Safety and security

MOGADISHU
Safety and Security Baseline Report: Mogadishu

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First Edition (August 2011)
First Printing (February)

ISBN: 978-9966-1614-1-3

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Acknowledgements

The Somali Observatory of Conflict and Violence Prevention wishes to thank the following organizations (in alphabetical order):

Right from the beginning of this project, the Danish Demining Group participated in consultations on the development of the survey tools, particularly the Crime and Victimization Survey (CVS). In addition, it provided logistical and substantive support for facilitating several rounds of focus group discussions, including training of local non-governmental organization (NGO) partners, and facilitating and recording the proceedings, including the District Safety Plans. It also helped gather additional data for the district mapping in Burao, Las Anod, Bossaso and Galkayo.

The NGOs Haqsoor (Burao), Hornpeace (Las Anod), SORSO (Bossaso) and KAALO (Galkayo) provided local support for the facilitation of the district mapping and sampling, the crime and victimization survey, and focus group discussions. SOYDEN and the Centre for Peace and Democracy also provided mapping information from four Mogadishu districts and supported the implementation of the CVS.

The International Centre for the Prevention of Crime (Montreal, Canada) provided expert feedback on the development of the CVS.

The Japan Centre for Conflict Prevention took a leading role in the development of the survey tools and methodological guidance, primarily the CVS and the focus group questionnaires. It oversaw the sampling of districts necessary to conduct the CVS, participated in the training of enumerators, set up the database, and oversaw data entry and cleaning.

The Observatory of Conflict and Violence Prevention (OCVP) contributed to the collection of additional information from Burao, Las Anod, Bossaso and Galkayo for the finalization of the Community Safety and Security Analysis.

SAACID contributed useful insights for the development of the CVS.

Saferworld was involved from the beginning in consultations on the development of the various survey tools, particularly the CVS. It took a leading role in collecting and analysing information from the focus group discussions, including additional desk-based reviews, for the production of the initial Community Safety and Security Analyses for Burao, Las Anod, Bossaso and Galkayo. For Galkayo and Burao, Saferworld also performed a first statistical analysis of the data from the CVS, including additional key informant interviews.

SOCDA took a leading role in the implementation of the CVS. From the beginning of the project, it participated in the development of the CVS, recruited and oversaw the local teams of enumerators, participated in their training and supervision, as well as contributed to data entry and cleaning.

SOYDEN took the initiative of conducting focus group discussions in four Mogadishu districts, providing precious additional qualitative information on patterns of crime and violence in Mogadishu.

The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) in Somalia, in particular, the Armed Violence Reduction project within the Rule of Law and Security Programme, provided overall substantive, technical and financial support.
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Executive summary

As a national capital, the modern history of Mogadishu is closely related to the history of the Somali Republic. A thriving, cosmopolitan city in the years following independence in 1960, the city’s various clan groups were gradually antagonized as the regime of General Siad Barre became increasingly repressive in the 1970s and 1980s. When Barre fled in 1991, the conflict that had played out in various regions, particularly in the northwest of the country, rapidly concentrated on the capital. The 1990s were characterized by fierce fighting between a succession of warlords and the failure of a peacekeeping mission in 1992–1993. By 2000, regional diplomatic efforts reinstated a national government, albeit with a very limited presence on the ground. By 2004, a new peacekeeping mission was brought in, this time under the African Union, but in 2006, it was the Islamic Courts Union (ICU) that succeeded in re-establishing a measure of stability in Mogadishu. Their reign was short-lived however, as an Ethiopian military intervention in December of the same year forced the ICU to disband. Meanwhile, opposition to the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) coalesced around two new movements, al-Shabaab and Hizbul-Islam.¹

The Crime and Victimization Survey (CVS) from which data for this report are extracted was conducted in July 2010 in six of the 16 districts under the Benadir Regional Administration. Over 1,500 surveys were collected through a random sampling methodology. It should be noted that roughly half of the sample were identified as permanent residents, while the other half were identified as internally displaced persons (IDPs). In 33 percent of the households surveyed, the head was unemployed, and 37 percent were labourers. Notably, almost 30 percent of the households surveyed reported spending less than US$2 a day on food.

Mogadishu has known insecurity for decades, and it appears that the situation continues to worsen: more than 50 percent of respondent households stated that their district had become “very unsafe” over the 12 months preceding the survey – with women slightly less pessimistic than men. Women, however, admit to avoiding more activities than men. Perceptions of insecurity are also influenced by witnessing violence: about one respondent household in four witnessed a crime in the 12 months preceding the survey.

In focus group discussions, violence appeared to be primarily related to conflict dynamics. The CVS inquired about the frequency of clan/community disputes. Although the majority of respondents indicated that these disputes “never or almost never” occur, one of their causes, more often cited in Mogadishu than in other locations surveyed, is “power or cultural struggle” (27% of conflicts). This relates to the political dimension that conflict continues to take in the city. Land disputes were also mentioned by focus groups, particularly within IDP camps where space and resources are limited.

The CVS captured a noteworthy 59 cases of homicide in Mogadishu over the 12 months preceding the survey – 48 males and 11 females ranging from 1 to 56 years of age (4% of the sample). Half of the victims were permanent residents, while the other half were IDPs. This corresponds to the demographic make-up of the sample in terms of residency status, which leads to conclude that killings are indiscriminate. The cause of death included small arms and light weapons in 59 percent of cases, and explosives (bombs, mines, mortar shells) in 41 percent of cases.

In addition, 133 cases of assault were recorded (15% of respondents, 11% of the sample), which occurred mainly in the home irrespective of the time of day, while the streets are particularly dangerous in the afternoon (rather than at night). The prevalence of firearms in assault cases is spectacular: 44 percent of assaults were committed with a Kalashnikov-type assault rifle, and 23 percent with a pistol or revolver. This might explain the seriousness of the injuries sustained: 40 percent of victims were heavily injured and in need of hospitalization, and 29 percent of victims required medical assistance.

Focus group participants identified IDPs as a population that is particularly vulnerable to assault. Indeed, the CVS reveals higher assault and particularly sexual violence victimization rates for these groups than for permanent residents. Women are another population highlighted in focus group discussions as victims of specific types of violence. Indeed, the CVS captured 46 cases of sexual violence (3% of respondents, 4% of the sample). Remarkably, two cases of sexual violence against men were also declared. Sexual violence takes place primarily in the home at night; perpetrators are organized armed groups (56% of cases), individual criminals (26%) and government agents (the army, the police) (12%).
Violence against children was captured in the CVS through data on assault and sexual violence. However, focus group participants drew particular attention to the problem of forced recruitment of children into armed groups. Participants explained that forced recruitment can range from persuasion and psychological manipulation to kidnapping.

In addition, the CVS captured a staggering 262 cases of forced detention (21% of respondents, 15% of the sample), which include illegal detention by security forces and kidnapping.

Focus group discussions made it possible for in-depth exploration of the drivers and risk factors of violence. A number of social factors were mentioned, including: clan identity and cohesiveness facilitating the impunity of perpetrators; disputed and opportunistic clan leadership; the erosion of protective social norms; misinformation facilitating the escalation of violence; qat chewing habits; misinterpretation of verses from the Koran; and importantly, a state of mind of youth characterized by trauma, hopelessness, and ignorance about the stability and safety deriving from good governance and the rule of law. Obvious economic factors are related to poverty and competition over limited resources.

At the political level, the lack of confidence in and respect for the government is due to problems of nepotism and corruption, which are also related to clan and tribal identities, as well as weak communication between the government and the communities affected by the conflict. Focus group participants also regretted a situation of an “ideological monopoly” where dissenting opinions are not easily tolerated.

Finally, the prevalence of firearms seems to be the main security-related risk factor. It is of concern that 52 percent of CVS respondents stated that firearms had become far more available over the 12 months preceding the survey. Furthermore, mainly high-powered weapons seem to be in circulation: the CVS revealed that 62 percent of firearms owned were Kalashnikov-type assault rifles, and 30 percent, pistols and revolvers. Explosives also pose a major security threat, particularly in the districts of Dharkenley, Waberi and Shangani.

The CVS then examined the perceived performance of various justice and security actors. The picture in Mogadishu is bleak, with the courts, the police, the elders and religious leaders all receiving negative ratings – 20 percent of sexual violence cases, 4 percent of assault and 1 percent of property crime were reported to the police. The CVS also reveals that most people turn first to their elders for redress, closely followed by the police. Mogadishu is furthermore characterized by a surprising diversity of actors to which the population will turn, including armed groups, community policing groups, and NGOs/United Nations agencies; it should be noted in particular that 27 percent of sexual violence cases are first reported to these agencies.

The reason stated for not disclosing crime to public authorities varies according to type of crime. In assault cases, non-disclosure is primarily due to the absence of an authority to which the crime can be reported (49%), followed by the physical inability to report the crime (17%) and a preference for other means to deal with the crime (13%). In sexual violence cases, failure to disclose the crime is primarily due to a feeling of embarrassment (42%), followed by the absence of an authority to which the crime can be reported (29%) and the physical inability to report the crime (13%). In property crime cases, unavailability of an authority to which to report the crime (54%) is followed by lack of hope for any redress (21%) and the physical inability to report the crime (12%).

As noted above, CVS respondents showed low levels of trust in the police. Albeit accessible to some extent, the police are deemed slow. Nevertheless, their response to actual crime is rated with some satisfaction, particularly by women in the case of assault. Focus group participants noted that there is some confusion in the population over the distinction between the police and other security actors, particularly the military, which might have influenced results.

Low levels of trust in the courts were also indicated, as well as perceptions of inaccessibility and slowness of response. However, in five out of nine cases where the outcome was documented through the CVS, the courts’ response to actual crime was rated as highly satisfactory by respondents. It should be noted that most district courts are currently relocated to the Hamar Weyne justice compound due to insecurity.

Other security actors identified through focus group discussions include the Madani, locally organized youth militias found notably in Dharkenley and Waberi. They are supported by the community and participate in maintaining peace
and security for lower levels of crime such as theft and freelance militias. The Somali National Security Force is also present in some districts to enforce peace, as are Ahlu-Sunna Wal-Jama militias.

Other capacities for peace include women: in the CVS, a majority of respondent households (74%) stated that there were no obstacles to women attending public meetings. The main obstacle cited in 26 percent of cases was that female household members themselves felt uneasy with such a public role. The role of the elders and religious leaders was also explored both through the CVS and in focus group discussions. In contrast to other areas of Somalia, the elders in Mogadishu do not enjoy overall trust, yet remain the first port of call for victims of crime. While their contribution to peace and security was recognized, the elders themselves admitted the limitations of their power, for example, to protect IDPs from violence. Similarly, while religious leaders are generally not trusted, the CVS highlights that victims of crime will still turn more readily towards shari‘ah than formal (statutory) law. The main limitation of religious leaders reported in focus group discussions relates to the rigidity of the religious doctrines that they apply.

1 This report was compiled prior to the decision by al-Shabaab on 6 August 2011 to pull out most of its forces from Mogadishu.
1. Introduction

Evidence-based programming and policy development in the fields of community security, armed violence reduction and peace-building require a comprehensive and accurate prior analysis of insecurity. Measuring the outcome and impact of interventions to deal with insecurity is equally important, both to advance collective understanding of what works and what does not, and to hold all those involved accountable. The Somali Community Safety Framework (SCSF) is a loose consortium of organizations and local and international, non-governmental and United Nations agencies, which collectively aims at building Somali capacity to mitigate violence and insecurity in a sustainable manner.1 Committed to evidence-based programming, participants in the SCSF identified the collection and analysis of solid data on safety as a priority.

The value added of these data would be greatly increased if they contributed to the adoption of common indicators and methodologies feeding into a common information pool. A broad consultation process was therefore undertaken in 2009–2010 under the umbrella of the SCSF to develop a CVS that would be recognized by SCSF participants. Somali ownership of the data and survey methodologies must be ensured. Until recently, the little data and knowledge available on causes and manifestations of insecurity – whether related to crime or conflict – generally remained within the organization that collected it, and were often lost when projects ended or key staff moved on. To contribute to local ownership, the Somali Observatory of Conflict and Violence Prevention (OCVP) is undertaking this task on behalf of participants in the SCSF, to ensure that a non-partisan academic institution will be the custodian of data and information on crime and conflict in the Somali regions. By collecting, storing and sharing the knowledge acquired, the OCVP can help ensure that interventions are guided by reliable evidence, and that their impact is measured and evaluated. It will also centralize data collection tools and methodologies, and encourage their widespread use to improve the comparability of the data collected.

UNDP Somalia is a founding member of the Somali OCVP. Through its Rule of Law and Security Programme, it supported the development and implementation of the CVS in selected Somali districts between 2009 and 2010. Specifically, this household survey was rolled out in the districts of Burao, Bossaso, Galkayo and Las Anod, as well as six Mogadishu districts (Waberi, Shangani, Hamar Weyne, Hamar Jabjah, Dharkenley and Wadajir). Locations were selected in order to cover some of the major population centres so that more people might benefit from the lessons drawn from the survey while at the same time illustrating a variety of security challenges. In particular, the locations surveyed vary between conflict, post-conflict or crime-related. The entire raw data, as well as the data collection tools and methodologies, form the initial endowment of the OCVP and are publicly available for further research.

Based on these data, UNDP Somalia then supported the drafting, on behalf of the OCVP, of five Safety and Security District Baseline Reports, which will also be translated into Somali. These analytical reports are compiled using a selection of data from the CVS, focus group results, mapping information, key informant interviews and a number of secondary sources. Results are validated by the community and authorities prior to publication. The reports will be supplemented every year by brief updates of trends based on focus group discussions and possibly new qualitative and quantitative data.

The picture of safety and security that emerges from these baseline reports then guided the elaboration of appropriate responses by communities, local and state governments. These recommendations were elaborated by the District Safety Committees (DSCs), which were established under the authority of the District Council in each location, composed of representatives of youth, women, the elders and religious leaders, local government and police/justice officials. The suggested interventions are described in District Safety Plans, which will be integrated into the District Development Framework and as part of annual planning and budgeting cycles. Local and international agencies will be able to benefit from these tools to select, design and measure the impact of ensuing interventions on the basis of this combination of data and needs assessment.

This Safety and Security Baseline Report is divided into eight sections. Following this introduction, the research methodology is described in Section 2. Section 3 provides a general profile (mapping) of Mogadishu, including important historical background notes. Section 4 examines perceptions of insecurity, and Section 5 presents the main security concerns noted in Mogadishu. The drivers and risk factors underlying these issues are then explored in Section 6. Section 7 examines the perceived performance of justice and security actors, including the police, the courts, the elders, religious leaders, women, and other non-state security providers. Finally, Section 8 provides a number of recommendations in response to the analysis.

1 See www.somalipeacebuilding.org for more information.
2. Methodology

This Safety and Security Baseline Report for Mogadishu was prepared through a methodology that consisted of compiling data and information gathered through three research tools: a district mapping exercise, the crime and victimization survey (CVS), and focus group discussions. It was complemented by desk reviews of relevant published and unpublished reports. More information on the development, content and use of the various tools is available in the Monitoring and Assessment Toolkit.3

2.1 District mapping

The first tool used to gather data for this baseline report is a mapping of the available formal and informal resources in the community to cope with insecurity. The mapping4 seeks to capture initial indications on the composition of the target community, its demographic profile and degree of social cohesion (e.g. proportion of IDPs, clan profile). Historical background information is included to reveal both traumatic events that may underpin the vulnerability of the community, and past peace initiatives that may provide important lessons learned and influence perceptions of any new peace initiatives. Existing institutions of justice, security and healthcare have been surveyed to map out the state’s capacity to enforce peace, justice and security, and provide assistance to victims of violence. Finally, capacities for peace such as civil society initiatives, conflict management mechanisms, and neighbourhood watch schemes have been mapped out because under certain conditions, they could be incorporated into programmes. Knowing how information is accessed and/or circulated in the community can also be useful for future awareness-raising activities. In Mogadishu, the mapping was carried out in Wadajir, Dharkeynley, Waberi and Hodan by SOYDEN and in Shibis, Shangani, Hamar Weyne and Hamar Jabjab by the Centre for Peace and Democracy (CPD).

2.2 The Crime and Victimization Survey

The second tool used was the CVS questionnaire developed in 2009.5 It aimed at providing the quantitative information necessary to establish an accurate picture of crime and victimization in target districts, and hence measure the impact of interventions.

The information gathered during the mapping exercise was used to determine possible subdivisions in which the CVS could be conducted. Due to security constraints, it was decided to only administer the survey in districts under the control of the TFG in July 2010, namely Waberi, Shangani, Hamar Weyne, Hamar Jabjab, Dharkenley and Wadajir. A total of 20 wards were chosen from all districts, and 80 households were then chosen from each ward. Figure 1 shows the total number of questionnaires collected in each district.

The CVS collected 1,601 questionnaires, of which 1,590 were valid (the remaining respondents were under 15 years of age). Based on the data collected, each household has an average of 7.9 people (4.1 male and 3.8 female), including 3.4 youth under 15 per household (1.7 male and 1.6 female).

Six enumerators were recruited by SOCDA for Mogadishu. From 14 to 18 May 2010, they travelled to Hargeisa to participate in a one-week training on data collection held by the Japan Centre for Conflict Prevention. A follow-up meeting for enumerators and indicator monitors was held by SOCDA in Mogadishu on 19 June 2010. Actual data collection was conducted in Mogadishu between 10 and 27 July 2010. Data entry started on 8 August 2010.

2.3 Focus group discussions

The third tool was a series of focus group discussions6 aimed at capturing perceptions on the nature of insecurity in the districts, its causes and risk factors, victims and perpetrators, and capacities for peace.

The analysis is based on information targeting four groups gathered over four sessions. Focus group discussions were held from 10 to 13 October 2010, both organized and funded by SOYDEN. The discussions included a group of local officials (members of district administrations and police), women, traditional and religious leaders, and youth. For each group, five participants from different segments of the community were invited from four districts: Wadajir, Dharkenley, Hodan7 and Waberi. A total of 20 individuals therefore participated in each focus group.

The focus groups began with participants being asked to define safety, security and violence, and then to
speak about the levels and changes in security over the preceding 12 months. Participants were asked to compile a thorough list of all major types of violence experienced in the area and to identify their main concerns. Then, they were led through a process of describing the causes, locations, times or seasons, victims, perpetrators, means or weapons and levels of organization for each priority type of violence. Finally, they were asked to identify the individuals or institutions that they trusted to either prevent or respond to violence.

2.4 Validation

A workshop was organized by UNDP in Mogadishu on 12 July 2011 with two representatives from each of Mogadishu’s eight District Safety Committees – including a significant number of women – as well as the Wadajir District Commissioner and local representatives from partner NGOs SOCDA, CPD and SOYDEN. The data from the CVS were presented to participants and discussions held to gather further insights into crime and victimization trends.

1 The Monitoring and Assessment Toolkit is available at http://www.somalipeacebuilding.org/pb-resources/maa.html
2 See Annex A of the Monitoring and Assessment Toolkit.
3 See Annex B of the Monitoring and Assessment Toolkit.
4 See Annex C of the Monitoring and Assessment Toolkit.
5 Note that Hodan was not covered by the CVS due to its frontline position in the confrontation between the TFG/AMISOM and al-Shabaab.
3. Mapping of Mogadishu

3.1 Historical notes

For centuries, the city of Mogadishu has been a cosmopolitan hub for commerce within the Horn of Africa, being constantly exposed to trade with other regions of the world. As early as 1897, Somalia was subject to Italian control. Throughout the 1920s and the 1930s, Mogadishu experienced a boom in economic development, transforming into a modern city. This transformation process was accompanied by assimilation policies, with thousands of Italians migrating to Mogadishu.

During World War II, British forces infiltrated the region coming from Kenya, and the Italians were eventually pushed out by the British and Allied powers in 1941. British forces continued to rule from 1941 up until 1950 when Mogadishu fell under the umbrella of the Italian Trust Administration of Somalia (AFIS). Independence finally came in 1960, under a collaboration of British Somaliland and Italian Somalia, which soon joined together to form the Somali Republic.

In 1969, after a succession of civilian governments, disgruntled military personnel staged a coup without meeting any resistance. The military takeover – the Somali revolution – placed in power a new Head of State and President of the Supreme Revolutionary Council (SRC), Muhammad Siad Barre. From 1969 to 1990, Siad Barre controlled the country under a “socialist” military regime, ruled from Mogadishu city. But despite the introduction of repressive laws, Mogadishu at that time was a thriving, cosmopolitan city, its university forming the intellectual elite of the entire country.

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In 1978, Barre’s regime was weakened by the failed Somali intervention in Ogaden (Ethiopia). Furthermore, his government was perceived as favouring Mogadishu and the southern part of the country in development efforts and revenue allocation, which gave rise to grievances in more neglected parts of the country. First led by individuals from various backgrounds, including army officers, the opposition gradually coalesced into a number of organized movements including the Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF, Majerteen), the Somali National Movement (SNM, Isaq) and the United Somali Congress (USC, Hawiye/Habar Gedir).

In the 1980s, the state of Somalia gradually descended into civil war in which Barre’s regime resisted any opposition. Barre heavily infiltrated the Isaq-dominated northwest, causing many deaths and much destruction and displacement. Escalating tensions had a deep impact on Mogadishu: businesses were closed down in Mogadishu, and entire families fled the area to avoid becoming the victims of the regime’s repression.

The combined clan-based rebellion in 1991 eventually pushed Barre out of Mogadishu and into exile in Nigeria. The USC was the primary opposition movement to successfully occupy Mogadishu. However, Somalia was more divided than ever. Mogadishu, with its strategic importance, quickly became the epicentre of the confrontation.

The main factions at the time were led by Ali Mahdi Mohammed and Mohammed Farah Aideed, both of whom competed for power and claimed presidency. Ali Mahdi, from the Abgal clan, was nominated President with the support of his clan, and Aideed, from the Habargedir clan and allied to the Murusade, used his clan militia to try to gain power. From 1991 to 1992, conflict ensued among these factions and other clan-based groups. Ali Mahdi’s nominal administration in Mogadishu controlled a decreasing territory of the city. Gradually, fighting followed a daily pattern: violence stopped at around 6 pm and started again the following day. The Medina District was divided into Wadajir and Dharkenley, the latter becoming a major theatre of this confrontation. Much fighting also took place in Waberi.

Mogadishu lost its cosmopolitan atmosphere. Military forces, which until then largely transcended clan, found themselves reorganized along clan lines, strengthening the association between clan identity and use of force. In the social sphere, the clan division also became impermeable, and individuals trying to cross clan lines for any motive were seen as spies or traitors, often becoming victims of persecution. Only a few businesspersons were still able to maintain cross-clan contacts.

In 1992, the United Nations Operations in Somalia (UNOSOM) was deployed to monitor a ceasefire. Due to the opposition of the local warlords, however, the mission was utterly ineffective, and in December 1992, 30,000 peacekeepers were deployed as part of the US-led United Task Force (UNITAF). Its mission was to assist in maintaining a ceasefire between warring factions and in Operation Restore Hope following the 1992 famine.
In reality, UNITAF troops effectively joined the war by fighting the two notorious warlords, Aideed and Morgan, who were openly opposing them.\(^9\) Fighting tremendously impacted the population of the city resulting in gang rapes, harassment and killings. In districts such as Waberi, many girls would not dare sleep in their own house for fear of being gang raped by militiamen, and sought refuge in the households of the more powerful clans.

In an attempt to put an end to the violence, in 1992, clan elders and religious leaders signed a petition prohibiting killing and declaring that offenders would be prosecuted or executed. It was clear at the time, however, that the decision would not extend to minority clans or marginalized groups. A ceasefire was then signed on 27 March 1993 by leading warlords, handing over the control and peacekeeping responsibilities to the United Nations forces. In May 1993, the UNITAF forces were replaced by UNOSOM II peacekeepers stationed in Mogadishu. However, the Black Hawk Down episode\(^{10}\) on 3 October 1993 in Mogadishu led to the withdrawal of US forces in 1994, and in March 1995, UNOSOM II followed suit.

The departure of Western troops from Mogadishu did not lead to peace. By 1997, confrontations developed in Waddajir District between two warlords: Muse Sudi Yalahow, who ruled Waddajir District, fought against Omer Finish, who ruled Dharkenley District. In Dharkenley, fighting also took place, between the Habargedir and Abgal clans (General Aideed and Musse Suddi) and between the Abgal (Daud) and the Murursade.

In an attempt to ease these tensions, the Arta Peace Process was launched in 2000 with the support of the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD). An assembly of some 245 clan-based representatives led to the establishment of the Transitional National Government (TNG) and the nomination of a new president. Importantly, it introduced the “4.5 formula”, an attempt to diplomatically distribute power among the Darood, Dir, Hawiye, and Digil-Mirifle clans. However, a new generation of warlords then emerged and sporadic fighting continued between the various clans and sub-clans in Mogadishu and the southern part of Somalia.

IGAD intervened again in 2003–2004, holding discussions in Kenya, which led to the establishment of the TFG in October 2004. It was hoped that this would bring stability to the region through an established, supported political framework. However, on the ground, the process did not break clan allegiances within the military forces.

In 2006, the Islamic Courts Union (ICU) took control of Mogadishu in opposition to the TFG, and subsequently expanded its control over South-Central Somalia.\(^{11}\) This introduced a period of relative stability in Mogadishu. Through the powerful presence of the Islamic courts, anyone who committed a crime against the strict rule of law was prosecuted, regardless of clan affiliation. For the first time in 15 years, basic services such as garbage collection were provided, and people could freely walk on the streets even after sunset.

The respite did not last long. In January 2007, the two rulers of the Islamic Courts, Sheikh Sharif Ahmed and Hassan Dahir Awey, became fierce enemies when Ethiopian troops invaded the country. The ICU vanished almost instantly and many of its leaders left the country. The international community then invited Sheikh Sharif to Djibouti to negotiate peace, excluding Awey from the process. The latter proceeded to create Hizbul Islam, a radical group established in 2008 in opposition to the TFG and its allies. Meanwhile, the former ICU’s radical wing re-emerged as al-Shabaab, soon to become a powerful opposition to the TFG and its allies.

In 2008, the election of Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed as President of the TFG significantly weakened popular opposition to the government. At that point, violence became chiefly marked by the confrontation between the TFG and Islamists. Hizbul Islam and al-Shabaab were also fighting among themselves over the control of particular territories in Mogadishu and the southern part of the country. They eventually joined forces in December 2010.

Meanwhile, in 2007, a new peacekeeping force was deployed in Mogadishu, this time under the African Union and with a United Nations Security Council mandate – the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM). In December 2008, Sheikh Sharif Ahmed was sworn in as the President of the TFG. He requested the withdrawal of the Ethiopian forces, which eventually occurred in January 2009; however, the division of the city persisted.

### 3.2 Geography and demographics

Positioned in the Benadir (Arabic plural for ports) region of southern Somalia, which stretches along the coast of the Indian Ocean, Mogadishu, or ‘Hamar’, has long served as the chief port and capital of Somalia, or today’s South-Central region of Somalia.
Mogadishu was historically divided into two territories, Hamar Weyne and Shangani. Today, each district in Mogadishu is distinct in its clan composition and ethnicity. Hamar Weyne is the old part of town, but today most of its original fair-skinned inhabitants have left to safer areas, and it is largely inhabited by wealthy IDPs. In Waberi, there are two majority clans, the Jerer Wyne and Abgal, and one minority, the Silcis Gorgate. In Wadajir District, the majority clan is the Rahanweyn, but there are also members of the Abgal and the Jerer Weyn. Some of the Hawiye minority sub-clans include the Murusade, Hawadle, Shikhal and the Gundhabe. In Hodan, the majority clan is Ayr and the minority is the Gibil Ad. The district of Dharkenley is composed of the majority clans, the Hawiye (Abgal), the Rahanweyn (Degil), and four minority clans, the Hawadle, the Habar Gedir, the Gugundhabe and the Murursade.

Some of these clans consider themselves “indigenous”, having long historical ties to the area (the Abgal to the north, the Murusade to the west, and the Benadir to the south/along the coast), while others are “national clans”, historically from other parts of the country and basing their presence in Mogadishu on its status as the national capital, which should consequently be shared by all communities (Habar Gedir, for example). The distinction is important because it gives rise to different types of claims to Mogadishu.

The most marginalized groups are referred to as Looma ooyan, which means “no one will cry if gunmen shoot and kill them”.

According to the CVS, Mogadishu is primarily made up of the Hawiye (36.4%), the Digil-Mirifle (16.2%), the Bantu (16.0%) and the Darod (10.2%) clans. Other less prominent clans are the Dir (7.8%), the Arab (5.6%), the Madiban (4.2%), the Isaq (2.6%) and the Indian clans (1.0%) (Figure 2).
School, and other slums in the district. Many more are concentrated in the Afgoye corridor, about 30 km from Mogadishu. As a result of high levels of violence, only limited humanitarian assistance is channelled through Mogadishu.

### 3.3 Resources and the economy

According to the CVS, around one-third (32.5%) of household heads are unemployed. The largest share of the employed is labourers (36.7%) or entrepreneurs (13.5%). Other occupations account for less than 5.0 percent of those employed: NGO and United Nations workers (4.3%), government workers (2.9%), fishers (2.7%), private or non-profit workers (2.3%), farmers and pastoralists (3.6%) and others (1.4%) (Figure 4).

#### Figure 4: Occupation of the head of the household (Freq. %)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Occupation</th>
<th>Frequency (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Labourers</td>
<td>36.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Entrepreneurs</td>
<td>13.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGO/United Nations workers</td>
<td>4.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government workers</td>
<td>2.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fishers</td>
<td>2.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private/Non-profit workers</td>
<td>2.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Farmers and pastoralists</td>
<td>3.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>1.4%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Salaries and income earnings are largely unavailable; therefore, the CVS deduces this information from the amount that Mogadishu households spend on food per day (Figure 5): 29.5 percent of respondent households spend less than US$2 per day on food, whereas 8.2 percent spend over US$30 per day on food.

#### Figure 5: Daily food spending (US$) (Freq. %)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Food Spending (US$)</th>
<th>Frequency (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Less than 2</td>
<td>29.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 to 5</td>
<td>22.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 to 10</td>
<td>12.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 to 20</td>
<td>12.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20 to 50</td>
<td>8.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50 to 70</td>
<td>6.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>70 to 100</td>
<td>4.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>100 to 300</td>
<td>2.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>300 to 500</td>
<td>1.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Over 500</td>
<td>0.7%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### 3.4 Access to basic services

Overall, focus groups stressed that basic services were severely lacking: there was a great need for garbage collection, health posts, nutrition, education, latrines, roads and infrastructure. Most focus group participants nevertheless stated that security was the top priority. Access to basic services was derived from the CVS’s response on levels of education and access to healthcare.

#### 3.4.1 Education

Out of surveyed Mogadishu households, 42.4 percent responded that the head of household had not obtained any form of education; 18.6 percent had received a form of informal education, and 21.0 percent had received a formal education.

Of those informally educated, 55.4 percent attended religious schools, 39.2 percent, a form of life skills education or literacy classes, and the remaining 5.4 percent attended other forms informal education.

Out of those formally educated, 36.7 percent were declared to have completed a university or college level degree, 41.9 percent had completed secondary or high school, 12.9 percent had completed intermediate education, and 5.2 percent, primary levels of education. An additional 3.3 percent received another means of formal education (Figure 6).

#### Figure 6: Education of head of household (Freq. %)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Education Level</th>
<th>Frequency (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>University or college degree</td>
<td>36.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secondary or high school degree</td>
<td>41.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intermediate education</td>
<td>12.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primary education</td>
<td>5.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other forms of education</td>
<td>3.3%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### 3.4.2 Healthcare

In terms of medical care, Mogadishu is severely lacking in resources. In Dharkenley, there is only one health facility (Aden Adde Hospital, 60 beds) and the demand is high from the host community and IDPs, causing overcrowding. In Wadajir, Medina and Benadir hospitals have about 360 beds. In Hodan, Darul Shifa Hospital has about 45 beds. In Waberi, there is a health centre with an auxiliary nurse, as well as Habeb Mental Hospital. Hamar Weyne has three functional facilities: Martini Hospital, one MCH and one clinic. In Shangani and Hamar Jabjab, there is one MCH that is occasionally operational. There are no health facilities in Shibis due to fighting in the area.

Health facilities are sometimes also the target of attacks. One focus group respondent from Dharkenley was visiting a hospital in January 2010 when it was shelled and shot at, killing four patients and wounding 28 people.

The only illustration provided by the CVS on access to medical care relates to the cases of sexual violence. Out of the 43 cases reported, a significant proportion had nowhere to go to receive medical (39.5%) or psychological assistance (48.8%). The largest share of victims received assistance from hospitals, local clinics and doctors (29.9%, medical assistance and 24.4%, psychological assistance); followed by traditional healers (16.3% medical assistance and 14.6 percent psychological). NGOs and United
Nations and other agencies provided medical services to 14.0 percent of the victims and psychological assistance to 9.8 percent. The remaining victims sought assistance from the elders (2.3% medical, and 2.4% psychological) (Figure 7).

**Figure 7: Medical or psychological assistance received in sexual violence cases (Freq. %)**

Ref. SV8 (n=43) and SV9 (n=41)

### 3.5 Governance

Mogadishu is divided into 16 districts, which nominally fall under the Benadir Regional Administration. The Governor of Benadir Region is also the Mayor of the city of Mogadishu. In fact, due to the conflict, the city is divided between areas controlled by the TFG, and those controlled by the opposition.

District councils were established in Mogadishu at the time of UNOSOM, in 1992–1993. Since then, departing or deceased members have been replaced by fellow clan members. They continue to be a kind of oligarchy, with members of the District Council appointed by the District Commissioner. The executive at the local level is composed of the District Commissioner, the Deputy Commissioner and the Secretary General. District Commissioners do not always recognize the authority of the Mayor, and participants in focus group discussions felt that perpetrators of violence still too often hold power in Mogadishu districts. However, some district administrations have registered some successes in delivering security and basic services. Focus groups, for example, noted that Wadajir District had powerful local authority representation that largely succeeded in warding off conflict, thereby earning the confidence of the people.

Each district is further divided into four *llantas* or divisions/wards, in turn divided into “wahs” or branches and sub-branches. Each *llanta* has designated authorities, as well as a local government building. Hamar Weyne also has a Security Committee of six people selected from different sections of the District Council. There are sometimes also committees of youth, women and elders, as well as business or sports committees. Finally, District Safety Committees were established in 2010 covering eight Mogadishu districts, including representatives of local authorities, the police, the elders and religious leaders, women and youth. They work together to identify security threats in their districts and collectively conceive responses in the form of a Community Safety Plan.

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8 Available at [http://www.websters-online-dictionary.org/definitions/mogadishu](http://www.websters-online-dictionary.org/definitions/mogadishu)


10 The Black Hawk Down episode: the US intervention in Somalia, which led to the Battle of Mogadishu in which five UH-60 Black Hawk helicopters were shot down.

11 After the collapse of the Somali Government in 1991, shari’ah-based Islamic courts began to offer other services such as education and health care. Gradually, they also started to perform police functions paid by local businesses. The courts established a joint committee to promote security. This move was initiated by four of the courts – Ifka Halan, Circolo, Warshadda and Hararyaaale. In 1999, this coalition began to assert its authority.
4. Perceptions of security

Focus groups participants defined safety as “peace” or “a way of surviving”. One participant from Hodan District responded that “safety is when a person has been attacked and survived”.

In the Mogadishu Districts, an average of 78.1 percent of CVS respondents felt that their communities had become more unsafe over the 12 months prior to the survey (Figure 8). It is notable that female respondents were slightly more optimistic than male respondents with respect to perceived safety trends.

Similarly, the majority of respondents (79.4%) stated that walking alone after dark was rather to very unsafe. But again, and counter-intuitively, female respondents had a less negative perception of security (Figure 9).

When disaggregated by district, results indicate that perception of insecurity at night is more acute in Waberi, Hamar Weyne and Dharkenley, while Hamar Jahjab, Wadajir and particularly Shangani are considered safer (Figure 10).

Witnessing violence is often a key contributor to perceptions of insecurity: 25.3 percent of respondents (n=1,274) were witness to a crime or violence during the 12 months prior to the CVS. As illustrated in Figure 12, a...
high number of crimes was witnessed by each household. Out of the total 289 respondents who answered the question, 255 (88.2%) witnessed at least one incident of physical assault. Respondent households frequently witnessed between one and five assaults, and one single household witnessed up to 14 assaults, for an average of 2.6 physical assaults per witness.

In addition, out of the 298 respondent households, 280 (94.0%) witnessed at least one property crime. The majority (85.4%) witnessed between one and five property crimes; one respondent household witnessed 20, an average of 2.8 property crimes per witness.
5. Forms of insecurity and violence

A criminological typology of violence includes standard crimes such as homicide, assault, sexual violence, or property crime. However, in the Somali context, some individual crimes are not viewed as distinct events, but rather as components of broader conflict dynamics and inter-group violence. In Mogadishu, the categorization is complicated by the confusion between a situation of conflict and pervasive criminal violence. The criminological lens is more difficult to apply in a conflict situation, although on the ground both dimensions are closely interlinked. In addition, the safety and security situation can vary significantly between Mogadishu districts (see also above, Section 4).

This section presents the quantitative data collected on individual crimes, placing them as much as possible in the context of the dominant forms of violence identified in focus group discussions.

5.1 Conflict dynamics

The most obvious layer of violence in Mogadishu is probably the overall confrontation pitting the TFG/AMISOM/Ahlu-Sunna Wal-Jama against al-Shabab/Hizbul-Islam. This confrontation transcends clan lines, and the number of people killed has risen dramatically. While male fighters are among the casualties, many non-participants were also the victims of raids, shelling or stray bullets. According to focus group participants, while the men fight and take cover (furka), women and children have no guns and therefore become easy targets.

Historically, Mogadishu was also the scene of fierce clan-based conflicts as clan leaders and warlords competed for political power and control over strategic positions within the city. Today, such rivalries seem to be played out less frequently or violently. A large portion of CVS respondents (63.2%) indicated that disputes never or almost never occur. Most of the remaining respondents indicated that these disputes occur on a yearly basis (Figure 13).

Focus group participants and key informants considered conflict between clans to be a common type of violence in the districts. Even if sometimes apparently triggered by crime (interpersonal killings predominantly), an in-depth examination reveals that what is at stake is almost invariably personal interests of particular individuals in terms of political power and/or financial gain. These individuals can order particular killings, and if needed, manipulate clan identity to mobilize the larger clan group in order to gain the upper hand. Clan members can be mobilized very rapidly – several hundred can sometimes be mobilized in less than an hour. They will be provided with money and ammunition for participating in a confrontation. Clan solidarity and the sense of honour is so strong that no clan member will dare question such self-serving motives and refuse to participate in the fight.

Clan militias can also be mobilized in case of need. Mobilized individuals will be given some rounds
of cartridges (40 bullets, for example). Militias are sometimes organized by particular warlords. Participants in focus group discussions estimated that each clan had one warlord or more, but there is some debate whether this is still the case today – one informant explained that only two warlords currently remained in Mogadishu.

Land disputes are particularly an issue in IDP camps where land is limited. This is exacerbated during periods of violent conflict, when rural communities move to urban centres, thus possibly resulting in clashes between the host urban dwellers and rural people over resources. Most of these conflicts are also clan-based. Participants in focus group discussions mentioned one land dispute in Wadajir that the elders were able to resolve. Forgery of documents was mentioned as a contributing factor for disputes, since falsified documents may be provided to individuals purchasing houses and land, later leading to conflict with their legitimate owners.

5.2 Homicide

The CVS respondents indicated a staggering 59 homicides in total (3.71% of the sample).\textsuperscript{13} Males of 10–39 years of age are at high risk of deadly assault, while women show significantly lower levels of victimization across the age spectrum (Figure 15). The proportion of child victimization is particularly worrying, especially of girls.

While the CVS cannot determine whether a homicide was intentional or not, some further information can be inferred from the declared cause of death. Among the 42 cases where the cause of death was identified, 28.2 percent of victims were killed by Kalashnikov-type assault weapons, 25.7 percent by a pistol or revolver, 25.6 percent by bombs, explosives, hand grenades or landmines, and 15.4 percent by mortar shell. Although not specified by the CVS, 5.1 percent households indicated stray bullets as another cause of death (Figure 16).

When further disaggregated by clan, the CVS data show that homicides occurred against members of the Digil Mirifle (ten cases), the Bantu (nine cases), the Hawiye (eight cases) and the Madiban clan (five cases). There were also two cases of homicides each against the Dir, Arab, Darod and the Isaq clans. When weighted against the predominance of each of these clans in the sample, it becomes difficult, however, to identify a clan that would be particularly vulnerable (Figure 17).

Half of the homicide victims were permanent residents and half were IDPs (22 cases each) (Figure 18). Since this roughly corresponds to the demographic profile of the sample, it would tend to affirm the indiscriminate nature of homicides.

![Figure 15: Homicide, by age and gender (Freq.)](image)

![Figure 16: Cause of death (Freq. %)](image)

![Figure 17: Clan profile of the homicide victims (Weighted %)](image)

![Figure 18: Residential status of the victims of homicide (Freq.)](image)
5.3 Assault or physical attack

According to the CVS, 133 households (11.1% of the respondents, homicides extracted) were victim to at least one assault or physical attack. In 94.3 percent of cases, between one and three attacks occurred per respondent household, yet one respondent households declared as many as seven (Figure 19).

Figure 19: Number of assaults to household members (Freq.)

Ref. AA2 (n=125)

The most frequent location of assault was the home, where most occurred at night (19.2%), followed by the afternoon (15.2%) and the morning (11.2%). The second most frequent location was the street, where assaults more frequently occurred in the afternoon (14.4%). More rarely, assault occurred in other public areas such as the market or commercial areas (12%) and the workplace (11.2%) (Figure 20).

Figure 20: Location and time of assault (Freq. %)

Ref. AA4xAA5 (n=125, homicides extracted)

The Mogadishu CVS data not only reveal that the use of firearms is the norm, but that they tended to be high-powered weapons. Kalashnikov-type assault rifles were used in 48.8 percent of assaults, followed by pistols or revolvers (22.0%); bombs, explosives, hand grenades and mines (10.2%), and hunting rifles or shotguns (1.6%). Bladed weapons (including knives, swords, pangas and clubs) were used in 11.8 percent of assaults; blunt weapons (stones bottles, glass, rope, sticks, etc.) were used in 0.8 percent (Figure 21).

Figure 21: Weapons used for assault (Freq. %)

Ref. AA6 (n=127, homicides extracted)

According to focus group discussions, assaults sometimes occur at illegal checkpoints (see section 5.8).

5.3.1 Victims

According to the CVS, the recorded victims of assault were 1 to 74 years of age. Men are more at risk than women, showing the highest peak in the 20–24 age group. By contrast, there was a slight peak for women in the 15–19 age group (Figure 22).

Figure 22: Victims of assault by gender and age (Freq.)

Ref. AA11_RxAA12_R1 (n=166, n Male=109, n Female =57)

Assault generally has serious consequences. Most respondents indicated that assault had resulted in heavy injury where the victim was hospitalized (40.1%); medium injury where the victim needed medical assistance (29.1%); and light injury (19.8%). Only 11.0 percent of the victims had not suffered from any injury (Figure 23).

Figure 23: Severity of injury from the assault (Freq. %)

Ref. AA13_R (n=133, homicides extracted)
5.3.2 Perpetrators

For both genders, organized armed groups and individual criminals were the primary perpetrators of assault; women are also at significant risk from government forces and friends/neighbours (Figure 24).

Figure 24: Profile of perpetrators of assault, by gender of victims (Freq. %)

Ref. AA11_RxAA7 (n=114)

The data further show that different categories of perpetrators tend to use different weapons. For example, organized armed groups, government forces and family/relatives predominantly use Kalashnikov-type assault rifles, whereas individual criminals tend to use pistols and revolvers, and foreign troops use bombs and mortars.

5.4 Violence against internally displaced persons

IDP camps were one location singled out by focus group participants as the scene of routine violence. The CVS confirms that IDPs were more frequently victimized than permanent residents (17.2% compared to 13.8%) (Figure 25).

Figure 25: Assault victims, by residential status (Weighted %)

Ref. AA1xRP10 (n=130)

Sexual violence is also more prevalent among IDP populations. Weighted by category, the CVS indicates that 5.2 percent of IDPs became victim of sexual violence, compared to 2.5 percent of permanent residents (Figure 26).

Figure 26: Victims of sexual violence by residential status (Weighted %)

Ref. SVxRP10 (n=44)

Focus group participants emphasized that IDP populations were victimized twice: first, because they were violently forced to leave their homes and belongings, and second, because they lived in particularly precarious circumstances in the camps. In Waber District, traditional and religious leaders admitted that they were powerless to prevent gunmen from entering the camps and raping, robbing and looting. Insecurity is such that IDPs do not dare venture out to the latrines at night, using plastic bags and jerricans instead, which are emptied during the day.

It should be noted, however, that focus group participants did not consider rape to be rampant among IDP communities; they claimed that since these communities stayed together in the camps, social norms and controls still applied. Acknowledgment of the problem therefore appears to be lacking.

5.5 Violence against women

Focus groups then drew attention to violence directed at women. The CVS data show that females are likely to be victimized between ages 10 to 39 years; girls aged 15 to 19 years are particularly at risk of assault (Figure 27).

Figure 27: Age of female victims of assault (Freq.)

Ref. AA12_R1 (n=57)

Furthermore, the CVS indicated 46 cases of sexual violence. Where the gender of the victim was indicated, 27 were females and two males, confirming that sexual violence is also directed at boys and men. Women are susceptible to sexual violence at any age across the spectrum; however, the most crucial period is between the ages of 15 and 19 (Figure 28).
Figure 28: Victims of sexual violence, by age and gender (Freq.)

![Graph showing victims by age and gender]

Ref. SV4xSV5_R (n=29, n\_Female=27, n\_Male=2)

Over half of the sexual crimes (58.6%) occurred while the victim was at home: 41.3 percent at night, 13.0 percent in the afternoon, and 4.3 percent in the morning. The second most common location was the open street (23.9%), where 17.4 percent of crimes occurred at night, 4.3 percent during the afternoon, and 2.2 percent in the morning. Other locations only recorded isolated cases, but given the low number of respondents to the question, trends cannot be reliably inferred (Figure 29).

Figure 29: Sexual violence, by location and time of day (Freq. %)

![Graph showing sexual violence by location and time]

Ref. SV6 and SV7 (n=46)

Perpetrators of sexual violence were more frequently identified as members of organized armed groups (55.8%), followed by individual criminals (25.6%) (Figure 30).

Figure 30: Profile of the perpetrators of sexual violence (Freq. %)

![Graph showing profile of perpetrators]

Ref. SV10 (n=43)

According to focus group discussions, the breakdown of law and order leaves women vulnerable to all forms of physical, sexual and psychological violence perpetrated by warring militiamen. The chances of holding perpetrators accountable to their crimes are particularly slim when they are soldiers or militiamen.

Rape and domestic violence are major concerns, although some focus group participants debated its prevalence. One elderly lady participant asserted that in pastoral societies “there were no sexual assaults – just killings”; according to her, there is a traditional taboo that raiders should not attack women, children and older people. This taboo, however, is obviously not always adhered to.

In focus groups, it was mentioned that women also suffered indirectly from the violence. They are too afraid to go out in the evening and face risks in travelling to the open areas outside of their villages because of threats of militiamen or the parties in conflict. When men are killed or disabled, women and children also suffer from food insecurity, and their right to property is not guaranteed – it is handed over to the deceased’s brother. In most cases, the brother is interested in the property and other possessions without any regard for the widow, in what is referred to as dumaal. The woman’s children will then be unable to go to school, will lack milk, develop malnutrition, and become more susceptible to diseases; on the other hand, children will enhance the widow’s chances of inheriting the property.

5.6 Violence against children

Focus group participants also drew attention to forms of violence against children. Indeed, the CVS confirms that children are at risk of violence: 17 boys and 17 girls under 18 years of age were victim of assault throughout the 12 months prior to the CVS (Figure 31).

Figure 31: Youth victims of assault, by age and gender (Freq.)

![Graph showing youth victims of assault]

Ref. AA11\_RxAA12\_R (n=34, n\_Male=17, n\_Female=17, homicide extracted)

According to focus group participants, however, the most worrying form of violence against children and youth is related to their recruitment into armed groups; when perpetrated by jihadist groups such as al-Shabaab, it often occurs around Koranic schools. It can take the form of persuasion and psychological manipulation up to outright kidnapping. School curricula developed in Arabic countries and presenting the jihad in a favourable
light make children and youth vulnerable to such groups. “Recruiters” sometimes approach and mobilize youth during or after school, luring them to recruitment centres. Due to group pressure, the individuals will no longer leave.

A participant from Hodan told the story of an 11-year-old boy who was kidnapped from his village and taken to Daynile District, at km 13, to be recruited as a child soldier for the insurgents. In Wadajir, the community found out that a Koranic teacher was bringing some of his students to al-Shabaab to be trained as child soldiers. The allegations were investigated by the local authorities and the police, and the man was arrested and tried in the regional court.

5.7 Forced detention

In the CVS, 262 cases of forced detention were indicated (20.9% of respondent households, 15.3% of the sample). However, since the survey provides no detail on the circumstances of the incidents, it is not possible to distinguish between illegal detention by security forces and kidnapping.

According to focus group participants, kidnapping was predominant at the height of clan conflict in the early 1990s, when militias were organizing themselves and needed financial resources to acquire technicals, vehicles, weapons, etc. Individuals from rich clans or their relatives were kidnapped to access those resources – even though the purpose of the kidnapping was often defeated when the aggrieved clan kidnapped a member of the opposing clan to obtain compensation. Kidnappings to date mainly target foreigners, but are a relatively rare occurrence.

The same applies to torture, which prevailed at the height of clan conflict, but now probably only concerns isolated cases. According to one respondent, “[n]ow either you are killed or not.”

5.8 Property crime

There were 258 respondent households (20.6% of the respondents and 15.1% of the sample) that were victim to at least one property crime. Most of the crimes against property were house burglaries (44.5%), street robberies (32.8%), theft of crops or livestock (8.5%) and theft of resources such as water or land (5.7%). An additional 8.5 percent were of types of property not specified through the questionnaire (Figure 32).

Property crimes were more likely to be committed in February to June, with a significant drop in crime from July to December (Figure 33).

The perpetrators of property crimes in Mogadishu were identified as organized armed groups (54.4%), followed by individual criminals (21.5%) and government police or military forces (10.5%). Other less significant perpetrators were family or relatives (4.6%), friends or neighbours (4.2%), clan groups (3.4%) and foreign troops (0.4%) (Figure 34).

Focus group discussions revealed that rackets occur at illegal checkpoints. Two types of checkpoints are found in Mogadishu districts: some are controlled by clans or warlords for income generation, while others are maintained by freelance militias.
Clan-based checkpoints are well-organized and serve for tax collection on various roads, particularly for taxing commercial trucks according to the weight of their cargo. Receipts are often be provided, and the revenue from such checkpoints is allocated among particular clan institutions or functions.

Freelance militias are groups of 20 to 40 individuals who control certain roads and sectors; some have no geographical basis and are ordinary criminals, found notably in Waberi and Hodan Districts. Freelance checkpoints are often temporary, and extort pedestrians and vehicles for smaller amounts of money, sometimes only seeking to generate enough income during the morning so that the militia can purchase qat for consumption in the afternoon. Individuals blocked at checkpoints but unable to pay the requested fee are sometimes humiliated, for example, asked to sing songs or are even assaulted.

Occasionally, more serious crime is also associated with such freelance militias, including killings, looting, torture, rape, kidnapping, and all kinds of human rights violations. Freelance militias are particularly problematic because of the impunity they enjoy: even if they are unpopular with their clan group, they will still enjoy the support of the wider group in case of need.

It should be noted that according to focus group participants, there are no independent checkpoints in areas controlled by armed Islamist opposition groups.

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12 See section on Homicide, p. 23.
13 Homicides are recorded by the CVS as instances of physical assault resulting in death.
14 See also section 5.7, Forced detention.
6. Drivers and risk factors

Drivers and risk factors of violence were discussed with focus groups involving representatives from the districts of Wadajir, Dharkenley, Hodan and Waberi.

6.1 Social factors

Clan identity seems to be one of the main facilitators of violence when it is used – or manipulated – to rally support for a particular cause, often in the economic or power interest of a leading individual. Participants in the youth focus group in particular considered tribal aggressiveness to be the most critical cause of violence. Clan solidarity also encourages impunity: since clan protection is systematically offered, criminals, however unpopular, almost systematically go unpunished. It should be noted that women are relatively freer to act independently of the clan group.

Moreover, in Mogadishu, clan leadership is also sometimes disputed and/or discredited. Focus group participants noted the presence of “unorganized elders and leaders” who took over leadership in their communities without the consent of their clans or the community they represent. They personally benefit from checkpoint rackets or compensation monies.

Misinterpretation of verses from the Koran and Sunnah were cited as a cause of violence by participants in the traditional/religious leaders focus group. One focus group participant from Waberi lamented that “violence [had] reached such high levels that militiamen cut innocent people’s heads and put the head on the dead man’s chest for religious reasons. It is shameful.”

Erosion of protective social norms weakens social resilience to violence. For example, in the past, the norm was “take the property, don’t kill”— this rule is now disregarded.

Focus group participants cited a number of related elements that collectively indicate a state of mind, particularly among Mogadishu youth, characterized by lack of faith in the ability of the community, much less the state, to protect individuals, a sense of injustice, trauma, and general hopelessness for the future. One participant in the women’s focus group claimed that “illiteracy, poverty and isolation [had] an impact on the level of violence in our community”. As a result of ignorance (illiteracy and lack of education), individuals do not have the means to question practices will be more easily manipulated by unscrupulous people. Some youth will also turn to individuals and groups perceived as strong for short-term protection or status. Participants in the youth focus group consider that “fear of the unknown” as one of the reasons for youth joining armed groups.

Misinformation and rumours (fadhi-ku-dirirada) can also exacerbate violence by causing tension and eventually social or political clashes. For example, rumours of planned attacks by hostile factions may lead to a trigger-happy attitude and the easy escalation of incidents into full-blown violence.

Finally, rape and domestic violence are often committed against women by unemployed men or men under the influence of qat. Qat chewing was identified as a risk factor because it increases and encourages violence in all forms and qat users may resort to crime to purchase the plant. According to the CVS, in 42.2 percent of cases of assault, respondents suspected that the perpetrator was under the influence of qat, alcohol or other drugs.

6.2 Economic factors

Due to poverty, military groups are able to entice youth to join their ranks. The lack of money and employment is one of the factors that will lead youth to join armed groups.

Limited resources are an important source of disputes, particularly in IDP camps where people fight over access to land and public services.

6.3 Political/governance factors

Competition between clans and “tribal aggressiveness” were already mentioned as a social driver of violence. However, in Mogadishu more than anywhere else, these elements play out in the political sphere. Nepotism and corruption are rife, and most politicians are perceived as lacking a long-term vision beyond their individual or clan interests. In addition to clan dynamics, the lack of adequate communication between government authorities and conflict-affected groups leads to the perception, at least by traditional and religious leaders’ focus groups, that the government does not respond to people’s needs.

Two decades of statelessness and the lack of a functional government in turn perpetuate lawlessness because citizens have little confidence in and respect for state institutions, and will therefore not turn to them for protection: an entire generation now has no experience with a functional government and does not expect anything positive from the state.
In addition, peaceful political debate is not the norm. Focus group participants referred to a situation of “ideological monopoly”: intolerance on all sides for alternative political or ideological views fuels violence – it seems that only armed opposition has a chance to be heard.

Finally, meddling by neighbouring states was also mentioned by youth focus group participants as exacerbating insecurity.

### 6.4 Firearms and security-related factors

The easy availability of firearms increases the lethality and intensity of violence. As already noted, firearms are indeed used in a large majority of cases of assault. Focus group participants asserted that Somalia has received weapons from Ethiopia, Yemen, Djibouti, Ukraine, Libya, Saudi Arabia, Eritrea and the United States of America. There is a common local market that trades in guns and ammunition near Bakara Market in Hodan District, called Cirtoogte (“sky shooter”). Guns can also be sourced from ex-fighters (warlord allies) who have retained or hidden them, as well as more recent militia group members who were armed by the government in Mogadishu but who are no longer part of the national army. Ordinary citizens sometimes have concealed weapons to protect their business or themselves during revenge attacks.

According to focus groups, weapons are considered licit or illicit possessions depending on the situation. For example, government weapons are considered licit but the opposing militia groups’ weapons are considered illicit. Focus group participants insisted that in Islam, weapons possession is permitted in order to protect the grace of Muslim societies, and not to harm them. No Muslim is allowed to kill another Muslim. Many “licit” weapons are in circulation, but they might be hidden in areas targeted by al-Shabaab allies.

According to the CVS, there is an increase in the availability of arms: according to 65.4 percent of survey respondents, arms became more available; according to 26.1 percent, there was no change; and according to 8.4 percent, there was a decrease in availability (Figure 35).

Figure 35: Change in availability of firearms over the last 12 months (Freq. %)

Ref. WE1 (n=1336)

However, trends vary between Mogadishu districts. At the higher end of the scale, 96.1 percent of the respondents from Shangani felt that weapons had become more available compared to only 50 percent of the respondents from Waberi (Figure 36).

Figure 36: Trend in availability of firearms, by district (Weighted %)

Ref. B2_RxWE1_R (n=1336)

These figures are in relatively stark contrast with the proportion of respondent households who admitted to owning one or more firearm in the CVS. In Shangani, for example, just 3.3 percent of CVS respondents admitted to owning firearms. The highest declared rates were in Wadajir (28.7% of respondent households) (Figure 37).

Figure 37: Firearm possession, by district (Weighted %)

Ref. B2_RxWE2_3 (n=1332)

The types of weapons available were mostly Kalashnikov-type assault rifles (62.3%), pistols or revolvers (30.2%), hunting rifles or shotguns (5.0%), and explosives (2.5%) (Figure 38).

Figure 38: Types of firearms owned (Freq. %)

Ref. WE3 (n=159)
The most common reason among CVS respondents for owning a firearm was protection (75.5%), followed by work (12.2%), traditional purposes (8.2%) and hunting (4.1%) (Figure 39).

Figure 39: Reasons for owning a firearm (Freq. %)

Explosives were also seen as a prevalent threat in Mogadishu; an average of 98.6 percent of survey respondents indicated a perceived threat from a remote-control or time bomb, including an overwhelming 70.7 percent who indicated a high threat and 27.9 percent, a low threat (Figure 40).

Figure 40: Perceived threat from a remote-control or time bomb (Freq. %)

Similarly, an average of 90.3 percent of CVS respondents indicated that there were some (50.0% of respondents) to a lot (40.3% of respondents) of mines present, with the most threat in Dharkanley and Waberi, and the least threat in Hamar Weyne, although in the latter, a third of the respondents also considered mines to be a high threat (Figure 42).

Figure 42: Perceived existence of mines or unexploded ordnances (UXOs) (Weighted %)

Again, variations are registered by district, with the threat perceived as particularly prevalent in Dharkanley and Shangani, but much lower in Wadajir and Hamar Jabjab (Figure 41).
7. Perceived performance of justice and security actors

Both the CVS and the focus group discussions inquired about the performance and ability to respond to insecurity of various public authorities, namely, the police, the courts, religious leaders, and the clan or community elders. The following sections first present a comparative perspective of the performance of these different actors, including by type of crime. Each actor is then considered separately in further detail, including a discussion of the role of women and other security providers.

7.1 Comparative perspectives

7.1.1 General perception

Mogadishu offers a bleak picture in terms of trust in any justice and security actors. According to the CVS, the respondent households rated negatively their trust in all public authorities. The least trusted of all were the courts (-32.5%) and the police (-28.9%), followed by the clan or community elders (-27.6%). Although still a negative degree of trust, the religious leaders were the least mistrusted (-21.1%) (Figure 43).

The main reasons mentioned for not disclosing incidents of assault to the public was the lack of someone to report such cases to (48.6%), followed by not being physically unable to report the incident (17.1%) (Figure 45).

7.1.2 Assault

According to the CVS, out of 100 physical assaults, 37.4 percent were disclosed to public authorities, including the community elders, religious leaders, the police, or others. However, only 4.2 percent of these cases were formally reported to the police, and 4.2 percent were reviewed by the criminal court (Figure 44). Note that the cases reviewed by the courts are not the same as those that were reported to the police.
Another interesting indicator of the level of trust enjoyed by various public authorities is the authority to whom victims of particular crimes turn. Figure 47 presents the authority first reported to, not only for assault, but for different types of crime. In the case of assault, 35.7 percent of respondents reported first to the community elders, followed by the government police (25%); the remaining responses were distributed between religious leaders (10%), NGOs and United Nations agencies (10%), the community police (7.1%), armed groups (7.1%) and others not specified in the CVS questionnaire (4.3%). Mogadishu offers a surprisingly varied picture in terms of reporting patterns compared to the other Somali districts surveyed.

Figure 47: Public authority first reported to, by type of crime (Freq. %)

Out of the 45 declared cases of sexual violence, only 11 were disclosed to the public. Figure 47 indicates that cases of sexual violence are most often reported first to the community elder (36.4%), while the government police and NGOs and United Nations agencies follow closely, with 27.3 percent of cases each. The share of sexual violence cases reported first to NGOs and United Nations agencies is particularly striking; the remaining 9.1 percent were first reported to the community police. Notably, no cases of sexual violence were first reported to religious leaders.

When asked the reasons for not reporting cases of sexual violence, 41.9 percent of household respondents indicated that they were too embarrassed to do so, 29.0 percent that there was no one to report to, and 12.9 percent that they were physically unable to do so (Figure 49).

Figure 48: Reporting of sexual violence (Freq. %)

Ref. SV1 (n=46), SV11 (n=11), SV16 (n=9), SV19 (n=1)

7.1.4 Property crime

Fifty-nine out of the total 258 declared property crimes were disclosed to the public (22.9%), only 1.2 percent of which were reported to the police; however, 3.1 percent had reached a verdict in a criminal penal court (Figure 50). Again, Figure 47 indicates that 21 of these cases (35.0%) were first reported to the community elders, while 20 were directly reported to the government police (33.3%). Less frequently, these crimes were first reported to religious leaders (15.0%), community policing groups (6.7%) and
armed groups (6.7%); two cases were reported to other authorities (3.3%).

When asked the reasons for not disclosing property crime, 53.8 percent of CVS respondents stated that there was no one to report these crimes to. A further 21.4 percent indicated that there was no chance of redress and no trust, and 11.5 percent indicated that they were physically unable to report the incident (Figure 51).

**Figure 51: Reasons for not reporting a property crime to public authorities (Freq. %)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reason</th>
<th>Freq. %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No one to report</td>
<td>7.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No chance of redress</td>
<td>2.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fear of revenge</td>
<td>4.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Persuaded not to report</td>
<td>4.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Physically unable to report</td>
<td>11.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lack of trust, no chance of redress</td>
<td>21.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Ref. PC9 (n=182)

**7.2 Police**

**7.2.1 Mapping information**

Each of Mogadishu’s 16 districts should have a police station, falling under four divisions; however, due to the conflict, some of these divisions or stations are outside of TFG police control and therefore not functional. According to the records of the Police Advisory Committee, in addition to the airport, port and the criminal investigation department, there are police stations in Dharkenley (65 officers), Hamar Weyne (91 officers), Hamar Jabjab (250 officers), Shangani (40 officers), Waberi (72 officers) and Wadajir (92 officers). These data could not be verified independently.

**7.2.2 General perception**

As previously mentioned, in comparison to other public authority figures, CVS respondents declared the police were less trusted than religious leaders, yet on par with community elders (Figure 43). Examining this in further detail, the data show that both male and female respondents indicated low trust in the police. Only 21.1 percent responded having relatively high to very high levels of trust (males, 20.4% and females, 21.9%) and over three-quarters indicated relatively low to very low trust (78.9%) (males, 79.6% and females, 78.1%) (Figure 52).

The responses from the CVS show a fairly even distribution over the accessibility of the police in terms of physical distance and ease to locate with 50.5 percent declaring the police as relatively to very accessible and 49.4 percent indicating as relatively to very inaccessible (Figure 53).

**Figure 52: Trust in the police (Weighted %)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Trust Level</th>
<th>Male</th>
<th>Female</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Very low</td>
<td>62.3</td>
<td>58.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relatively low</td>
<td>17.3</td>
<td>20.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relatively high</td>
<td>10.3</td>
<td>12.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Very high</td>
<td>10.1</td>
<td>9.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Ref. AR7 (n=1297)

Perceived accessibility of the police varies greatly by district: Wadajir respondents were the most satisfied with accessibility, while Shangani respondents felt overwhelmingly dissatisfied (Figure 54).

**Figure 53: Accessibility of the police in terms of physical distance and ease to locate (Weighted %)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Accessibility Level</th>
<th>Male</th>
<th>Female</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Very inaccessible</td>
<td>40.2</td>
<td>39.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relatively inaccessible</td>
<td>30.6</td>
<td>31.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relatively accessible</td>
<td>21.6</td>
<td>21.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Very accessible</td>
<td>25.4</td>
<td>24.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Ref. AR8 (n=1298)

In terms of speed of police response, 80.5 percent of CVS respondents indicated a relatively to very slow response...
from the police, while with the remainder (19.6%) indicated a relatively to very rapid response. Females found the response only slightly more rapid than males (Figure 55).

Figure 55: Speed of police response (Weighted %)

Ref. AR9 (n=1293)

Focus group discussions confirmed that satisfaction with the local police was mitigated. Participants conceded that some people were afraid of the police, and that most youth did not want to cooperate, but rather preferred violence and conflict. The public cannot always distinguish who is a member of the government police, and who is a member of a militia or the army; the military and law enforcement agencies seem to be confused. One participant from Waberi stated that intellectuals supported the presence of police stations, but not as law enforcement agents. One focus group participant from Hodan asserted that government officials sometimes participated in the extortion of pedestrians on illegal checkpoints (*isbaaro*). This does not serve to strengthen the legitimacy of the government. However, a participant from Wadajir insisted that the majority of the population in this district understood the mandate of the police and were willing to cooperate.

### 7.2.3 Response

In the CVS, police performance was also rated with respect to actual cases of crime affecting respondent households. In cases of assault, over half the respondents reported being very unsatisfied (53.8%); the remaining victims were rather satisfied (19.2%) or very satisfied (26.9%). There are significant differences, however, between the satisfaction of male and female respondents, with women more positive than men (Figure 56).

Figure 56: Satisfaction with police response to assault (Weighted %)

Ref. AA40 (n=26)

There were four cases in which respondents, all of them male, gave reasons for their dissatisfaction: two stated that the police did not take action; one believed that the treatment was not fair; and one felt harassed or intimidated.

Out of 22 declared CVS victims of property crime, 50.0 percent stated they were very unsatisfied and 18.2 percent rather unsatisfied with police response. Of those who expressed satisfaction with police response, 22.7 percent were rather satisfied and 9.1 percent very satisfied (Figure 57). It should be noted that since gender is not relevant in the case of burglaries, the data on satisfaction with police response were not disaggregated by gender for property crime.

Figure 57: Satisfaction with police response to property crime (Freq. %)

Ref. PC14 (n=22)

The declared reasons for the low satisfaction in police response to property crime were mainly that the police either did not take action (33.3%) or because the treatment of victims was considered unfair (33.3%). Dissatisfied victims also stated that the police took too much time to take action after the initial reporting of the incident (13.3%), and that they took too long or waited too long to respond to the call for assistance (6.7%) (Figure 58).
Three victims of sexual violence reported to be dissatisfied with the police response without stating a reason. No victims reported to be satisfied.

### 7.3 Statutory courts

#### 7.3.1 Mapping information

The judicial process in Somalia is composed of three levels: the First Grade Courts (Regional and District Courts), the Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court. The regions have their own District Courts, Regional Court and Court of Appeal: in Mogadishu, these are the Benadir Regions Appeal Court, Benadir Regional Court and eight District Courts. There are no shari‘ah courts in districts controlled by the TFG, but statutory courts do apply shari‘ah law for family law.

A 2011 UNDP assessment of the judiciary identified some 55 judges and prosecutors in Mogadishu, including 32 with formal law degrees, five with a background in shari‘ah law, and 18 with informal education. Most of the judges of the Appeal Court and Regional Court are former judges, with a relatively high level of experience and high educational level. In addition, eight District Courts were operating in Mogadishu in January 2011, in the districts of Hodan, Hawlwadag, Hamar Weyne, Wadajir, Dharkenley, Karan and Yaqshid. However, infrastructure is poor: at the time of the assessment, most District Courts were relocated to the Justice Compound in Hamar Weyne District, with the TFG providing security to the compound.

#### 7.3.2 General perception

As stated previously, CVS respondents had the least trust in the courts (Figure 43). A closer look reveals that an average of only 17.5 percent of respondents indicated relatively to very high levels of trust in the courts, whereas an average of 82.5 percent indicated relatively to very low trust. Female respondents mistrusted the courts slightly less than their male counterparts (Figure 59).

Survey respondents’ perception of court accessibility in terms of physical distance and ease to locate was also negatively skewed, where an average of 66.6 percent of respondents found the courts to be relatively to very inaccessible, and an average of 33.4 percent of respondents, to be relatively to very accessible. Again, females were less critical than their male counterparts, showing a slight difference in perceived accessibility (Figure 60).
Survey respondents perceived the courts to respond slowly to cases, with an average of 83.1 percent rating court proceedings relatively to very slow, compared to an average of 16.9 percent who rated them as relatively to very rapid (Figure 62).

**Figure 62: Speed of court response (Freq. %)**

Ref. AR12 (n=1264)

The main reason for not going to court was that judgments were perceived as unfair (39.2% on average for both genders), followed by the overly lengthy procedures (19.2%), the fact that courts do not take action (17.4%), corruption or bribery (12.2%), overly expensive court fees (7.1%), and inaccessibility of the courts (1.3%). It should be noted, however, that there were some differences between reasons given by males and females: men were more likely to report that the verdicts by the courts are not fair, whereas women were more likely to report that matters would take too long (Figure 63).

**Figure 63: Reasons that victims do not go to court (Weighted %)**

Ref. AR14 (n=603)

Local courts were not cited by focus group participants among the capacities for peace. One participant from Wadajir mentioned that the court in that district works with the police and that people are generally satisfied with it because it is not biased and follows the law “except in extraordinary cases”.

### 7.3.3 Response

Out of the 65 property crimes, eight (12.3%) reached a verdict in a criminal court. Out of a total of 73 assaults, eight cases (11.0%) reached a verdict in a criminal court. Finally, out of the total of 44 crimes of sexual violence, only one (2.3%) reached a verdict in a criminal court (Figure 64).

**Figure 64: Court verdicts reached in the cases of assault, property crimes and sexual violence (Freq. %)**

Ref. AA42 (n=8), PC16 (n=8), SV19 (n=1)

Two victims of assault stated that they were very unsatisfied with the court verdict, two were rather satisfied and five were very satisfied with the court verdict. Women tended to perceive the court verdict more positively than did their male counterparts (Figure 65). One victim explained that the court proceedings took too long.

**Figure 65: Victims’ level of satisfaction with court verdicts, assault cases (Weighted %)**

Ref. AA44 (n=9)

### 7.4 Other security providers

As already noted above, the police in Mogadishu are often confused with other law enforcement agents, particularly military forces. While unsurprising in a context of open insurgency, such blurring of responsibilities between security providers does pose particular challenges to the rule of law. Furthermore, it is not always clear whether individual members of these law enforcement forces are to be considered security providers, or indeed perpetrators of violence. Regardless, in their discussions, focus group participants mentioned the following actors:

*Locally organized youth (Madani)* are found notably in Dharkenley and Waberi. Set up by the District Commissioner or emerging spontaneously, they are supported by the community and participate in...
maintaining peace and security for lower levels of crime such as theft and freelance militias. However, when violence scales up, for example, when clans start fighting, they will disband. The Madani are generally clan-based, unless a district is made of several clans, in which case they will be mixed. They can also involve substantial numbers of women, particularly as informants and recruitment agents. In any case, they are generally well regarded: one focus group participant indicated that the Madani enjoy more trust from AMISOM and its backers than do the Hillac brigade (see below).

The behaviour of the Somali National Security Forces was questioned by focus group participants. One participant from Hodan claimed that “800-900 guns were given to a disobedient army, which means that they are not controlled by the military commandment, but received weapons based on clanship.” One of its brigades deserves particular mention: the Hillac brigade (“lightening”), based in Halani military camp in the district of Dharkenley, distinguishes itself for being composed of former Somali military officers who had served under Siad Barre and were brought together by one of their former commanders when he returned from exile in Europe. Although principally composed of Hawiye clan members, it is a cross-clan brigade with older-than-average combatants.

In addition, Ahlu-Sunna Wal-Jama have aligned themselves under the TFG following a March 2010 agreement, but since the central command provided by the agreement was never put in place, the forces operate largely autonomously.

7.5 Women

Women and women’s groups have an important role to play in the promotion of justice and security. Encouragingly, according to the CVS data, a majority (73.5%) of Mogadishu households indicated that there were no restrictions on women attending public meetings. This still leaves a significant 26.5 percent of households indicating that females were restricted from attending town hall or community meetings (n=1,345). The reasons given for this were the female household member’s lack of comfort with participation (26.3%), the family’s collective belief that women should focus only on issues regarding the family (24.6%), the husband’s jealousy or lacks trust in her loyalty (21.3%), and the male household member’s dislike of female visibility in decision-making in the public sphere (19.6%). Among the other reasons respondents cited for female non-participation not specified by the questionnaire were fear, lack of awareness and religious reasons (Figure 66).

Focus group participants recognized that women are key to creating peace within and between communities. They transmit values and ideals or memories of peace that would otherwise be lost by composing poems and singing songs of peace. In the four districts represented among focus groups, women’s groups were formed to make peace. Mothers of youth who sometimes participate in war meet to discuss alternative livelihoods that would keep their sons out of the fighting.

However, focus group participants also recognized that in some limited cases, women can also be perpetrators of violence, directly by using weapons, or indirectly by encouraging their sons to raid.

7.6 The elders

Depending on the region or clan, the traditional elders are referred to as Malaak, Suldaan, Wabar, Ugaas, Imaan, Boqor, etc. As noted above, CVS data reveal that people in Mogadishu have largely lost faith in their ability to contribute to security; this perception does not differ significantly between men and women (Figure 67).

The elders remain the first port of call for victims of crime, be it assault, sexual violence or property crime (Figure 47). According to focus groups participants,
they voluntarily contribute to conflict prevention and the reduction of disputes and crimes through cultural mechanisms known as xeer. The Shir is a traditional assembly in the district where the elders who live in close proximity to the conflict serve as negotiators.

There are, however, limitations to what the elders are able to achieve in maintaining peace and security. For example, participants in the traditional and religious leaders’ focus group noted that the elders cannot access IDP camps in Waberi to prevent gunmen from entering the camp to rape girls, drink alcohol, chew qat, loot and rob, even in broad daylight. Traditional settlement mechanisms such as the xeer also have their weaknesses. Compensation monies do not always reach the aggrieved when unscrupulous clan elders appropriate the money for their personal benefit, thereby undermining their credibility and sometimes leading to a continuation of hostilities between clans. Also, application of traditional xeer is unevenly applied: if an elder comes from a minority clan, he is expected to obey the majority clan, even if his understanding and application of xeer is better.16

Focus group participants also noted that there were “unrecognized elders and leaders” who took over leadership in their communities without the consent of their clans or the community that they represent. They sometimes benefit from checkpoint extortion or compensation monies for their own personal use.

The erosion of the influence of the traditional elders in Mogadishu stems from several dynamics. First, the powerful clan-based faction leaders (the ‘warlords’) that emerged from the conflict in South-Central Somalia have consistently challenged traditional elders’ authority in Mogadishu. During the prolonged period of chaos and lawlessness, such leaders, together with politicians and businesspeople, recruited armed militias to further their own interests. They also promoted their own choice of elders, who lacked local legitimacy and undermined the existing system of leadership.

A second difficulty has been fragmentation and distrust within the main clan families, which has led smaller sub-clans to identify their own leaders. Traditionally, clan elders were seen as responsible for ensuring the peaceful co-existence of the community as a whole and for working to resolve local conflicts. However, the circumstances of the civil war led some elders to mobilize their own clan militia for inter- and intra-clan fighting and to side with their kin, even when they were the aggressors.

Another important feature of the civil war period in many areas of Benadir Region has been the breakdown of xeer between pastoral and agricultural communities.

7.7 Religious leaders

The elders are supported by Islamic doctrines from religious leaders (Manhaju-daalibiin rules) to support conflict resolution. Overall, the CVS shows a degree of mistrust in religious leaders, which is not significantly different between men and women (Figure 68).

Figure 68: Trust in religious leaders, by gender (Weighted %)

![Graph showing trust in religious leaders by gender]

Ref. AR4xRP1 (n=1242)

Indeed, people rarely turn to the religious leaders first when victim of a crime, and never when victim of sexual violence (Figure 47). However, it would appear that victims nevertheless tend to trust shari‘ah law more than the statutory courts.

7.8 Civil society

Historically, civil society has also contributed to peace and security. Under the Siad Barre regime, for example, a drama producer, Abdi Bashir Indhabur, a member of the Heegan Club, the drama section of the Somali Police Academy, produced songs on five key topics: Justice (caddaalad), Equality (sinnaan), Unity (midnimo), Prosperity (barwaaqo) and Development (horumar). While some of his songs were used as propaganda for the regime, others aimed to reinforce national values and are still well known.

15 The civilian police is generally accepted, whereas the military trained in Uganda and Ethiopia is much less so.

16 Application of xeer can differ on a case by case basis, first because the rules/precedents will change for each clan combination, and second because more powerful clans will be able to impose deviations from xeer on minority clans.
8. Recommendations

8.1 Preventing and reducing conflict

Encourage contacts between communities in different Mogadishu districts. Historically, in Mogadishu, clan conflict has often pitted communities from different districts against each other. Although clan conflict currently does not appear to be a major source of insecurity in the area, clan cohesiveness still occupies a prominent role among the drivers of violence, which more frequent cross-clan contacts could help mitigate. A first step would be to promote collaboration between civil society and community-based organizations from different districts. This could also include sports events and traditional dances bringing together youth from different parts of town.

Improve the reporting of news. Misinformation and rumours are one of the factors identified in focus group discussions in escalating tensions and violence by playing up real or perceived hostile intentions of other groups. Local media should be invited to reflect on their role in peace-building, by refraining from disseminating and possibly dispelling unfounded rumours.

Strengthen mechanisms such as local peace commissions to manage land disputes among IDPs and between IDPs/rural migrants and urban host communities, involving local leaders and district authorities.

Support discussions on clan unity and conflict. Clan identity and cohesiveness can be misused when illegitimate elders invoke it for self-serving goals or illegitimate ends. This phenomenon has been highlighted in the CVS, which noted “power and cultural struggle” as an important cause of conflict. It was denounced in focus group discussions and should be questioned more broadly to pave the way for a change of attitudes. This can be achieved through public dialogues and communication campaigns encouraging non-violent conflict resolution through appropriate messages, including poems and songs. At the community level, a reconciliation forum could also be set up as a neutral forum providing dispute resolution services.

8.2 Strengthening security providers

Facilitate a broad-based discussion on the provision of security in Mogadishu. The CVS reveals that none of the classic “security” provider enjoys the trust of the people – whether the elders, religious leaders, the police or the judiciary. Restoring trust in security providers is probably one of the biggest challenges facing Mogadishu today. It will require an open discussion on security with a cross-spectrum of community representatives in order to harness the strengths of a wider group of stakeholders – including women, youth, community and business leaders – likely working in combination with official law enforcement agencies. The District Safety Committees could play a central role in these consultations.

Consider setting up all-female neighbourhood watches. Risks associated with neighbourhood watch militias include the possibility that they may divert into clan militias and/or their exposure to retributive behaviour by criminal elements. The Somali Police Force in Mogadishu therefore suggests setting up an all-female neighbourhood watch system with no coercive powers, but rather, a mandate covering surveillance and reporting. This would represent a non-threatening mechanism able to strike a delicate balance between these risks and the need to fill the current security vacuum. They would be associated with the police and the local authorities to be able to draw on law enforcement powers in case of need.

Empower women to participate in safety and security decision-making. Women represent over half the population, yet too often are marginalized in public discussions, particularly on safety and security issues. However, they can also contribute to fuelling violence, particularly when clan identity is at stake. Interventions should seek to raise awareness among both men and women on the role that women should play in safety and security. In addition, the CVS revealed that a major block to female participation is their own discomfort. Training in public-speaking skills and an introduction to the roles and responsibilities of security providers could therefore also be considered.

Improve police response to crime and its image in the community. In the medium term, the police will likely be called on to take a central role in the provision of security in Mogadishu. While it will take time for them to be able to fully assume this role, support could be directed at strengthening internal control and discipline mechanisms and clarifying the police mandate. Importantly, communication must be stepped up to improve the police’s public image. As noted in the report, currently, one of the main reasons not to report crimes is the perception that there is “no one to report it to”, and in addition the public often confuses the police with the military. Both misperceptions could be addressed by organizing regular meetings between the police and the community, and creating links between the former and other community-
based security providers such as neighbourhood watches in order to broaden their reach, and by providing police with distinctive uniforms.

8.3 Strengthening justice providers

Set up alternative sentencing. In the absence of detention facilities and capacity to enforce sentences, the entire penal chain (police – justice – prisons) is weakened. To ensure the credibility of security and justice mechanisms, alternatives to incarceration could therefore be developed. Consultations should identify such alternatives, which could also include a code of conduct as a first step towards the full implementation of criminal laws and a community-based disciplinary committee as a community-based, alternative sentencing mechanism capable of fostering reconciliation and redress.

Enhance the influence of legitimate elders. Within the clans and sub-clans, a disturbing trend highlighted by key informants and focus group participants is that a number of illegitimate “unorganized elders and leaders” forcefully took over the leadership of their community and use their influence for personal benefit. Consultations involving both authorities and community representatives could seek to identify a process and criteria to distinguish and strengthen the legitimate elders.

8.4 Reducing assault and sexual violence

Further examine and address vulnerability factors. The CVS has revealed particular patterns of violence and insecurity. For example, assaults are committed in the home at any time of day, or in the streets in the afternoon. Understanding why these places and times of day are particularly prone to crime and violence would help identify entry points for decreasing the vulnerability of victims. Members of neighbourhood watches could then be trained in crime prevention strategies, for example, to improve the security of the home, and could advise the local communities on steps that can be taken.

Improve accountability of government and foreign troops. While it can be difficult to pursue individual criminals and organized armed groups in the absence of strong law enforcement, the perpetration of crime by law enforcement agents themselves is inexcusable. The CVS found that women are particularly at risk from irregular government or pro-government forces, including cases of sexual violence. Internal disciplinary mechanisms must be put in place to detect and prosecute these cases. Complaints mechanisms could also be set up, relying on the District Safety Committees at the district level, and the Police Advisory Committee (PAC) at the level of the police.

Support a discussion on clan unity and crime. Clan identity and cohesiveness can also be misused when it is invoked to enable criminals to escape justice. Focus groups noted that even freelance militias benefit from the protection of their clan in case of need. Such impunity contributes to perpetuating cycles of violence and should be questioned with traditional leaders and local authorities. Regular contacts between the police, district authorities and community leaders should be fostered and eventually institutionalized to improve the cooperation between the clans and the criminal justice system. Alternative sentencing could also be encouraged (see above, section 8.3).

Break the taboo against reporting sexual violence. The CVS shows that a large percentage of sexual violence cases is not reported due to the victims’ embarrassment. While this is understandable, it does point at the importance of breaking the taboo surrounding sexual violence, which affects both men and women in Mogadishu. Encouraging public disclosure and denouncement of such acts could boost prevention and dissuasion, particularly if the prosecution of perpetrators is encouraged. A non-threatening reporting structure could also be set up in community centres since police stations are deemed inaccessible and presumably intimidating. In addition, neighbourhood watches could be trained to advise survivors of violence on available services and reporting mechanisms.

Reinvigorate protective social norms. Focus groups noted that there were social and religious codes of conduct against the killing of other Muslims, and for the protection of vulnerable groups such as women and children. These codes have been eroded and are now routinely disregarded. Traditional and religious leaders should be supported to re-introduce these codes to, inter alia, combat domestic violence. This could be achieved by developing, through a broad consultative process, community codes of conduct in order to provide an intelligible and non-legalistic reading of criminal code provisions.

Stigmatize qat chewing habits. Men’s qat chewing habits not only represent a significant drain on the limited economic resources of families, but also often form the backdrop of domestic violence when men resent their wife’s criticism of the allocation of family income to purchase the drug. Furthermore, it seems that men under the influence of qat are more likely to commit acts of violence: in over 40 percent of assault, the perpetrator was suspected to be under the influence of qat, alcohol or drugs. Awareness-raising and prevention campaigns should be supported while seeking to provide viable alternatives for qat sellers. Also, given the recent information on drug laboratories emerging in Mogadishu, which are partly responding to local demand, further research
should be undertaken on potential new addictions so that appropriate measures can be taken early.

8.5 Reducing the vulnerability of children and youth

Raise awareness among school children on the risk of forced recruitment. Children and parents should be alerted to how children and youth are recruited into armed groups, and its consequences. Youth should also be taught how to react if they are approached by recruitment agents.

Encourage sound religious education. The misuse and misinterpretation of religious teachings to justify violence and antisocial behaviour were repeatedly denounced in focus group discussions and validation meeting. Although the importance of religious education is not questioned, children and youth should be exposed to sound religious values.

Set up community-based peace and civic education programmes. Focus group participants consider that youth fall into violence and antisocial behaviour in part because of their lack of faith in the ability of the community and authorities to protect individuals. Indeed, young people in Mogadishu have never experienced a functioning state and the rule of law. It is therefore necessary to embark on widespread peace and civic education, whether through broad interventions targeting the community at large, or more selected interventions for groups of youth at risk. School-based peace clubs could be set up for the youngest children. For adolescents, topics to be covered through education programmes include good governance, rule of law, non-violence, traditional conflict management processes, and civic participation, among others. To reach the broader population, popular songs from the Heegan Club18 could be revived. Interventions should be designed in a way to strengthen links between youth at-risk and their communities.

Offer reintegration opportunities for youth engaged in armed activities. Youth who are already engaged in armed activities, whether related to crime or conflict, need to be provided opportunities for reintegration. These opportunities would be conditional on an absolute renunciation on crime and armed activities, and would involve local communities and focus both on vocational/entrepreneurship skills and on civic education.

8.6 Controlling the instruments of violence

Control firearms more effectively. The prevalence of firearms, especially high-powered weapons, in acts of violence in Mogadishu is particularly worrying. Although plain disarmament could be unrealistic in the current climate of insecurity, and given the weakness of law enforcement agents, measures should nonetheless be taken to control firearms and increase the accountability of owners and users. As a first step, a system of firearms registration should be set up, in a partnership between the police, district authorities, and community leaders. This could later be followed by restrictions on carrying firearms outside of the house, and/or on the type and number of firearms that can be owned. In parallel, opportunities could also be provided for voluntary disarmament, ensuring in particular that the firearms and ammunition collected are destroyed.

Raise awareness on the risks of remote-control or time bombs and unexploded ordnances (UXOs). In addition to firearms, the CVS highlighted that both landmines and UXOs, particularly remote-control or time bombs, pose a significant threat in Mogadishu. The threat varies per district, however; for example, Shangani is at high risk of remote-control or time bombs but has a much lower risk of mines and UXOs. Classic mine risk education should therefore be expanded to educate the population on the detection of improvised explosive devices, particularly in high-risk districts.

8.7 Strengthening governance

Increase the accountability of government officials. Nepotism, corruption and the lack of adequate communication between government authorities and citizens were all identified by focus groups as drivers of violence and insecurity. For example, since District Councils were set up in 1992/1993 by UNOSOM, they have not been renewed in a transparent manner. In addition, while still enjoying a degree of legitimacy, they resemble more an oligarchy under the District Commissioner. Transparency and accountability could be reinvigorated, starting at the district level, by encouraging wider consultations on the composition of District Councils and their advisory bodies. Regular dialogue between government officials and community representatives, including women and youth, should also be fostered.

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17 See above, Section 7.6, The elders and Section 6.1, Social factors (Drivers and risk factors).
18 See above, Section 7.8, Civil society.
About the Somali Observatory of Conflict and Violence Prevention (OCVP)

The Somali OCVP – referred to as *Homboro* in Somali – gathers data and information on patterns of criminal social and political violence in the region, supporting analysis that can be useful to all Somalis. *Homboro* is the Somali name for the bottlenose dolphin, an animal celebrated in traditional songs for its intervention in protecting and rescuing human beings. The OCVP pursues a similar human security objective.

The OCVP is currently accumulating quantitative and qualitative data on insecurity and violence in the Somali regions, which are available for further use. The OCVP data and analytical reports can help practitioners ensure that interventions are guided by up-to-date information and evidence. The OCVP is also setting up a safety and security monitoring system to form the cornerstone of a Somali Early Warning and Response Network (EWARN). Beyond data collection and analysis, the OCVP will draw on the fields of conflict management — traditional and contemporary — to support practitioners and policy makers with guidance notes, an interactive discussion forum and training. By collecting, storing and sharing the knowledge acquired in the field of crime and violence reduction, it aims at becoming a centre of excellence for conflict and violence prevention.

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