that the courts were inaccessible due to distance and difficulty to locate (Figure 59).

**Figure 59: Physical accessibility to the courts (Weighted %)**

Accessibility, however, also varies by subdivision within the district (Figure 60).

**Figure 60: Accessibility of the courts, by subdivision (Freq. %)**

A mean of 77.0 percent of respondents felt that the courts were slow to respond (Figure 61).

**Figure 61: Speed of court response (Weighted %)**

In the event that respondents become victim to crime or violence, over half (62.4%) stated that they would take the case to court. The primary reasons for not resorting to the courts were: corruption or the need to bribe court officials (36.2%), expecting an unfair judgment (30.1%), overly expensive court fees (10.0%), overly lengthy legal procedures (7.0%), and finally, because court officials do not take action (3.9%) (Figure 62).

**Figure 62: Reasons to avoid court (Freq. %)**

7.3.3. Response

Only one out of the 44 reported court cases of physical violence crimes (excluding homicides) reached a verdict (2.3%); the victim was very satisfied with the court decision. Out of the 21 reported property crimes, two reached a verdict. Out of the 45 cases of assault, only one verdict was reached, in which case the victim was very satisfied. Finally, none of the ten reported cases of sexual violence and 45 cases of homicide reached a verdict in a criminal court.
7.4. Women

The CVS enquired whether female member(s) of households were ‘allowed to participate in village/town meetings’. The majority of respondents (75.2%) stated that women were allowed to participate in the community and town meetings; however, almost one-quarter (24.8%) of respondents stated that they were not allowed. The reasons were: the family’s belief that the woman should focus on family issues (38.6%); the husband’s jealousy or lack of trust in his wife’s loyalty (24.2%); prohibition by religion (13.6%); the dislike of male household members of female visibility in decision making (12.9%); the feeling of discomfort of female household members with participating (9.8%); and other reasons not specified in the questionnaire (0.8%) (Figure 63).

Figure 63: Reasons for female non-participation in community and townhall meetings (Freq. %)

![Graph showing reasons for female non-participation](image)

Focus group participants emphasized that women can bring an important contribution to peace since they play a major role in mediating conflicts. While generally not recognized as players in the decision-making process, they transcend many divisions in society: they belong to the clan of their parents as well as that of their husbands, serving as a bridge between the two, and their marginalization from mainstream social decision-making often provides them with a certain neutrality when mediating conflict.

During an open interview with members of the IDP committee and the broader community in an IDP settlement of North Galkayo, one woman stepped forward to denounce the lack of recognition of women’s role by highlighting how they often mediate conflicts within the settlement, as well as in communities outside of the settlement, and can mediate when the IDP committee or traditional elders are deadlocked. Although appearing generally ad hoc, their role maintains a certain level of formality: the woman described how during conflicts between two tribes, “[women] wear white clothes and discuss” the issues at stake. The lack of social weight granted to women as well as their marginalization in formal structures and institutions provide a softer entry point from which disputes can be negotiated, and their position as members of the clan of their fathers as well as their husbands allows them to cross boundaries when disputes arise.

However, women were also identified by focus groups as encouraging violence and providing support to perpetrators of violence. The dual role defies many preconceived notions of the role of women in conflict: although they have traditionally played a major role in reducing conflict and tensions, they may also reinforce conflict by encouraging men’s participation in violence.

7.5. Youth

Sports for peace activities bringing together youth from both sides were organized in 2008, allowing for a change of mindsets among a demographic group that is often left out of the process until their age dictates full participation. While currently closed due to insecurity, a peace school was also erected in Garsoor 1, along the line dividing North and South Galkayo, to bring together students from both areas as a test of reconciliation. Initiatives like this, and the recognition of the need to mend the ruptured social fabric of the district have the potential to increase interactions and ultimately reconcile the two major clans. However, civil society generally reflects the fragmentation of society. For instance, youth organizations were proud of the multitude of youth organizations on both sides of the line, but they admit to low levels of interaction with traditional actors such as elders, and complained of lack of attention and recognition by both local and international communities alike.

7.6. Elders and religious leaders

The reliance on traditional actors is inevitable when the administrations are unable to ensure stability. The elders are generally considered to be a capacity for peace in Galkayo District. When conflicts occur at the sub-communal level, local committees seek to resolve them, usually using the elders as mediators. At the district level, community-wide conflicts and political stalemates often result in meetings between the elders of clans in neutral areas; between Sa’ad and Majerteen sub-clans, these usually occur at the airport or the local peace school that had been established to reconcile the two communities.

It should be noted that the elders can also encourage conflict by persuading members of their clans to escalate disputes with other clans, and their capacity to deal with modern threats in the community is rather restricted. They are also more likely to resist state-building: the elders were the only focus group that openly expressed a negative opinion of the police.

Furthermore, the influx of populations from all Somali regions and the presence of pirates and district gangs all contribute to dynamics that the traditional actors are
no longer equipped to deal with, resulting in a vacuum in which crimes can go unpunished. The increasing modernity of crime and the relative absence of clan identification among criminal groups render traditional structures for dealing with violence and conflict relatively obsolete because they are founded on this form of social identification and accountability.

Interestingly, in the CVS, while trust in religious leaders is almost unanimously high (Figure 64), a significant minority of respondents (15.5% of males, 19.5% of females) expressed very low trust in the community elders (Ref. AR1xRP1 (n=658)).

Figure 64

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Trust in Religious Leaders, by Gender (Weighted %)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>41.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>61.2%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Ref. AR1xRP1 (n=658)

Figure 65

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Trust in Community Elders, by Gender of Respondent (Weighted %)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>41.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>58.8%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Ref. AR4xRP1 (n=656)

7.7. Business community

Businesspersons can play multiple roles with respect to violence and conflict. According to a local businessperson interviewed, they often attempt to reduce and minimize conflicts in order to protect their business and property from looting or disruptions. However, some businesspersons can play a role in escalating conflict by providing funds to warring parties. According to a Galmudug peace-building organization, businesses at times support conflicts because they believe that if the opposing clan militia reaches them, their property will be looted. Further, the businesspersons’ investment and support of piracy appears to be well established; according to a local businessperson, this relationship is becoming stronger as businesses fulfill the financial and logistical requirements for piracy on the seas.

7.8. Other justice and security providers

The weak capacity of the government to provide security is reflected by an increased reliance on non-state security mechanisms. Neighbourhood watches have been set up in a number of villages or sub-divisions of the town. They are funded by the local communities and the mayor, and individuals caught committing crimes are arrested and handed over to the police. These neighbourhood watches have difficulties operating however, partly through lack of funding, partly because individuals handed over to the police will often be released, and partly because their activities are creating tensions among the clans.

A number of IDP settlements in both North and South Galkayo have also identified local militias as the actors who provide security to settlements (notably in rural areas), and urban settlements are often provided security by the land owner. In North Galkayo, the Holoboqod IDP settlement located roughly 13 km outside of Galkayo town is protected by a group of 17 militiamen who guard a nearby borehole, as well as two police officers detached from the Galkayo Police, despite the disagreement of the local administration on this subject.

Finally, clan groups also maintain armed militias, which will be mainly accountable to the traditional elder, clan businessmen and militia commanders. Relations with the police are often poor to non-existent, and reliance on private security actors and local militias to ensure security, notably in IDP settlements, strengthens the perception that the government cannot provide security to the people, resulting in many taking security into their own hands.

References:

88 Mapping of Galkayo District, KAALO, October 2009.
89 Interview with the Galmudug Police, 28 August 2010.
90 Interview with the Galmudug Police, 28 August 2010. It was reported that prisoner conditions were also a function of a weak governing structure: according to the Galmudug Police during a visit to the police station, due to inadequate structures to prevent the detainees from escaping, they had to wear loose shackles around their ankles when in the inner courtyard; otherwise, not allowing them to go outdoors would worsen their health.
91 Presentation by the Galkayo District Safety Committee, Garowe, 12–13 December 2010.
92 Mapping of Galkayo District, UNDP, October 2009
93 Mapping of Galkayo District, KAALO, October 2009
94 Interview with the Galmudug Police, 28 August 2010.
95 Interview with Galmudug youth organizations, 29 August 2010.
96 Interview with a local youth organization (North Galkayo), 7 June 2010; interview with Galmudug youth organizations, 29 August 2010.
97 Interview with a local businessman, North Galkayo, 30 August 2010.
98 Interview with a Galmudug peace-building organization, 30 August 2010.
99 Interview with a local businessperson, North Galmudug, 30 August 2010.
100 Meeting with the Galmudug youth organizations, 29 August 2010.
8. Recommendations

The following recommendations are extracted from the District Safety Plan for North Galkayo, which was developed in several steps. A workshop was held from 13 to 18 May 2010 with 40 individuals who had participated in the focus group discussions in Galkayo and facilitated by DDG, UNDP and KAALO. Participants validated the draft community safety diagnosis, prioritized security concerns, and brainstormed solutions to the identified issues. It should be noted that quantitative data from the CVS were not yet available at the time. The District Safety Committee then adopted the produced District Safety Plan, which is to be revised on an annual basis to form part of the District Council’s annual work plan. External support is required for its full implementation.

8.1. Improving the capacity of the police

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Vision</th>
<th>Intervention and activities for its implementation</th>
<th>Local contribution</th>
<th>External support needed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Effective police checkpoints on the main roads in detecting illegal cargo and persons, and reduce the incidence of theft and killings. | **1. Intervention for the improvement of checkpoints.** Activities:  
a. Increase the number of police personnel manning the checkpoints (150 new police officials will be needed, distributed between the police stations covering the areas of the checkpoints).  
b. Train police personnel to search for illegal cargo.  
c. Train the police to identify criminals.  
d. Provide the police with appropriate equipment.  
e. Provide the police with adequate salaries to prevent bribery.  
f. Develop regulations for conduct on the road (speeding, driving under the influence) and increase the capacity of the police to enforce the law. | Local Council to set up checkpoints  
Contribution for infrastructure by business community  
DSC  
Police | Technical and training support  
More police officials  
Equipment  
Salaries |
| Police stations are adequate and functioning; and reduce incidents of killings, theft and rape in crime hotspots² | **2. Intervention for setting up additional checkpoints.** Activities:  
a. Setting up additional checkpoints between Galkayo and Godod, Galkayo and Laanta Tusmada, and Galkayo and Bayra. | | |
| **3. Intervention for establishing four additional Police stations.** Activities:  
a. Establish new police stations in Isaac Branch 3 and, Horumar (Galkayo Main Market).  
b. Provide equipment for new police stations.  
c. Provide 60 additional police officials for new police stations (30 per police station).  
d. Establish a new police station in Garsoor 5.  
e. Provide equipment for the new police station.  
f. Provide 30 additional police officials for the new police station. | Local council – provide land  
DSC – coordinate community contribution  
The community contributes funds, material and unskilled labour. | Funding  
Training  
Food for work |
| **4. Intervention for establishing visible policing activities.** Activities:  
a. Identify crime hotspots and peak times.  
b. Increase police patrols in crime hotspot areas and over peak times.  
c. Identify positions and priorities for satellite police posts in crime hotspot areas.  
d. Establish satellite police posts according to priorities.  
e. Train the police in greater sensitivity to cases of sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV, particularly rape.  
f. Establish gender desk and increase number of female officers. | DSC and the District Police Commander and City Council plan patrols and identify priorities for satellite police posts.  
The community provide unskilled labour. | Funding  
Tents for mobile satellite police posts  
Charge offices built from wood close to priority hotspots  
Communication equipment (VHF)  
Uniforms  
Transport to deploy police |
### 8.2. Improving prisons

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Vision</th>
<th>Intervention and activities for its implementation</th>
<th>Local contribution</th>
<th>External support needed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The prison is efficient and adequate to handle prisoners and act correctly.</td>
<td>Intervention for upgrading the prison infrastructure. Activities: Expand the existing infrastructure to humanely accommodate more inmates. Create divisions to separate categories of prisoners, e.g. male, female and juveniles, as well as long-term prisoners (serious crimes). Improve the nutritional, health, hygiene, sanitation and drinking water facilities. Intervention for improving the efficiency of the Custodial Corps. Activities: Train the Custodial Corps in human rights and the humane handling of prisoners. Provide primary education to guards and prison staff.</td>
<td>District Council DSC Local vocational training institutions</td>
<td>Financial support Technical support Training packages Tools (electricity auto mechanic, tailoring, welding, building, carpenter)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Intervention for rehabilitation of prisoners. Activities:** Provide vocational education to prisoners (English, mathematics, languages and Islamic religious education). Provide vocational and skills training in carpentry, electricity, auto mechanics, welding, building and tailoring. Provide psycho-social services.

### 8.3. Improving the capacity of the judiciary

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Vision</th>
<th>Intervention and activities for its implementation</th>
<th>Local contribution</th>
<th>External support needed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>An independent judiciary system capable of applying the law properly.</td>
<td>Intervention for carrying out justice independently. Activities: Improve the quality of administering justice through the training of judges. Increase the number of skilled justice officials. Increase the remuneration of officials to avoid bribery. Train the prosecutors. Intervention for improving court infrastructure. Activities: Evict squatters from district court buildings. Renovate district court buildings. Intervention for properly applying the law. Activities: Ensure that judgments are implemented. Review the judicial process and current laws.</td>
<td>District council DSC</td>
<td>New appointments Funds for salaries Financial support Training Legal experts</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Intervention for improving court infrastructure.** Activities: Evict squatters from district court buildings. Renovate district court buildings. Intervention for properly applying the law. Activities: Ensure that judgments are implemented. Review the judicial process and current laws.

### 8.4. Involving the community in safety and security

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Vision</th>
<th>Intervention and activities for its implementation</th>
<th>Local contribution</th>
<th>External support needed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Functioning streetlights prevent crime after dark.</td>
<td>Intervention for improving visibility in crime hotspots during the night. Activities: Mobilize the community to erect streetlights in front of their properties and businesses. Mobilize private electricity providers to provide electricity to their areas. Raise awareness among the community of the importance of streetlights for their safety. Raise awareness among the community to protect the streetlights against vandalism.</td>
<td>Private electricity providers – provide electricity Community members and business community erect lights</td>
<td>Technical support</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Intervention for improving visibility in crime hotspots during the night.** Activities: Mobilize the community to erect streetlights in front of their properties and businesses. Mobilize private electricity providers to provide electricity to their areas. Raise awareness among the community of the importance of streetlights for their safety. Raise awareness among the community to protect the streetlights against vandalism.
### Domestically and child abuse are prevented by conflict management skills and awareness raising

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Intervention and activities for its implementation</th>
<th>Local contribution</th>
<th>External support needed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Intervention for improving interpersonal conflict management skills. Activities: Provide Conflict Management Education (CME) to parents. Provide training for community volunteer CME trainers to ensure sustainability. Provision of TOT in CME to intermediary and secondary teachers. Advocate for the inclusion of CME in school curricula. Increase awareness on women’s rights and access to recourse (victim services)</td>
<td>DSC, CECs, District Education Coordinator and CBOs to coordinate sessions. DSC, CECs and CBOs to advocate with MOE</td>
<td>Trainers and training materials for CME and ToT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intervention for fighting the use of alcohol and drugs. Activities: Raise awareness on the consequences of the use of alcohol and drugs Improve the moral standards and raise awareness among the community. Cooperate between the community and the police to fight the alcohol and drug trade.</td>
<td>Awareness raising by CBOs Awareness raising by the local media Religious teaching Community cooperation with local police</td>
<td>Technical support</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### The community is involved and cooperates with the police to reduce crime and violence.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Intervention and activities for its implementation</th>
<th>Local contribution</th>
<th>External support needed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Intervention for establishing a Community-based Policing (CBP) Committee. Activities: Establish a CBP Committee at the district level. Provide training for the CBP Committee. Establish links between the district-level CBP and communities, villages and IDP camps. Establish neighbourhood watches in all neighbourhoods and IDP settlements. Decrease stigma associated with rape through awareness raising, community support networks and victim services.</td>
<td>DSC and the District Police Commander coordinate community and police</td>
<td>Technical support Training</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### The community is free from pirates and their threat.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Intervention and activities for its implementation</th>
<th>Local contribution</th>
<th>External support needed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Intervention for minimizing the attraction of piracy. Activities: Provide skills and vocational training for youth from poor areas. Create jobs for youth from poor areas. Raise awareness about the dangers of piracy.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### 8.5. Demobilization of freelance militia

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Intervention and activities for its implementation</th>
<th>Local contribution</th>
<th>External support needed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Intervention for establishing a functional rehabilitation centre. Activities: Establish a functional rehabilitation centre for demobilization. Raise awareness among the community on the importance of demobilizing freelance militia. Develop a rehabilitation programme for the reintegration of demobilized freelance militia into the community. Advocate participation in rehabilitation activities among juvenile criminals (pirates, gang members, drug users)</td>
<td>DSC, District Council Community</td>
<td>Financial support Equipment Expert advice</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### 8.6. Improving the capacity of the District Safety Committee (DSC)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Intervention and activities for its implementation</th>
<th>Local contribution</th>
<th>External support needed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Intervention for establishing a Resource Centre for Peace (RCP). Activities: Mobilize the community to take responsibility for the centre. Expand the current centre to fulfil the needs of the community. Equip the centre according to the needs of the community Build the capacity of the DSC to manage the centre.</td>
<td>DSC to manage the centre Community – contribute to equipping the centre</td>
<td>Financial support Technical advice Training package Equipment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intervention for strengthening the capacity of the DSC. Activities: Provide training to build the technical capacity of the DSC. Implement additional training to build the functional capacity of the DSC to implement the District Safety Plan. Explore the possibilities of representation of outlying villages.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
8.7. Improving the safety of internally displaced persons (IDPs)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Vision</th>
<th>Intervention and activities for its implementation</th>
<th>Local contribution</th>
<th>External support needed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The IDPs are accommodated in safe settlements and integrated socially.</td>
<td>Intervention for allocating land to IDPs. Activities: Survey land that would be suitable for IDPs. Transfer the land to the individuals. Mediate with appropriate agencies to supply shelter to IDPs. Increase the security of dwellings: establish more permanent housing structures.</td>
<td>District Council – survey and transfer land; provide services. DSC – mediate for safe shelter. District police commissioner – deploy police officers for patrols.</td>
<td>Supply of shelter. Financial support. Technical advice. Food distribution. Medical care. Distribution of non-food items.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

8.8. Providing alternatives for youth

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Vision</th>
<th>Intervention and activities for its implementation</th>
<th>Local contribution</th>
<th>External support needed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>There are adequate playgrounds and/ or sports fields to occupy the youth positively.</td>
<td>Intervention for improving the sports facilities. Activities: Improve the sports infrastructure. Evict illegal squatters from the football stadium. Intervention for establishing new sports facilities. Activities: Allocate land for new sports facilities. Ensure that sports facilities are accessible to youth from North and South Galkayo. Mobilize the community to take responsibility for establishing the new sports facilities.</td>
<td>District Council – eviction of squatters on sports grounds. Allocation of land for new sports grounds. DSC – for initiating the activities. District sports coordinator for coordination of activities.</td>
<td>Financial support. Technical advice. Equipment. Training.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

8.9. Improving moral behaviour

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Vision</th>
<th>Intervention and activities for its implementation</th>
<th>Local contribution</th>
<th>External support needed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Religious groups promote moral behaviour.</td>
<td>Intervention for resolving differences between religious groups. Activities: Establish a committee representing all religious schools or shuras in Galkayo. Facilitate a meeting of all shuras to discuss differences of moral opinion.</td>
<td>Religious groups – for taking part in committee and meetings. DSC – coordinate.</td>
<td>Financial support. Expert religious advice.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Footnotes)

1 Crime hotspots have been identified as: Garsoor village: between Hotel Guure and the ex-post antenna, Rahma Mosque up to the small bridge in the tarmac road, Somali Red Crescent Society close to the Qurucda trees, Jiiru Garoob, Ceelasha Barda Dheere, Suuqa Barwaaqo, the Maize Factory and its area; Israaq village: Kamaal Hotel up to the airport, from Mohamud Rasuulalaah Mosque up to Sinaay village, from the football stadium up to Sinaay village, from Salaama Mosque up to Sinaay village, Dalco Telecom up to Cirjifile, Hotel Qaboobe and the Miir Police Station up to Buulo Bacley.

2 Priority areas for street lighting projects have been identified as: Garsoor village: between Hotel Guure and the ex-post antenna, Rahma Mosque up to the small bridge in the tarmac road, Somali Red Crescent Society close to the Qurucda trees, Jiiru Garoob, Ceelasha Barda Dheere, Suuqa Barwaaqo, Maize Factory and its area; Israaq village: Kamaal Hotel up to the airport, from Mohamud Rasuulalaah Mosque up to Sinaay village, from the football stadium up to Sinaay village, from Salaama Mosque up to Sinaay village, Dalco Telecom up to Cirjifile Hotel Qaboobe and the Miir Police Station up to Buulo Bacley IDP camp.
About the Somali Observatory of Conflict and Violence Prevention (OCVP)

The Somali OCVP – referred to as Homboro in Somali – gathers data and information on patterns of criminal social and political violence in the region, supporting analysis that can be useful to all Somalis. *Homboro* is the Somali name for the bottlenose dolphin, an animal celebrated in traditional songs for its intervention in protecting and rescuing human beings. The OCVP pursues a similar human security objective.

The OCVP is currently accumulating quantitative and qualitative data on insecurity and violence in the Somali regions, which are available for further use. The OCVP data and analytical reports can help practitioners ensure that interventions are guided by up-to-date information and evidence. The OCVP is also setting up a safety and security monitoring system to form the cornerstone of a Somali Early Warning and Response Network (EWARN). Beyond data collection and analysis, the OCVP will draw on the fields of conflict management, traditional and modern, to support practitioners and policy makers with guidance notes, an interactive discussion forum and training. By collecting, storing and sharing the knowledge acquired in the field of crime and violence reduction, it aims at becoming a centre of excellence for conflict and violence prevention.

For further information:

The Director

Observatory of Conflict and Violence Prevention (OCVP)

Hargeisa, Somaliland

info@ocvp.org

http://www.ocvp.org